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Introduction
"Enforcement of environmental laws is essential to attaining the international objective of
sustainable development to be effective; however, this enforcement must be routine, reasonably
resourced and predictable-an arduous challenge". - Nicholas A. Robinson
On April 20, 2010, through willful conduct or by gross negligence, British Petroleum
(BP) released several hundred thousands of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The
only remedy afforded to the victims was a scheme of civil liability under the “Polluter Pays”
principle.1 This principle asserts that private parties who generate the pollution should bear the
costs of clean up. BP’s failure to seal an exploratory well caused an explosion, sinking the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig. This unleashed a gusher of oil that lasted for months and coated
beaches with thick oil all along the Gulf Coast. The initial corporate response from BP was to
downplay the severity of the spill. This created significant misinformation that delayed effective
remedial measures from the American Government and BP.2
Immediately after the spill, public opinion and private parties began suggesting that the
nature of accident, and the special circumstances surrounding the gross dereliction of duty should
trigger criminal liability, in addition to civil penalties. Under public pressure and aggressive
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) campaigns, the United States Attorney General, Eric
Holder, charged BP officers aboard the drilling rig with manslaughter in connection with each of
the 11 men who perished. The charges alleged that the officials were negligent in supervising
tests to seal the well.3 Prosecutors also brought charges against BP’s former Vice President for
Exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, David Rainey. Mr. Rainey was prosecuted for obstruction of
Congress and making false statements in relation to the rate at which oil was spilling from the
well. BP agreed to a settlement of an estimated $4 billion over a five year period. This includes
$1.256 billion in criminal fines; it became one of the largest fines levied by the United States
against a corporation. The corporation also plead guilty to 11 felony counts related to the deaths
of BP employees, a felony related to obstruction of Congress and two misdemeanors.4
In the Deepwater Horizon spill, the crime was committed by an international corporation,
with business entities across the globe. The location of the incident was within the territories of
the United States. Of particular interest within the penalties brought forth against BP, are the
sanctions the corporation faced in U.S. courts. Public pressure and awareness were significant
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factors in the swift and heavy-handed response suffered by BP. A failure to respond by the U.S.
government would have placed the governing apparatuses in a position to lose confidence in its
ability to handle environmental crisis.
In similar situations involving international corporations, when a crime happens outside
of the company’s domiciliary nation state, the country in which the crime took place could be
reluctant to take legal action beyond civil penalties for economic or political reasons. In other
instances, a nation could find that it lacks sufficient jurisdiction to dispense damages. Domestic
governments may also be reluctant to defend the victims of other foreign nationals when their
rights collide with the economic interests of the home state.
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell), victims of crimes against humanity in
Nigeria alleged that Shell was complicit in the violent suppression of a nonviolent movement.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and asked whether lawsuits
concerning human rights could be brought under an Article III court, (a federal court within the
United States) when the abuses occurred outside the U.S. The Obama administration submitted
a brief arguing that courts should not allow the human rights claims to be heard in a federal
venue. The Department of Justice did not urge a blanket rule against all cases arising in foreign
countries, but it did argue that in a case like Kiobel, where the defendant is a foreign corporation
doing business in the U.S., and where the abuses were committed by government forces within
their own territory, the courts should deny the victims application by withholding jurisdiction.
In circumstances that closely parallel these facts, we see that national courts are unable or
unwilling to take criminal legal action for political or economic reasons. In the case at hand,
Shell had close relationship with the Nigerian military regime during the early 1990s. The
corporation provided monetary and logistical support to the Nigerian police.5 Frequently, crimes
against the environment result in financial remediation and little if any criminal liability.
Inflicting criminal liability upon international polluters such as BP or Shell would pose a set of
questions regarding legal doctrines and may leave many questions unanswered. Among the
inquiries to be addressed are those regarding applicable law, enforcement of that law, proper
jurisdiction and other economic or international comity concerns.
Vast arrays of issues arise when dealing with international corporations, or when the
effect of the action in question has a transnational geographical spread. BP for example, is an
international corporation. The company explores for oil in 30 countries. It markets Shell products
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in more than 80 nations and operates 22,400 gas stations around the world.6 A corporation with
this type of global reach and business brings forth challenges when attempting to address
criminal liability from conduct that was seen during the Deepwater Horizon incident. This
dissertation will attempt to address this issue.
The devastation of the BP oil spill continues to have an intense environmental impact and
will likely cause severe economic damage to several generations. The damage will include local
fisheries, and more importantly, the oceans upon which they survive.7 It is important to note that
financial remediation alone will not result in an effective deterrence of willful or negligent
environmental destruction.
The system of the Polluter Pays Principle demands that the harm done to the environment
be internalized by those that have caused the harm.8 This incentivizes corporations to factor in
the environment as an expense related to the cost of production. Therefore, if harming the
environment is profitable, since civil liability will be outweighed by profit, than harming the
environment is an expense worthwhile in the line of business. Only tough and aggressive
international criminalization of environmental crimes will be able to achieve the outcome future
generations of our world desire; a healthy and vibrant planet with vast eco-diversity.
As the argument is made for an international system to bring individuals to justice
through criminal statutes, it is critical to recognize the corporate system that serves as a back
drop to the current political and economic climate of liability. The twenty and twenty first
century has seen the creation and dawn of the global corporation. From the British East India
Company, to Exxon and Apple, global companies enjoy a special place within the framework of
the modern legal system.
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that corporations under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution are legal persons.9 Since this ruling, corporations within the U.S.
have been afforded legal protections that include the rights of selling and buying property,
transferring assets, and the ability to initiate and defend against law suits. In the early uses of
corporations, a large public service sentiment was tied closely to the establishment and missions
of American companies.10 States within the Union saw their municipalities, universities, guilds,
transportation systems and other public entities seek incorporation status.11 By the 1800s, there
were only 335 business corporations, which only amounted to a minuscule force in the American
economic landscape.12
3|

After the Supreme Court Case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,13 the public-service
aspect of corporations was in steep decline.14 From this period until the present, corporations
have become a major driver of the global economy and the immoral pollution of the natural
earth. In a recent case that solidified the bedrock upon which corporate law has been forming
over the centuries, Citizen United expressly granted corporations the right of speech in a split
decision.15 Under the U.S. Constitution, this would grant corporations a fundamental right that
cannot be infringed by the government unless it falls under the standard of strict scrutiny
(government has a necessary and compelling interest in infringing the right). This decision has
empowered corporations to continue transforming the American legal system by swaying
politicians and the public opinion into ways that align with their specific business interests. One
of the many assets that these companies have includes their ability to spend great sums of money
in specific areas of use. For instance, millions of dollars can be used for a public image blitz.
This recent decision opens up the flood gate of corporate money in U.S. political campaigns. The
end result is a weaker, less capable political system that can reign in the power of corporations
and their interests.
Recent congressional opposition to climate change legislation can be explained by the
corrupting influence of financial contributions in the form of campaign donations. These
donations do not discriminate by party and find root in politicians across the spectrum. Since
1990, total financial contributions have exceeded $239 million in direct campaign donations. 16
These donations are back by significant resources being channeled into Washington D.C. in the
form of lobbying funds to directly contact and convince legislators to act against the interest of
the environment. In turn, U.S. leaders legislate against environmental protections including
drilling, zoning, and regulations.
The argument for an international organization to reign in corporations is given additional
merit by the Citizen’s United Case. As will be discussed under current models such as the E.U.,
international organizations have the ability and willpower to check institutions, such as global
corporations, when domestic government are unable or unwilling to do so. Regardless of the
system that is used to bring criminal prosecution, the nexus between corporate personhood and
corporate responsibility is a key analysis that is discussed in this dissertation. Criminal liability
of corporate actors must in essence pierce the corporate veil to attach to directors and those
individuals who make decisions on behalf of their companies. Throughout the twentieth and
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twenty first centuries, countless actions have gone unpunished because of the blanket protection
that is often afforded to those acting under the corporate umbrella. With the proposed solution of
an international mechanism enforcing stern criminal laws against corporate polluters, the
environment as a whole will benefit from responsible conduct that will be the natural result of
such policies.
This dissertation puts forward the argument that violations of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should be penalized under a criminal body of
international law. The theories brought forth under this proposal stems from the field of green
criminology, which explores the criminal application of law in the context of environmental
protection. The concept of crimes against future generations can be the crux of new law that can
be used to criminalize conduct against the interest of future populations. In an effort to maintain
sustainable development which centers on environmental protection, economic protection and
social development, the principle of crimes against a generation can be built on the principle of
basic normative ethics that teach us to care for ourselves and others.
The underlining proposal is to establish a new sovereign international court that has the
ability to supersede domestic decisions and implement international principles for the execution
and enforcement of environmental protection. This dissertation argues that it is acknowledged
that domestic and international regulatory instruments are semi-effective. Currently, there exists
a plethora of legal instruments on environmental protection. Although bodies of law exist, as
well as courts to hear violations, the current ability to stop the very worst acts of environmental
destruction is nonexistent. Gross acts by corporations continue as they are largely unsanctioned.
To further elaborate on the gaps and solutions proposed, this dissertation shall delve into the
existing international and national legal responses to gross environmental damage and the
feasibility of a new area of criminal justice.
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Chapter 1

NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND THE FAILURE OF THE
CIVIL LIABILITY SCHEME TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
I.

Internalization of Pollution

A brief discussion of the internalization of pollution costs is helpful for conceptualizing
the problem with enforcing environmental protection worldwide. It also illustrates how the
current civil liability scheme does not discourage environmental pollution. Within the legal
infrastructures of all existing countries, governments have the authority to regulate private
citizens on the use of personal property; this is so, especially when such use is likely to cause
negative externalities. Regulation of pollution is justified because pollution imposes costs on
others. If the effects of pollution were solely suffered by a property owner, there would be less
justification for the imposition of environmental restrictions.17
The traditional way for polluters to internalize costs under a pollution control regime, is
for the regulators to charge the company for its emissions. Within the context of this method, this
treatise argues that civil penalties are not effective in in persuading the leaders of international
corporations to comply with environmental regulations. It is evident that criminal sanctions need
to be enforced by a regulatory scheme to incentivize corporate leaders to cease illegal activities
that result in damage to the environment. By carefully installing criminal sanctions, governments
could induce companies to reduce carbon emissions. Such penalties can increase the marginal
cost of production to then exceed the benefit of continued environmental destruction. In this
circumstance, the corporation and its officers would be liable for significantly more damages,
both civil and criminal. This would create a system designed to put pressure on the culprits of
environmental crimes by holding them fully accountable.18
A common way to understanding the problem of external and internal costs is by looking
through the prism of a single property owner’s interests. This is illustrated by the following: an
owner of a ballpark does not put a fence around his field, so balls sometimes break the windows
of the neighboring houses. The owner gains by omitting the fence; he saves a substantial sum of
money. Through this omission, the neighbors suffer a harm because the windshields on their
cars keep breaking. The neutral spectator can observe these circumstances and conclude that if
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the amount of money saved by not placing the fence is less than the amount of monetary damage
to the neighbors, a waste has occurred. This interplay of interests should be contemplated in the
aggregate; we decide whether there is waste by comparing the gains and losses of all the parties
involved. The challenge is to have the ballpark owner understand this, and curve selfish gains
for the benefit of the community.19
The argument follows that approaching the solution to the ballpark simulation is to
calculate all the interests at stake. Then we should ask, if there was a single owner, what would
that person do given the circumstances? The problem has its genesis because the owner of the
ballpark has separate interests from his neighbors. Therefore, he doesn’t take their losses as
seriously as he takes his own.20 This is analogous to the challenges faced by criminalizing
international environmental polluters. The environmental objective is that when corporations
pollute on a global scale, there will be criminal sanctions enforced on them by an international
governing body able to exercise jurisdiction such as the International Criminal Court.21
Specifically, corporate executives and employees will receive criminal sanctions, while corporate
profits suffer from both civil and criminal penalties.
When Corporations like BP and Chevron-Texaco engage in legal contest against
government agencies and private NGOs, they employ white-shoe law firms and substantial
financial resources to win high profile cases. The corporate philosophy is to safeguard the
interest of the shareholders, as a fatal liabilities verdict could force a company into bankruptcy,
or simply into a new corporate entity. The costs associated with challenging government
agencies and environmental activist organizations are internalized as the “cost of business.”
Therefore even if a corporation were found liable under civil penalties, those costs are accounted
for and no real net loss to the corporation has come to fruition.
Acts against the environment deny basic livelihood of inhabitants, virtually altering
health, shelter, water, education, nutrition and physical safety in a region.22 The avenues of
recourse afforded to these communities are few and the costs high. Court systems in certain
regions can be easily corrupted by the vast financial resources of large corporations, effectively
denying any available of justice for community groups. The costs of litigation can itself run into
the millions of dollars, disallowing poorer groups to engage in legal battles over years – all while
the corporate war chest flows with profits from the illegal acts that set the chain of events into
motion.
7|

Between 1971 and 1972, Texaco began unprecedented oil exploration as it extracted 1.5
billion barrels from Ecuador.23 Subsequently, the company has been responsible for the world’s
worst oil spill, even surpassing the Exxon Valdez disaster. Texaco spilled approximately 18.5
billion gallons of water that was contaminated by oil. The financial benefit to the corporation
was estimated to be $2 per barrel. To acquire this economic benefit, a criminal decision was
made to illegally dispose of toxic waste in manner that brought great harm to the citizens of
Ecuador. Tragically, the cost to the environment and the local communities is immeasurable.24
These dumping pits resulted in significant contamination of the groundwater and
ecosystem. Reports have estimated that thirty thousand people in this region do not have an
alternative water source. Therefore, the local population must use this water to drink, bathe, and
cook. Furthermore, a significant portion of the local citizenry is now afflicted with cancer.
Women in the region have experienced frequent miscarriages during pregnancy, and children are
now suffering from skin related diseases that arose from bathing in contaminated waters.25
The real tragedy was the legal outfall that came as a result of the illegal dumping. The
lack of a transnational body that could prosecute and hear the case resulted in a true miscarriage
of justice. While the initial arbitration award was for $40 billion, after years of costly tactics and
illegal bribes, the matter was settled for a mere $40 million. Texaco was able to place significant
legal pressure on its challengers by draining the financial capital of the community bringing suit.
This was done by filing motions to change venue, bribing judges, challenging every legal
question in court, and extending proceedings.26
Corporations benefit greatly from their lack of legal status on the international level. 27
This in turn is amplified by the lack of uniformity in the application of international law and
norms to corporate activities. “While a number of voluntary codes of conduct or sets of norms
applicable to corporations have been developed to fill this gap, such voluntary initiatives, lacking
effective measures to monitor and sanction non-compliance, have proved to be ineffective and
insufficient.”28 The violation of international law subverts the rule of law and the administration
of justice for the common person. The Texaco-Chevron case study exemplifies the ability of
corporations to use their status as floating international bodies to pick and choose their forums,
and then using any means necessary to undermine the opposition, including corruption.
Governments are also complicit as they accept bribes and welcome corporate profits into their
treasuries, effectively placing corporate and personal interest over the citizens of their states.
8|

II.

Polluter Pays Principle and Criminal Liability

Professor Hans Chr. Bugge, a Professor of Environmental Law at the University of Oslo,
has noted that there are four main policies of the Polluter Pays Principle. First, it economically
promotes efficiency. Second, it promotes justice. Third, there is a promotion of the
harmonization of international environmental policies. Finally, it specifically defines the proper
way to allocate pollution costs within a certain State. 29
Proponents argue that the Polluter Pays Principle is the optimal mechanism for two
prongs of enforcement, prevention and remediation. In fact, this principle plays a particularized
role in incentivizing the potential pollution by only holding the polluter civilly responsible for
environmental contamination. The avoidance of potential future pollution is not a priority under
this theory. This is because the undertaking of the preventive mechanisms is likely to exceed
remedial retributions.30 Furthermore, corporations understand that there is a possibility that they
may not be prosecuted at all for their infractions.
The failure of this system has caused a significant drain on developing countries.
Through legislative and judicial acts, many nations oblige themselves to pay victims of
environmental harm when the actors fail to compensate.31 In other words, states, local
governments, and the polluters themselves are joint and severally liable for damages from
environmental crimes.32 This has in turn virtually gutted the purpose of the Polluter Pays
Principle by turning it into the Government Pays Principle. This new method of operation shifts
the responsibility from the actor, to the State, and in turn to the general population (through taxes
and damages).33 This is seen in nations like India where the government is mandated to make
direct disbursements to victims while it is permitted to seek damages from the actor. This would
be an efficient method of paying and collecting, except the Indian government is unable to chase
after those who break the law while it suffers from administrative deficiencies.34 Rather than
deter corporate polluters, this has had the opposite effect in developing nations.
When deterrence has failed to be achieved, one can conclude that such policies will not
result in the furtherance of environmental protection. In the instance of environmental
protection, full deterrence cannot be effectively achieved without criminal liability. The
deterrence of a crime is the essential goal of criminal law. Legislators have sought to optimize
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the control of crime by devising a penalty-setting system that assigns criminal punishments in
accordance with the unlawful conduct of the perpetrator. The magnitude of the penalty should be
sufficient to deter a thinking individual from committing the specific crime.35 Commentators
writing for the American Criminal Law Review support the notion that criminal punishment is
the proper mechanism to effectively deter crimes against the environment. Those commentators
argue that criminal penalties are favorable when prosecution deters future infractions and brings
justice through remedial measures.36 The reasoning behind this follows closely to general notions
of crime, punishment and deterrence. For those who have the means to commit illegal acts, there
must be a reaction or response to discourage actors, and criminal prosecution is an optimal
solution.

III.

Corporate Environmental Crimes and Corporate Control

BP and Halliburton are allegedly responsible for committing environmental crimes by
polluting the Gulf of Mexico. These two companies are legal persons pursuant to controlling
U.S. law.37 A perversion of justice towards Corporations can be linked to the vast amounts of
financial resources at their disposal. This money is used increasingly to influence media
coverage and convince politicians of corporate friendly legislation. Regarding the Gulf of
Mexico, BP launched a comprehensive marketing and propaganda campaign to paint the
Deepwater Horizon incident as a natural disaster, rather than a criminally sparked tragedy. Due
to this effective use of finance, the media shifted the conversation from criminal negligence, to
the discussion of alternative clean energy and compensation for victims. BP effectively changed
the national dialogue to suit its corporate interests.
There is however significant outrage at the incident. Within the media, pundits called for
immediate cleanup efforts in the Gulf of Mexico. Coupled with these demands, calls rang out for
civil penalties to be brought against BP. In comparison to other disasters, these calls for penalties
are generally rare, but many argued that BP’s actions inflamed an already dire environmental
situation in the Gulf of Mexico. Experts and observers further called for the freezing of assets
held by BP in the U.S. A portion of the discourse even revolved around the banishment of BP’s
corporate presence within the territorial United States. Proponents for criminal prosecution were
few and sporadic. Nearly all media coverage on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig was either silent
or against criminal prosecution.38
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The media played a crucial role in changing the national dialogue from the criminal acts
of the corporate polluter to the need for alternative green energy and appropriate victim
compensation. There was a strategic downgrade in the importance placed on the impact of the
pollution on the environment. News networks continued to misdirect the blame onto innocent
parties while manufacturing controversial stories that diverted attention from BPs criminal
liability. Corporations with vast financial capabilities can easily divert the public focus by
utilizing media actors. BP and other companies are armed with the knowledge that the severity of
corporate punishment is linked to public opinion and anger.
The media is able to shape and frame the public’s perception and anticipated acceptance
of corporate criminal behavior. Historically, providers of news information have influenced the
public acceptance of illegal actions by corporate and individual environmental polluters. Those
who wish to influence the general population seek to do so through legacy media networks and
networks of mass self-communication (through broadband and other internet technologies).39 As
the general population now has access to “communicative bridges” such as YouTube and
Facebook, corporations have the same ability to use these forums of information dissemination.40
However, the corporate pocketbook allows a far greater reach than the average users. News
propaganda significantly contributes to a constant clouding of the unfortunate facts that
accompany environmental crimes.
Corporations invest substantial sums of money and time into preempting negative
information that could impact their interests. It is within their ability to commit assets for internet
surveillance in order to protect themselves from embarrassing revelations.41 Furthermore, this
edge in technology puts them steps ahead of damage control and public relation efforts. This
furthers the notion that international environmental criminal prosecution is necessary as domestic
governments can be challenged in attempting to prosecute and bring corporate violators to
justice, given their ability to effectively change public opinion.42
A prime example illustrating corporate influence can be found in commentator and radio
talk-show host Rush Limbaugh, who has an estimated three million daily listeners. His assertion
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident suggested that environmentalists probably
bombed the oil rig to stir up substantial support for the ‘cap and trade’ bill. He went on further to
state that the oil gushing out under the surface is as natural as ocean water. These comments are
part of a larger pattern of corporate support that reaches commercial airways through media
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actors like Rush Limbaugh. Unless the global community finds a systematic way to bring
corporations like BP to justice, media outlets will continue to support and relieve perpetrators of
environmental crimes. 43
Within the George W. Bush Administration experts have documented the effects of
lobbyists “with regard to the politicization of climate change.” The number of lobbyists in
Washington D.C. representing the oil and gas industry number at least 786. This is more
lobbyists than there are members of the U.S. Congress (535).44 These lobbyists, combined with
the systematic use of media as discussed supra, define a narrative that undermines the scientific
and true realities of climate change and the environmental impact of human conduct. “Politicians
tend to gain significant amounts of information through these sources. This includes the lobbyists
and news media outlets. The constant flow of information from one area of though slowly
changes the agenda of politicians themselves to believe the well-funded anti environmentalist
philosophy.45
When observing the contemporary American landscape, it is apparent that the Republic
Party has swayed further toward a group of corporate donors that have built the anti-environment
narrative. The current Republic party, protecting its corporate donors, effectively blocks any
attempt to mitigate the quickly changing environment. Unfortunately, the Republican Party also
leads efforts to repeal already existing legislation that protects the environment.46 In 2010, after
Republican victories in the mid-term elections, vote tallies showed that the house attempted to
repeal or undercut environmental laws more than two hundred times.47 This record of
Republican voting is illustrated in 2011 by their attempts to repeal an authority that was firmly
established in Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that allowed the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions. This vote was also coupled with another which had the sole
purpose of stating that climate change was not real.48
In recent years, the discourse within the Republican base has been shaped by a growing
faction called the Tea Party. This right wing populist movement has been accredited with
pushing extremist views into the political mainstream. This right wing faction has been
supported by activist billionaires such as the Koch Brothers who are industrialists that are
invested in hydrocarbons. These billionaires and media outlets that are funded by the right wing,
have given the tea party enough grassroots energy to surpass the power of long established
political institutions, effectively changing the American conversation on numerous issues.49
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Therefore, the conclusion is that one out of the two major American political parties has been
virtually high jacked by private interests who profit greatly from the subversion of interests in
line with the environmental cause. Mann and Ornstein have concluded recently through
academic study that the GOP is an American outlier that has facilitated extreme political thought
that counters progress in Washington.50
BP serves as a shining example of corporate influence in Washington D.C. Over time, the
corporation has aggressively lobbied the federal government on regulation and policy,
specifically around the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. This coupled with a heavy marketing
campaign touching on BPs efforts in the cleanup have swayed decision makers in Washington.
To see other corporations work similarly with this modus operandi in the U.S. or elsewhere, we
need go no further than Texaco-Chevron in Equador as discussed supra.
Corporations are able to influence policy making decisions that aim to regulate them in a
rapidly globalizing economy. Illustrative of this is the Minerals Management Service’s decision
to expressly grant BP’s lease at the Deepwater Horizon a “categorical exclusion” from the
National Environmental Policy Act in 2009. Such exclusion came through hard fought
negotiations and persuasion through lobbyists in Washington employed by BP. Again,
corporations who have large sums of money to spend can not only shift the national conversation
from crimes the they have committed, but they can also influence regulation to allow greater
ability to create profits and harm the environment. A decision to categorically exclude BP from
the National Environmental Policy Act of 2009 is an example of a failure to effectively regulate
international corporations by a national government.
A recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision allows corporations the absolute right to
uninhibited contributions to political candidates. This has served only to embolden corporate
mingling in political affairs. In this ruling, the Court invalidated laws and regulations that
separated significant corporate influence from public elections by allowing an unlimited amount
of private money to enter political action committees.51 This decision has opened up the flood
gates. An influx of special interest money in American politics has begun to rapidly undercut the
integrity of its elected institutions. The Republic, founded upon representation of the American
people, now favors representation of private interests with substantial sums of money.
In light recent public attention to the environment and global warming, corporations
around the world have begun to alter their image to reflect environmental responsibility. It is a
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fact that corporations do not exist for the welfare of people, or the planet. Rather, the corporate
goal is to make as much profit as possible for the interested shareholders. It then comes as no
surprise that environmental damage is not a significant consideration when corporations are
planning their business model. The same can be said for calculating potential costs and profits
when weighting environmental safety. The free capitalist market inherently views the
environment as a collateral cost to production in light of the financial burden caused by
following the rules, and therefore, corporations will only act to alter their image rather than
significantly change their practice of conservation.52
The consequences are apparent as a result of the influence of corporations in the media
and political institutions. The corruptive nature of these powers has politicians serving as willing
accomplices in an agenda that serves private corporate interests. The urge to drill, regardless of
the social and economic consequences, represents a mindset at odds with sustainable
development.53 In 2008, the John McCain/Sarah Palin ticket used the slogan “Drill Baby Drill.”
The apparent goal of the slogan was to support the idea of attaining self-sufficiency in energy
production, while decreasing the dependence on foreign oil. This is a prime example of how a
policy fits perfectly within the interest of certain oil companies that spend billions to influence
Washington. This relationship between corporate money and political action is a fact that should
not be ignored and left unquestioned. As long as Corporations have significant support in
political circles, they will continue to evade liability and undermine the interests of citizens.54
Political corruption is another form of pervasive corporate conduct that continues to
undermine the ability of domestic governments to combat illegal action. In 2001, a former
employee of BAE systems informed British authorities that an arms dealer was bribing Saudi
officials to win lucrative arms contracts.55 When the Saudi Government threatened the United
Kingdom with the loss of a $10 billion arms contract, and severing of intelligence cooperation,
the U.K. dropped the investigation.56 It was soon picked up by the United States and what was
uncovered was the largest corporate corruption scheme in history.57 BAE was forced to pay a
$400 million fine to the U.S. What the BAE incident represents is the ability of corporations to
bribe politicians throughout the world. With the environment, we see corporate actors bribing
local officials to dump toxic wastes and obtain illegal permits.
Economic globalization has given tremendous power to corporations. This has limited the
right of self-determination for local communities. This is done when corporations impose
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restraints on the government’s ability to intervene or properly utilize its authority to regulate a
sector of commerce. With the emergence of a global economy, the difficulty in implementing
environmental law stems from jurisdictional and choice of laws issues. Many countries and
numerous organizations, both domestic and international, have been debating this problem for
years. With the continued growth of economies all over the world, environmental protection has
been pushed to the forefront of international affairs.58 The lack of sufficient solutions for this
emerging problem has caused a gradual and increasing deterioration of the environment.
Furthermore, it has created a dire set of circumstances for human rights as forests, farms and
oceans deteriorate. In particular, the unregulated and under regulated extraction of natural
resources, exploitation of hydrocarbons and open pit mining have caused severe detrimental
effect on biodiversity, contamination to the land, water and air.
National governments have been constrained from taking actions by the political power
marshaled by influential corporations. As a result, corporations have tried to suppress the rights
of native communities in many regions that have tried to challenge the harmful actions of these
companies; companies who are only driven to maximize profits while causing significant harm
to the environment. The tactics used by corporations in the suppression of public opinion and
outrage include media deception, corruption of the judicial/political process, and the push to
criminalize public dissent.
Globalization has been driven by free trade agreements. These agreements also play an
integral part in providing corporations free reign to secure their interests above the welfare of
people and the environment. For example, such covenants also allow companies the ability to
utilize legal safe havens, free of certain liabilities that are not enjoyed by local businesses.
Unfortunately, the result in the aggregate is the silencing of opposing voices, which ultimately
leads to adverse effects on human rights matters in health, food, and security. It also interferes
with any substantial long-term development of countries participating in the global economy.59
The insistence for a system that promotes the public domain and democratic control over
resources would be wholly inconsistent with the principles of free market capitalism. At a
minimum, what is needed is effective governmental oversight and proper regulation that can
protect the environment from corporate polluters. An effective regime of governance can be
achieved by establishing enforceable laws that protect the environment and legal mechanisms
that aim to repair the damage done by the ills of capitalist production. Another avenue of
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achieving this goal is to have states ally with each other by agreeing to international
environmental treaties. This would require meaningful participation in assuring the prosecution
and oversight required for environmental protection. These are the straightforward solutions to
secure environmental preservation. To do this, we must shift the corporate analysis from a cost
cutting-profit driven mentality, to process that involves weighing harm to the environment.
Environmental preservation that is not instantly driven by profits can still achieve a long
term goal of profit maximization while maintaining a healthy environment. For example, a rule
restricting property uses may limit the economic potential of a parcel of property, but by
supplying the entire community with improved environmental quality, the rule allows an owner
to enjoy the benefit of a clean environment. In the long run, real property may be more valuable
if they exist in a clean community, rather than one that has been degraded.60
The reasons for committing corporate environmental crimes are varied. And thus, ways
to fight these crimes differentiate. A crime may occur because there is a presence of ignorance
regarding environmental obligations, negligence or deliberate and intentional illegal acts. In the
case of Deepwater Horizon, and many other environmental crimes, a decision was made by
company employees in full knowledge that the act(s) were illegal and would result in
environmental harm. It is ineffective however to attempt to deter international crimes with pure
national laws because enforcement of domestic law can only achieve a limited remedy against
powerful perpetrators.61
The transnational element is significant for some particular attacks on the environment. It
seems that a substantial amount of environmental harm caused in the modern economy is not
done so by nation states. Since the international link is generally omitted in most environmental
calamities, the primary jurisdiction of the country where the offense has occurred is exercised
over penalties. It is these local laws that are enforced against polluters. The issue with this
current mode of regulating environmental harms is that the state with jurisdiction, implementing
domestic sovereignty, “greatly limits the ability of [other] states to arrest and prosecute those
responsible.”62

IV.
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The International Community and Environmental Crimes

In 1987, Professor Nicholas A. Robinson stated it was “time to do something because we
had already launched irreparable change to the environment. . . . But the urgent pace of
international development is slow.”63 Over the past four decades however, general awareness for
environmental issues has been on the rise. With the emergence of green energy, and a
willingness of countries to further cooperate with their international partners to stave
environmental crime and catastrophe, concrete progress has been measurable and significant.
However, the destruction and degradation of the environment is exceeding the international
response in speed and ferocity.
Specifically in the current period of the Anthorpocene Epoch’s Great Acceleration,
increasing disruptions to human society are inevitable. The warming of the ice caps in
Greenland, and new reports of Antarctic melting will flood coastal cities and cause a crisis of
mass migration.64 One need look no further than Hurricane Katrina and the emergency alarmed
by nation states such the Maldives that are being threatened with absolute submergence within
the next few generations. Al l though the task of changeing the current momentum is
astronomical, crimes of unregulated and unchecked pollution adds to the oncoming crisis of
climate change.65
When looking at existing agreements, a lack of speed in solving issues of environmental
degradation is apparent. For instance, in the Kyoto negotiations, the premise of the accord was
based on the assumption that nations can address climate slowly. When stepping back and
looking at the totality of accomplishments between the various international covenants, one is
hard pressed to find significant headway in reversing global environmental damage between the
Stockholm Convention and the Copenhagen Accord.
In light of the current landscape of international progress, the importance of criminal
sanctions and injunctive measures to deter crime are extremely important. Crimes equal in their
broad effects and deliberate destruction of environmental habitats during war are covered by the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Specifically, the field of law covers forced
migrations of civilians due to environmental damage.66 For many years the international
community has sought to find a legal formula that is suitable for redress regarding international
crimes against the environment. This need is urgent in light of the obvious incompetence of
national forums to effectively provide such capabilities. Environmental activists have begun to
call the destruction of ecosystems crimes against peace and the welfare of nations. Such a
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classification would place these crimes at the same level of genocide and crimes against
humanity. If the UN adopts "ecocide" as a fifth "crime against humanity,” then certain cases of
egregious misconduct could be adjudicated at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This legal
recognition would create sufficient precedent to supply support for existing environmental
mechanisms charged with protecting community interests.
There is an illuminating possibility that international crimes against the environment may
one day fit into the jurisdiction of the ICC. This may become a reality because domestic laws are
seen as insufficient in handling the most egregious transnational crimes. Domestically, these
types of offenses generally beget civil penalties from relevant government agencies.
Unfortunately, these laws are generally insufficient to penalize perpetrators. The current
classification of environmental destruction is not a crime against humanity under the
contemporary international legal structure. This is because these types of crimes do not
systemically attack a specific civilian population, although the results can be very similar.
The severity of the impact on biodiversity and the degradation of environmental health
when considering these acts give sufficient ground to consider the criminality of the conduct on
an international scale. Uncontrolled pollution has the ability to destroy entire eco-systems and
therefore reduce bio-diversity within a region. Just as important, the health of locals where the
pollution takes place can be severely harmed as is seen in South America with American oil
companies. To categorize such conduct as world-wide crimes would be appropriate for an
international community embracing globalization.67
Opponents of international environmental laws have worked tirelessly to stymie any
substantial measures to advance legislation in an effort to protect communities. Many arguments
have been put forward through lobbyist, governments and scholars to defeat any attempt to
create a unified system of criminalization of the most serious crimes. For instance, an argument
was made that it is very difficult to establish the causation element of why the act occurred, let
alone whether it was deliberate or not. Opponents further state that there is great difficulty in
linking harm to specific corporations given the diversity of actors who commit crimes and a lack
of investigatory resources. This is why the degree or extent of culpability is not weighed in most
environmental crimes on an international scale. Most of these crimes are designated as strict
liability offenses; accordingly civil fines are the only proper remedy for these violations.68
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The pertinent question is whether BP can be prosecuted in a criminal forum. Under
current controlling U.S. laws, it can be a felony to pollute the waterways, but a court cannot
sentence a corporation to prison. When implementing a criminal system internationally, fear of
incarceration is necessary to insure corporate obedience. Criminal liability is ultimately enforced
by such penalties. However, under current law, a company can only be court ordered to pay civil
fines, and there is no possibility of criminally convicting the executives of the condemned
corporation.69
Ultimately, BP may be civilly responsible for its environmental crimes and may pay fines
in the billions of dollars. The world however, will not see the controlling executives serve prison
time, despite the known fact that the occurrence in the Gulf of Mexico was a criminal act.
Opponents of executive criminal liability assert that a balancing test between government interest
and the burden of prosecuting such crimes are unfavorable for a criminal liability regime. The
argument rests on the premise that the proof necessary to show an executive had a direct
involvement and was criminally negligent is a significant prosecutorial burden, and that being an
executive of a corporation should not expose that person to criminal liability.70The fact is that the
cost of prosecution is worthwhile when considering the protected interest and the effect of
deterrence on the offending officers and others who are similarly situated.
There is evidence that much environmental harm is executed in a deliberate fashion, with
full knowledge of the crime. There is also a weighing of beneficial interests upon which crimes
are committed. Frequently, the purpose behind corporations committing intentional crimes rests
on the corporation’s interest in seeking an inexpensive way of performing their business, even if
substantial fines would be levied in the future. The polluting corporation is generally fully
conscious that its actions are illegal and the decision to take such conduct was made. This is
because it was the most economically effective way of protecting the best interests of the
company, even with the element of illegality attached to such action.71

V.

Criminal Deterrence of Environmental Crimes

Criminal prosecution will have the effect of shifting the status quo of current corporate
business. On the national and international levels, corporate officers will assess not only the
profit risk and loss statements when considering committing a crime against the environment, but
their own freedom and risk of incarceration and financial penalties. Although the reality of such
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a system is apparent, developing mechanisms to implement them are challenging given the vast
resources of special interests.
For example, in 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission created general
sentencing guidelines.72 The purpose behind this act was to deter criminals, by enforcing
environmental statutes that were already in the books, through stricter penalties. However, the
corporate involvement in the actual process of recommending, developing, and executing the
guidelines were borderline corrupt. These guidelines were flexible and broad enough to fit
corporate interests, while still giving the public the perception that stricter laws and regulations
are in place. This in essence is comparable to state legislators asking felons for advice on
drafting state criminal law.
The schematic change this dissertation is arguing for is that international polluters would
be liable under international criminal prosecution, and not just civil fines. Criminal liability
would have an effect on the actions of transnational corporation. The reason such measures need
to be taken are evident in characteristic of companies to put corporate welfare above the global
environment, and in doing so causing widespread damage to the environment.73 The creation of
the ICC contributed substantially to decreasing the crime of genocide. Political leaders noticed
that the international community was actively voicing their strict stance on the crime of
genocide. In 2002, the ICC was establish under political pressure and the need to prosecute war
criminals.
The establishment of the ICC was a revolutionary and ground breaking step forward for
international cooperation in the pursuit of justice against criminal actors. “It serves both as a
practical and symbolic articulation of the scheme (referring to the Kantian model of the
international community) and a powerful push to its full realization.”74 Although the court has
short comings and successes, scholars have designated the two faces of the court to be a
“watchdog court” and a world “security court.”75 It is important to note that this institution is not
just a court system, but an entire criminal justice system with a prosecutor, defense unit and
judges (unfortunately it still lacks its own enforcement agency or prison).76 It does however work
with the hallmarks of any criminal court, implementing warrants, indictments and judgments that
are to be followed by nation states.77 It is this court system that could accept a new mandate of
including environmental crimes within its jurisdiction to serve the community of nations.
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What makes the ICC an attractive option as a mechanism of prosecution is its role as a
United Nations “security court.” Fletcher and Ohlin make the argument that the U.N. Security
Council refers matters to the ICC under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The intention is that the
Court use its power as a U.N. institution to restore international peace and security when there is
a conflict between parties.78 In essence, the Court serves as an impartial body seeking only to
find solutions to complicated issues on the global stage. To allow the ICC to increase its
jurisdiction over environmental matters however, there must be a concord to expand its purview
and many fundamental structural changes.
The ICC is structured to adjudicate cases for four crimes against the peace: crimes of
aggression, crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.79 The benefits of adding ecocide
to the list of jurisdictionally proper crimes pursuant to the Rome Statute would provide more
authority for the international community to prosecute individual corporate executives in serious
violations of environmental protection schemes. This would cause many parties to revisit current
practices. For instance, extractive mining may all together cease or be limited. Chemicals that
leak into bodies of water that cause harm to the established ecosystem would become illegal and
their use obsolete. All of these events would greatly further the cause of environmentalism.
It is clear that ecocide has the same result in certain situations as genocide and war
crimes. It is misleading to downgrade the seriousness of ecocide. This crime itself “is the
heedless or deliberate destruction of the natural environment through various human activities
that endanger human life. It is the extreme environmental degradation of the vital areas needed
for the survival of indigenous communities.”80 The peaceful enjoyment of land by populations
that inhabit them are severely affected at the loss of bio-diversity. Eventually, environmental
crimes that rise to the rank of ecocide cause wide spread displacement of communities. They are
often categorized under the term “environmental refugees.” These individuals are forced to
migrate when they are left little to no choice to remain in their homes.
The commission of ecocide is indeed the very antithesis of life, resulting in the depletion
of natural resources and poverty. This in turn causes war and facilitates crimes against humanity
and peace. As such, it could be regarded as a crime against the peace, and the self-interested
perpetrators should be subject to international prosecution. Nations will have to engage in
competition over resources such as water, oil and minerals with historic consistency. Recently,
Sir David King of the United Kingdom predicted a “resource wars” that would engulf the
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coming century. The United Nations has publicly accepted the premise of his argument and has
called for caution and action to avert such a crisis.81

VI.

International Jurisdiction of Environmental Crimes

This dissertation argues for the creations of an international legal system combined of
both national courts and one international court specializing in environmental crimes.
Alternatively it proposes that the International Criminal Court’s purview should encompass
universal jurisdiction over conduct, not already within the ICC’s Rome Statute, that affects
future generations.82 Crimes against future generations by those parties who place profits over
their moral duty to others are an international problem, and it heeds the call for global action that
will canonize an international legal binding framework.83
The crime of Ecocide contains the necessary elements that qualify it to be under the
sharpest scrutiny with the international community, similar to other crimes against peace.84 This
call to protect the interests of environmental integrity must be answered immediately. A failure
to do so will inevitably leave the human race vulnerable and unprepared to take on some of the
most challenging issues of the 21st century.
It is clear that future generations are disadvantaged because of harmful actions that
neglect the interests of this class. This disregard for the future finds its roots in the consistent
defense of the status quo of the current socio-economic and political structure. What makes this
group so vulnerable is their inability to bargain for proper treatment. The unfortunate result will
mean future generations are inevitably destined to inherit a poor quality of life in consequence of
current environmental destruction. This degraded inheritance poses severe consequences for the
sustainability of life. Human health and security are automatically threatened when natural
resources are depleted. Crimes against the environment coupled with the changing climate will
inevitably result in catastrophe with famine, exodus, and loss of life.85
This dissertation makes the argument for an international legislative scheme that outlines
defined offenses. These laws would be universal protocols that would serve the international
community by creating a proper mechanism to deter and punish potential perpetrators from
committing crimes against the environment.86 Attached to these laws would be a schedule of
fines and incarceration recommendations for the illegal shipments of waste, discharge of
dangerous substances, and the unlawful possession of protected wild life. These categories would
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be structured with the purpose of eliminating conduct causing significant deterioration to the
environment in an effort to protect habitats and the general health of the planet. Such legislation
would curb environmental disasters like the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the chemical
catastrophe in the Ivory Coast, where 500 metric tons of toxic waste were released from a Dutch
cargo vessel.87

VII.

International Law and International Environmental Crimes

The September 11th attacks (9/11) in the United States gave rise to extreme patriotic
feelings within the country and brought together a coalition of international actors ready to
commit to an immediate response. In the U.S, Political will increased for war, and the nation
came together to make decisions, even though contemporary scholars still judge the wisdom of
those choices. 9/11 serves as an example of how the world can unite to create agreements (in this
case, conventions against terrorism) when an incident occurs that shocks the conscience.
The U.N. Convention against Illicit Drugs is another example of how such cooperation
was boosted by an existing problem; it represents the will and ambition of politicians to make a
global effort against criminal organizations that feed from the financial benefits of producing and
running narcotics. This agreement made strides in the free flow of information between nations
to regulate and combat the flow of drugs across borders. It created the most advanced and
effective international criminal law yet seen.88 Unfortunately, international enthusiasm is not the
same when it comes to combating international environmental crimes. When discussing recent
environmental catastrophes, it is important to capitalize on current and ongoing disasters that
affect the global commons, in order to establish a sound system of law to protect the
environment and achieve sustainable development.
The recent disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, the hazardous waste incident in the Ivory
Coast, and other notorious environmental disasters show how environmental crimes can have a
devastating effect on people and the environment. These tragedies continue to reinforce the need
for more stringent measures to ensure a sustainable future.
There have been a wide range of laws that have been adopted by several nations and
international bodies. These legislations have been created to adjudicate war crime and prosecute
human rights violators. Although these bodies of law and their enforcement mechanisms have
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strengthened over time, environmental law that is safeguarded by criminal sanctions for
violators, continues to be evaded because of jurisdictional issues and lack of political will. The
boundaries and circumstances of environmental crimes do not have an international legal
definition.
In the international forum, categorizing legal and illegal activities can become a difficult
legal analysis. There is debate that genocide is an illegal action. The elements of genocide,
including the extermination of a specific human population, does not closely mirror any conduct
that could be justifiable. Unlike genocide, determining whether an environmental crime has
occurred in the international forum is challenging. In order to guide the discourse, this
dissertation argues that an international agency, such as the ICC, is the correct body to adjudicate
these issues. Going further than the ICC, a proposal is set forth establishing a new legal system
that would establish a new court on the international level. A prolonged delay in creating the
required infrastructure to protect our environment will continue to allow transnational
corporations to go unpunished for their crimes.89
The model to be implemented will provide provisions for criminal liability and direct
agency oversight. Jurisdiction will be exercised by the international body when the most serious
of environmental crimes occur; in the alternative, when states are unable or unwilling to
prosecute under a domestic court of competency. The notion of sovereign rights will surely
provide challenges to this model of prosecution, but using existing examples of international
cooperation will allow a feasible blueprint to be articulated. This approach will encourage states
to make substantial changes to their existing body of law in this area. Such changes of law are
necessary if individual states wish to adjudicate domestic matters of environmental concerns.
The proposed model that will facilitate international jurisdiction over crimes against the
environment will have several fundamental challenges. These challenges stem from the nature of
international law which is constantly changing through new agreements and can sometimes be
difficult to enforce. Furthermore, environmental harm can many times be a boon to local
economies. Therefore, local politicians and citizens seek to continue supporting the degradation
of their lands in order to reap immediate benefits. This causes an issue with sovereignty and the
ability to allow individual states to determine their own course of action.
There are three fundamental reasons that undercut absolute authority.90 First, every
sovereign nation is not legally required to apply a sentence ordered by the courts of any other
24 |

country against a natural or a legal person. Second, there is no international agency that has
executive global international police duty, similar to the missions created under Chapter 7 on the
United Nations Charter.91 Finally, there is a lack of an international or regional body that may
properly exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign nation. The only applicable exception to this is
the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg. This court can properly assert its power to enforce
compliance with standing European Community environmental laws. However, jurisdiction fails
outside the euro-zone. Since 1993, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has formed an ad hoc
Environmental Chamber consisting of seven judges handling petitions lodged by individual
States. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is extremely limited due in major part to the court’s inability to
bind states who reserve the authority to follow or refuse compliance with court orders. Further
limitations can be traced to the ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction for claims that arise from individuals
and corporations.92
An international body that has the characteristics to adjudicate international
environmental crimes is both possible and necessary. Legal experts and commentators have
produced various proposals that are forging a direction forward. For example, the United
Nations has made a recommendation termed the “Swiss Initiative.” This called for the formation
International Court on Human Rights with the inherit ability to adjudicate matters arising from
multinationals. Additional proposals have been introduced that recommend that the ICC have
competent jurisdiction over legal persons such as corporations. Both of these examples serve as
prime examples of how challenges to create a universal body for environmental regulation can be
overcome.

VIII. Ecocide as an International Crime
The term ecocide is a legal doctrine upon which parties can be criminally convicted for
activities that harm the ecosystem, land, and humans in a given location. The common definition
is “the extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether
by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the
inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished.”93 In recent years, international
lawyers and activists have reviewed their calls for the creation of a body of law that incorporates
ecocide into current legal systems and international agreements.94 Efforts have centered around
making ecocide “the fifth International Crime against Peace.”95
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The crucial establishment of ecocide as an international form of criminal conduct would
bring it under the purview of the ICC and other international courts that adjudicate corporate
culpability. This is especially the case when national governments are unwilling or unable to take
proper judicial actions to enforce and redress environmental crimes. A recommended way to
produce this outcome is to have ecocide be labeled under provisions of international legal norms,
such as a fifth crime against the peace.
When observing criminal activity that transcends national borders, a significant
component to the development of a legislative scheme is recognizing the failure of both bilateral
and unilateral enforcement measures. No government possesses sufficient resources to police
every crime that occurs in the transnational forum. Even rarer are countries willing to unilaterally
pursue a criminal when doing so would involve a blatant affront to another nation’s sovereignty.
International norms develop in order to eliminate the potential havens from which criminals can
flee. That is the very substance of an international criminal norm.96
Genocide, a crime that is subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC is a result of criminal
intent, planning and execution. Ecocide however, is the result of greed and aggravated
negligence. This is coupled with an indifference to human life, allows this crime be criminalized
in the same legal processes that international humanitarian law applies to armed conflict.
Genocide is a horrific policy of extermination that is intentionally planned by political and
military leaders to destroy large groups of people. The unnecessary exploitation of resources and
ecological degradation will eventually force families from their homes by literally destroying
their surrounding environment. This unfortunate result is the probable and expected consequence
to environmental destruction; the end result frighteningly parallels planned extermination.97
The ICC seems to be the appropriate forum through which criminal prosecution and
adjudication can be effectuated. The court is empowered with identifying individual actors who
possess criminal mens rea. Corporations repeatedly act with the intent of only earning large
profits and thoroughly disregarding provisions that were created to prevent human and
environmental disaster. Such disasters lead to mass exodus, with people being forced to abandon
their homes and become refugees. The same result can be found under the reign of Saddam
Hussein when he utilized chemical weapons. Evidence has shown that wars over resources occur
directly as a result of contamination and the rights to limited natural resources.
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Many domestic legal systems continue to shirk their duty by protecting criminal
polluters. This is another reason why the ICC would make a proper forum through which
environmental crimes can be prosecuted. Most nations already have controlling law to
criminalize polluters, but these crimes must be linked to a mass killing of a group of people.
When seeking efficiency and effectiveness, what is required is both national and international
courts that prosecute environmental crimes.98

IX.

Domestic Legal Failures and Need for International Jurisdiction

Despite the current establishment of national or regional forums, these mechanisms are
extremely limited because many governments do not have the will and resources to properly
monitor environmental impacts. What is needed is a firm coalition for international monitoring
and the enforcement of criminal provisions. Such laws can be wholly distinct from the ICC or
properly under its competent jurisdiction. This system would be designed to address domestic
governmental failure in reporting and effectively responding to environmental harms.99
At its backbone, an international mechanism for monitoring criminal provisions would
mirror some of the existing adjudicative tribunals in several nations. In the United States, the
federal appellate courts serve as “circuit courts” encompass smaller “district courts.” At the apex
is the “supreme court” which serves as the court of last resort. Within the appellate system,
certain courts have specific subject-matter jurisdiction that include drugs, domestic violence, tax,
bankruptcy, and others. These areas can be seen as specialized topics assigned to a specific body
within an already established judicial body. Other countries such as Sweden have established a
“water court” focusing on water rights issues. Denmark also has created a “nature protection
board” focused on the conservation of the environment.
Environmental courts and tribunals have been arising more frequently in the 1970s after
the emergence of the environmental movement. Currently, in only 35 nations, there exists some
form of environmental court or tribunal.100 In each of these courts, certain strengths and
weakness can be attributed to local legal culture and socio-economic circumstances. However,
certain benefits arise from all of these systems, such as consistency in the application of law,
expertise of judicial professionals in the environmental field, and the reduced costs of
environmental damage. Furthermore, the general benefits to the non-environmental legal system
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can be seen by the relief in backlog as specialized environmental courts handle environment
based cases efficiently.
Specifically within the United States there is lacking any national environmental court.
National tribunals do exist however with in the executive branch to perform functions within the
EPA. However, state courts for the environment do exist. The Vermont Environmental Court
was the first U.S. court to specialize in the environment. “It hears appeals from state land use
permit decisions (Act 250), from state environmental permits and other decisions of the Agency
of Natural Resources, and from municipal land use zoning and planning decisions. The Court
also hears municipal land use enforcement cases, and enforcement actions brought by the
Agency of Natural Resources and Natural Resources Board. Almost all cases are heard de novo,
with an evidentiary trial, and are scheduled for a courtroom in the county in which the case
arises.”101 Its enforcement functions center on civil penalties allowed by statute. The court itself
has the authority to set civil penalties by recapturing economic benefits or instituting fines under
statute.102 This in turn makes it economically challenging for parties to break environmental law.
This “sanctioning” is the main form of deterrence.
The goal that the international community should strive for would be one that includes an
international policing mechanism for state and corporate compliance, which is controlled by
international environmental law – a step above the domestic systems just discussed. Setting aside
the prospects that the ICC may be granted jurisdiction, attention must be brought to the urgent
need for national courts and the international community to effectively adjudicate environmental
crimes. This would undoubtedly protect and insure that domestic legal actions are enforced
against polluters.
What should now be undertaken is a comprehensive international codification of
environmental laws that guarantee individual states are responsible in helping prevent and
properly punish environmental criminals. In light of the fact that domestic courts have a binding
mechanism that punishes violators is an option for the international legal community to strongly
consider. As stated by Professor Nicholas Robinson in his address in Johannesburg South Africa,
nations cannot obtain sustainable development without regional cooperation of judicial
institutions who systematically apply fundamental environmental principles103 This uniform
application of the law, under the assistance of criminal sanctions provides the international
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community the ability to effectively and systematically tackle aggressors against the
environment.
After years of continued failure in dealing with environmental crimes through domestic
systems a time for change has come. Considering the gravity of the crimes and their effects on
human life, the tremendous power of the offending transnational corporation to corrupt officials
and silence dissenting communities has crossed an event horizon. The academic community
must now provide a solution. It has become apparent that voluntary codes of conduct, selfregulation and national courts have failed to tackle human rights and environmental abuses of
transnational corporations. Ultimately, calls for the current system of broken enforcement to be
replaced by a binding international code are well founded. This would limit the powers and
influence of transnational corporations, and standardize their responsibilities and obligations,
which they have successfully resisted over time.104
This fundamental change starts by identifying international environmental crimes which
cause systematic violations of human rights. We must develop effective regulations and control
irresponsible corporations by aiming to cure the imbalance created by the new current realities.
This can be accomplished by establishing a system where corporations are accountable, do not
hold more power than nation states, and can no longer define for themselves responsibilities and
regulations. There must be a reversion of theory upon which profits are prioritized over the
wellbeing of people and nature. This can be achieved by forcing international companies to
submit to an international code, which would define the limits of corporations’ legal
responsibilities for the consequences of their activities. This binding legal framework must have
the ability to prosecute, adjudicate and enforce decisions. The content of these laws should be the
result of a synthesis of the ad hoc codes of the ILO, the OECD and the proposals discussed at the
UN in the 1970s.105
There is a challenge in pinning down the responsible party when the actor is a
corporation. Identifying a certain company as the polluter requires filtering through a network of
corporations. The same issues arise when attempting to pierce the corporate veil, as it can be
difficult understanding and finding the truly responsible parties, especially when corporations are
layered in parent and sibling companies.106
Substantive evidence has produced ample facts that illustrate international corporations
are a source of environmental crimes on the global stage. Illuminated by this, economic and
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environmental crimes carried out by these companies should be properly identified as “crimes
against humanity.”107 A new legal framework argued for in this dissertation will propose the
formation of an international environmental tribunal that can properly adjudicate claims against
transnational companies. This body would be responsible for defending the basic rights of people
affected by criminal environmental activities.108
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Chapter 2

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL LAW
“Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for presentation and future generations.” –
1972 Stockholm Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment
The Stockholm Declaration sought to set principles in the field of environmental law.
Following closely in its footsteps, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
reiterated in its Principle 1, “Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”109
These declarations of principles were eventually codified in the 1998 Aarhus Convention. This
agreement affords new rights that allow for public engagement in the process of environmental
protection decision-making. The convention directs signatory states to create procedural rules
and legislation to enact laws to achieve the goals of the agreement. These goals – the right to
information, right to public participation, and right to the access of justice for environmental
protection, create the “three pillars” of environmental justice behind the agreement.
This agreement has helped usher the rise of “third generation” rights that are sometimes
in contradiction to long settled common law surrounding economic development, property rights,
and employment arrangements.110 There is a struggle with governments on how to balance these
conflicts between environmental protection and development; however as scholars continue to
focus on the commons, more just legislation can be promulgated through the international
community.111

I.

The Transboundary Nature of Environmental Damage

“The urgent need for refining and observing environmental rules becomes increasingly
evident as the trends in environmental degradation deteriorate worldwide.” 112 As massive super
storms pummel unsuspecting regions, and droughts and fires ravage communities, it has been
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more evident now than ever the consequences of human consumption on our world. For example
in 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused massive devastation in Central America. Death and destruction
were left in its wake as the damage was multiplied the excessive foresting that failed to capture
water and hold soil steady.113 Also worthy of note is the excessive melting of the ice caps in
Greenland, which is exacerbated by black ice that results from forest fires and carbon emissions.
The reality is clear that our planet is vulnerable to change and human conduct.
When considering the consequences of environmental harm and its international effects,
we must observe the dire need to install criminal sanctions. A failure to do so will result in
irreparable damage to our communities. These crimes will continue to impact the life support
system that nature has developed over millions of years. The imperative to create these
mechanisms has never been stronger.
Currently, criminal conduct that is not within the jurisdiction of a national court and is
not covered by competent international jurisdiction is allowed to simply go unpunished. Without
a court to adjudicate matters, a prosecutorial body is unable to punish perpetrators. This failed
system provides criminals an avenue to enrich themselves at the expense of the others and to the
detriment of the global community. In addition to the current state of affairs, directives and
aspirations of many international treaties have failed to bring results because of their lack of a
powerful and centralized enforcement mechanism.114
Several treaties addressing environmental concerns have been promulgated. For example,
during the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth
Summit, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was born. One hundred and ninety two
nations, including the European Union, are now parties of this convention.
In April 2002, the signatories of the CBD committed to drastically reducing the loss of
biodiversity by 2010 in an effort to alleviate poverty and improve general global conditions.115
Predictably, this benchmark was never attained. This is illustrative of world leaders failing to
deliver on promises made in 2002 and during other covenants to combat the decline of global
biodiversity. The international community has instead been the steward of a planet that has seen
biodiversity decline at alarming rates. A recent study brings these findings to light and illustrates
the lack of will shown by international leaders based upon their 2002 CBD commitments. This
study asserted that the "analysis shows that governments have failed to deliver on the
commitments they made in 2002: biodiversity is still being lost as fast as ever, and we have made
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little headway in reducing the pressures on species, habitats and ecosystems.” This statement was
made by lead author Dr Stuart Butchart of the United Nations Environment Programme World
Conservation Monitoring Centre and BirdLife International.116 Sadly, despite numerous
successful conservations measures and agreements supporting biodiversity, targets emphasized
by them still have not been achieved.
The same failures are seen with the Kyoto Protocol. This agreement forged in Japan,
introduced flexibility mechanisms which were defined as alternative methods for achieving
reduction of emissions as a component of an effort to address the changing climate.117 The
categories set out by the protocol include: Clean Development Mechanisms, Joint
Implementation, and Emissions Trading. Each of these classes are aimed to “(1) stimulate
sustainable development through technology transfer and investment, (2) help countries with
Kyoto commitments to meet their targets by reducing emissions or removing carbon from the
atmosphere in other countries in a cost-effective way, and (3) encourage the private sector and
developing countries to contribute to emission reduction efforts.”118 The acceptance of these
mechanisms remains highly controversial. Criticisms were drawn at the inclusion of these
priorities by U.S. (even though the U.S. eventually withdrew).119 Additionally, elements of the
protocol have received further criticism as emissions reductions have not been effectively
achieved.120 It is important to note however the effectiveness of one international body in
accepting and agreeing to the measures of the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union was able to
effectively set key agenda items in part because of their ability to subordinate themselves to the
greater international community.121
In 1995, the United Nations was awakened by disastrous environmental degradation, and
the calls by global citizens and special interest groups for tougher national and international
measures to protect the environment. These protests included calls for criminalization of certain
activities. The Economic and Social Counsel of the United Nations reached resolution 1994/15,
wherein it called upon the community of nations to “consider acknowledging the most serious
forms of environmental crimes in an international convention.”122 The resolution also urged
member states to focus on the need for law enforcement resources to address environmental
crimes. The premise behind the proposals was the viability of an international criminal court
being able to adjudicate matters of environmental concern under criminal doctrines.123
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The Council urged signatory states to adopt a list of recommendations in their domestic
laws.124 The purpose of these recommendations was to provide the basic ground work for
criminal sanctions when endangering the environment. Provisions that signatory states were
asked to provide included certain core criminal offenses.125 They involved a variety of mens rea
levels, intent, reckless or negligence, that are required to find a party guilty of causing imminent
risk, damage, or injury. The Council stressed that these offenses should be categorized separately
in accordance with the harm of the conduct (damages). As a consequence, the injury caused by
the offense would be reflected in a proportional sanction against the offending party.126
The position was also taken that states should impose criminal fines on corporations.127
This alone would require a fundamental change in the domestic laws of signatory states,
including the criminal philosophy of liability; enforcement mechanisms would also require
significant remodeling. Overall, this enforcement strategy would be facilitated by the provisions
of technical assistance, through relevant international agencies such as the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and the U.N.128
The resolution also encouraged cooperation among the internal agencies of member
states. Forums for discourse and enforcement were identified through relevant international
agencies. They include the CCPCJ, the network of institutes of the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Program, and other similar regional institutes. The Council has
emphasized the threats posed by environmental crimes, which inflict irreparable damage. They
pointed out that cross border cooperation has to be regarded as a top priority to mitigate longterm harmful effects.129
This resolution was neither the first nor the last of the many international attempts to
move forward transnational cooperation in fighting environmental crimes. However, similar to
the fate of many other attempts, the resolution remained a dead letter without any meaningful
implementation of its recommendations. Although many of the ideas proposed were ambitious
in scale, none had any noticeable impact. The failure to these propositions to take hold points to
the harsh reality that international criminal law and international environmental law are restricted
at best when considered together, despite their depth of law.130 This could be attributed to one or
more reasons; chief among them, the corporate might factor, and its influence on national and
international law.
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As the climate begins to change, and the environment as a whole is thrown into the
forefront of a global conversation, calls for international laws penalizing certain attacks on the
environment and derivatively future generations have mounted. There is an urging of harsh
punishment for perpetrators of trans-boundary crimes against the environment and for stricter
criminal enforcement.131 However, there are critics that think that environmental crimes are not
suitable for criminalization. The voices that disfavor criminal liability are seen in the text and
spirit of many international treaties and conventions, including the Convention against
Transnational Crime which completely omits any reference to environmental crimes.
At one time, the United Nations gave credence and attention to the application of
criminal law in the context of environmental protection. These efforts were predominately
focused on organized crime. A recommendation was made that “National and supranational
authorities should be provided with a wide array of measures, remedies and sanctions, within
their constitutional and legal frameworks and consistent with the fundamental principles of
criminal law, in order to ensure compliance with environmental protection laws.”132 These U.N.
efforts never amounted to significant progress, and the Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime eventually omitted any reference to the environment.
The omission of the environment occurred, despite the undisputable fact that
environmental crimes are often transnational in nature. They involve organized crime activities
such as trafficking in natural resources, the illegal trade in wildlife, unregulated fishing and the
illegal exploitation and trafficking in minerals and precious stones. The Convention touched
upon the illegal sale and manufacturing of firearms and human trafficking as relevant global
issues.133 These initiatives all failed to touch upon what are arguably the gravest threats.
Although examples of such failures are evident in the formation of a body of law, the
international community has paid specific attention to providing protection for the environment
during war time. Such focus suggests that the global community is more interested in regulating
war than in protecting the environment.

II.

Protection of the Natural Environment During Warfare

This topic will be reviewed briefly as the purpose is to give a general background for this
dissertation. This subject has been the discussion of many treatises and research papers. The
law in this area is much clearer, and volumes of treaties have been specific in criminalizing
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activities during armed struggles; specifically activities with the purpose to destroy the
environment as the mean to achieve military advantages.134 The long-term effects of
environmental damage caused as part of belligerent military operations may have serious after
effects on the ecosystem. The area of law to address this long term damage is lagging, but there
are still some instruments available to pressure violators.
The international community turned attention toward such endeavor following many
atrocities committed during war, specifically during World War II. This included acting
affirmatively to prevent war related activities that create major consequences on the natural
environment.135
War is conducted based upon internationally recognized principles. This includes selfdefense and the protection of sovereignty. This right however, to engage in war, is not absolute.
“The Law of War prescribes restrictions on three aspects of armed conflict: the definition of war,
relations between neutral and belligerent states, and the conduct of war.”136 Touched upon the
law of war includes recognized boundaries in the treatment of prisoners, nationals, property,
vessels, weapons, and occupied territories.
International rules on the conduct of war are intended to avoid unnecessary suffering or
injury to combatants, civilian populations and property. But under the Law of War, the definition
of “unnecessary” is decidedly limited. Generally, by declaring a military necessity, states can
exempt themselves from the restrictions of the Law of War and sidestep barriers towards illegal
conduct.137
Limitations are present however. A States' ability to claim exceptions on the basis of
military necessity is one. First, local covenants established by nation-states or regional
governmental bodies set out rules that regulate the use of certain weapons.138 Secondly, the use
of weapons of mass destruction are governed by well establish international customary law. This
is evident by opinions from the ICJ. In 1996, the ICJ ruled on nuclear weapons concluding that:
"States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never
use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military
targets... it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly
prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their
suffering. In application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom
of choice of means in the weapons they use."139
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The 1907 Hague Conventions did much in establishing a system of law that addresses
armed conflict. Unfortunately, the environment was not a priority in 1907, and therefore the
articles agreed upon do not offer explicit protection. Within Article 55 of Hague Convention II,
when occupying enemy territory, nations may not destroy or permanently alter the land, nor use
natural resources irresponsibly. The environment itself can be interpreted as property of the state
and therefore, invoking the Hague is within legal abilities. The convention further provides for
compensation for the destruction of seized enemy property. It is unclear however what exactly
the term property covers (e.g. air, water, land).
In the wake of the Vietnam War, a global concern emerged in light of U.S. military
operations that cause severe environmental damage.140 About 3 million Americans served in the
armed forces in the Vietnam War during the 1960s and early 1970s. During that time, the U.S.
armed forces used large amounts of chemical agents known as defoliants. Once dispersed, these
chemicals caused the leaves to fall off plants and trees. One of these defoliants was called Agent
Orange. Throughout the war, many troops and civilians were exposed in mass numbers to this
specific variant.141 Many years later, questions remain about the lasting health effects of those
exposed. More Vietnam Veterans were being diagnosed with different forms of skin cancers,
which were later determined to be caused Agent Orange, specifically dioxins contained within.142
After multiple generations and relative stability in the region, the true after effects of U.S.
operations have become apparent.143
In response to what had transpired in Vietnam, the international community responded
with the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.144 Article 35 asserts that Parties
to warfare are “prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment.”145 Within
Article 55, this prohibition is further elaborated.
Article 55, which is titled “Protection of the natural environment,” states under the first
provision, “Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread,
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes the prohibition of the use of warfare
means which is intended or expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.” Under second provision, the Article
states, “attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.”146 Reprisal
during wars is one of the disputed areas of the law of war.147 Even the Supreme Court and its
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learned Justices have struggled over the true extent and breadth of anti-reprisal treaties,
sometimes being in stark contrast to the views and opinions of the U.S. Congress.148
The 1977 protocol purported to virtually ban all forms of reprisal during armed conflicts.
The language of Article 55 under the second provision of Protocol 1 is clear as to the prohibition
of “attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisal.” The purpose of this prohibition
is stated is “to avoid prejudice to the health of the civilian population.”149 Despite being
unambiguous, scholars are continuing to debate the boundaries of this prohibition. Their
questions revolve around the definitions of reprisal and the natural environment. These inquiries
stretch to understand how far the protocol reaches in the protection of biological environments,
and the specific beneficiaries of the protection (e.g. humans and wildlife). Questions have also
been raised to ascertain the specific types of resources to be protected, such as forests and
water.150
The actual implementation of Protocol I may be hard to gauge, but the purpose is defined.
The covenant aims to make significant advances in the protection of the environment from the
effects of conventional warfare. It prohibits wartime damage to the environment even when it is
a military necessity under the traditional rules of jus in belli. A central challenge with the Article
is that the criterion of widespread, long-term, and severe damage are not well defined. For
example, “long term” can be considered to occur over the expanse of numerous decades or after
10 years. The conjunctive use of these terms contemplates a higher threshold of damage before
its prohibitions are implicated.151
Some scholars argue however, that the language of the article is too vague to impose
criminal liability under international humanitarian law.152 They assert that while it imposes the
affirmative duty to be cautious, the article falls short of being a control on warfare that damages
the environment. An example of this is the use of the expression “long-term.” The simple
ambiguity of “long term” turns a clear mandate into a murky and toothless prohibition. The only
use for the protocol would be in the most outrageous violations that generate international
outcry, or when an offending party is too powerful to be punished. Ambiguity, whether in the
language of the legislation or concerned scholarly writings, opens the doors for selective
application of the law.153
Damage caused by warfare on the environment has been further protected by the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
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Modification Techniques (ENMOD). The ENMOD is the first international agreement that
governs the impact of armed conflict on the environment. It is a foundation for further
agreements as it touches upon the manipulation of the environment for war. This was adopted by
the U.N Security Counsel in December 1976 and opened for signature in May 1977. This was
largely done to address the use of defoliants in Vietnam. In 1980 the ENMOD was ratified by the
United States.154 The convention aimed to prevent deliberate and catastrophic environmental
changes from being triggered by hostile conduct. The agreement is referred to as a non-use
agreement, where it prohibits certain weapons from use. Other agreements take a different
approach by halting the creation and production of weapons. This is the first environmentspecific law of armed conflict in history.155 This covenant coupled with Article 55 and 35 are
now seen as a clear expression of international law in area.
Within the ENMOD, signatories agreed to not “engage in military or other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the
means of destruction, damage or injury.” Ratification was fiercely opposed by environmentalist
because of the disappointing language of the ENMOD that only attached the protection of the
environment to warfare. 156 Furthermore, a fear out of the language’s lack of control and
regulation was amplified as legal scholars argued the ENMOD could legitimize weapons
targeting the environment.157 Furthermore, Additional Protocol I allows for the prohibition of
environmental damage even if human suffering is not shown. Time will be indicative as to
whether this treaty will be respected by the most powerful nations within its intended boundaries.
A key observation centers on the language within the ENMOD and the ambiguity surrounding its
provisions.
In his dissertation “The Responsibility of Head States for Environmental Crimes Under
International Law” submitted at Pace Law School, Mishari Alefan argued that the Iraqi
government’s decision to set a fire to the oil fields in Kuwait, while simultaneously dumping
millions of tons of crude oil into territorial waters, is an example of environmental crime.
Unfortunately, since no Iraqi government officials were prosecuted for the offense, the impact of
the provisions are still vague.158 Although the ENMOD has been around for more than three
decades, it has never been used, even though there have been cases upon which it could have
been invoked.
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Examining some of these cases, the Mexican army in 1998 targeted a well-known
insurgent, the Mediterranean fruit fly, for "phytosanitary" reasons; Zapatistas alleged that the
army was trying to wipe out the rebels' food crops.159 The loss in crops affected fruits and
vegetables that are required and relied on by the citizens of local areas in Mexico. The spraying
endangered the livelihood and welfare of these people.160
Colombia serves a model example of domestic law destroying the local environment. The
War on Drugs has given license for the use of herbicides in areas where environmental impact is
severe. From the air, approximately 25,000 hectares were treated with a chemical agent
containing glyphosate.161 The use of these agents were designed to stem the production of plants
that led to the manufacturing of narcotics.162
Also in the 1990s, the United States' instituted the High Frequency Active Auroral
Research Program (HAARP) to study the behaviors of the ionosphere with the goal of enhancing
communications and surveillance systems. This initiative created a giant antennae beam that
blasted powerful frequencies into the ionosphere. Representatives of the Russian Federation
alleged that these can induce region wide headaches and psychological distress. There were also
allegations that such blasts could rupture oil and natural gas pipelines. In times where cases like
these have been brought to the international forefront, the ENMOD has remained silent.
Although their authority has not been exercised, the group's power in theory is
considerable. In a detailed study, legal experts Susana Pimiento Chamorro and Edward
Hammond point to the "remarkably simple and direct" language with which ENMOD commands
its fact-finding committee to take complaints straight to the U.N.'s most powerful agency, the
Security Council.163 Which has lately shown signs of leaving its war footing and warming up to
climate as a security-related concern.

III.

International Criminal Liability for Crimes Against Nature

A. International Conventions

Various international treaties contain mandates for criminal sanctions against violations of
certain environmental norms. However, all unanimously fall short of expressly asserting
international jurisdiction over these crimes, exacting punishments, or designating an international
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body of enforcement. Furthermore, they failed to create an international system independent of
domestic mechanisms to deal with these crimes.164
The introduction of environmental protections as a priority in international law arose
rather late. Recently, global catastrophes and activists have brought the relevant discourse to the
forefront. In the first half of the century, the international community adopted agreements that
protect the birds, polar bears, whales, fish, and fur seals. Other covenants such as the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora served as broader nets
protecting a wide array of species. In the 1970s, nations saw the terms of the International
Convention for Prevention for Pollution from ships, and the 1979 Geneva Convention on LongRange Transboundary Air Pollution come into effect.
These international conventions have dealt with the issue of environmental crimes
through general directives. Signatory states are required to follow certain mandates to
criminalize certain activities. States have varied in their individual implementation of these
treaties for many reasons. Chief among these reasons are costs of implementation, the resilience
of perpetrators, especially powerful and politically connected corporations, protecting their
economic interests and corruption. Also many attempts to create the desired level of protection
at the international level through criminal sanctions are frustrated at the outset during the
establishment of agreements. For example, a treaty that attempted to regulate environmental
crimes in the international forum was made at the Rome conference. Although the ICC Statute
that would have brought criminal liability into consideration was considered, it was ultimately
rejected. These occurrences are too commonplace.
Crimes against the environment such as illegal fishing, trade of endangered species, CFC
smuggling, illegal logging, and the unsanctioned dumping of wastes have been the subject of
many international treaties.165 The number of international treaties regarding the environment has
ballooned as countries are alerted to the ever growing presence of dangerous actors in the
destruction of the environment. Pressure is also being exerted by indigenous people and NGOs.
NGO’s are becoming more persuasive in shaping international environmental criminal law.
They are enhancing the knowledge base for international governance of the matter. NGOs
accomplish this task by compiling and disseminating relevant information to policy-makers and
the broader public. A particularly well-known example in the area of implementation review is
TRAFFIC International (the wildlife trade monitoring network), which has regularly provided
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information to the signatories of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).166
The legitimacy of NGOs stem from their mission and purpose. They are generally
established to represent the public interest and therefore, they are able to garner public trust. This
in turn allows them to influence public opinion more effectively than other organizations. Studies
have shown that NGOs and their measured strength have correlated to the passage and adoption
of key international legislation. The Kyoto Protocol is an example of the effects of NGOs and
their ability to persuade the adoption of legislation within nation states.167 When 26 transitional
economics were studied in Europe and Eurasia between 1998 and 2009, it was found that nations
which had higher NGO strength oversaw a quicker adoption of the protocol.168 Furthermore, the
study revealed that NGOs gain influence and support over time as “citizens [obtained]
opportunities to observe new sources of political agency.”169
As the international community is trying ineffectively to face the challenges imposed by
adverse environmental activities, environmental crimes are rapidly growing due to strong
demand, low risk, and other factors. In an effort to combat this, nations are attempting to put
into place international agreements to halt the rapid growth of environmental offenders. Efforts
however have been stymied by poor bureaucratic management, corruption, and lack of resources.
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Marpol
Treaty),170 the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution,171 and CITES have
implemented criminal provisions.172 The Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal is another covenant that includes such
mechanisms.173 Most of these conventions inhibit certain activities and their focus on
criminalization of differentiating conduct varies. The effect of these treaties remain limited
when it comes to criminal sanctions at the national and international level. Many countries fail
to either to pass domestic legislation or undertake ratification procedures; so they may comply
with their international obligations. In many nations, the process of transforming international
prescriptions into national law is very slow.174
Treaties have failed to protect the environment, because they lack obligatory provisions
and enforcement mechanisms. For example, the provisions of ENMOD have no effective
enforcement or remedial provisions for a breach of duty, such as reparation or monetary
compensation. Instead, any state party which has reason to believe that another signatory state is
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acting in violation of the convention's obligations, may lodge a complaint with the U.N. Security
Council. This U.N. body would then investigate the claim and make a report. Article V(2)
requires the U.N. Secretary-General to convene a Consultative Committee of Experts at the
request of any signatory. However, ENMOD does not provide for any civil or criminal liability.
It remains to be seen whether the Consultative Committee has more than soft authority.175 In
light of these circumstances, substantive adjudication of matters affecting member states have
yet to be litigated. Many states continue to fail in their responsibilities and commitments under
the various treaties. This is mostly due to lack of political will and the involvement of
corporations in politics and environmental policymaking.
According to U.N. sources, there are currently over 500 international agreements or
treaties related to the protection of the environment. The majority of these accords have been
concluded in recent years.176 Finalizing an agreement however, is only a step towards a far
reaching goal. The most difficult challenge is to breathe life into the substantive objectives of
these treaties. This can only be done by implementing and enforcing them. Countries that
embrace a treaty by becoming a signatory are not bound by its commitments until an internal
legislative body ratifies the treaty.177 This turns into a sophisticated dance between politics and
lobbyists with corporate and economic interests. The backing of corporations and other
influential constituencies may not be easily be secured. For instance, corporations in the business
of oil and offal fuels will marshal their political power to resist ratification of international
treaties that would otherwise mitigate climate change. These industries are politically powerful
and have the ability to defeat attempts at ratification. Elements of legislation that would
otherwise strengthen the global community find their demise in bodies of representatives who
are bombarded by corporate money.178
Another mechanism used by the international community is widening the jurisdiction of
conventions to regulate and expand categories of activities in illegal trafficking of a number of
restricted substances such as wildlife.179 The criminalization of certain environmental crimes are
encompassed in the terms of various treaties. International conventions generally require
signatory states to implement domestic regulatory schemes that punish prohibited acts that are
originally addressed in the convention. The preciseness and clarity of these convictions, their
degrees, and specific elements are varied. Some require that parties take "appropriate measures
to ensure the application of the [agreement in question] and the punishment of infractions against
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[those] provisions.”180 Other treaties have required parties to "enact and enforce such legislation
as may be necessary to make effective the… provisions [of the agreement] with appropriate
penalties for violation thereof.”181
Other less effective conventions have included clauses providing violations "shall be an
offense punishable under the law of the territory in which the ship is registered," or "shall be
made a punishable offense by each State Party under its national law.”182 The least effective
examples requiring criminal sanctions through implication provide that the parties "shall enact
and enforce such legislation and other measures as may be necessary for the purpose of giving
effect to [the] agreement.”
Various agreements structure their conventions so that "the penalties specified under the
law of a party shall be adequate in severity to discourage violations of the present Convention.”
For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states, “penalties
provided for by the laws and regulations of States for vessels flying their flag shall be adequate
in severity to discourage violations wherever they occur.” Also the Bama-ko Convention
addressing the ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements and
Management of Hazardous Waste within Africa states, “each state shall introduce appropriate
national legislation for imposing criminal penalties on all persons who have planned, carried out,
or assisted in such illegal imports. Such penalties shall be sufficiently high to punish and deter
such conduct.”183
These conventions contain frequently what is known as "policing provisions." These
provisions allow signatory states to enforce the rules. For example, this rings true of the 1911
Convention for the Preservation of Fur Seals in the North Pacific. This covenant provided in
Article 7 states that “it is agreed on the part of the United States, Japan and Russia that each
respectively will maintain a guard or patrol in the waters frequented by the seal herd in the
protection of which it is especially interested, so far as may be necessary for the enforcement of
the foregoing provisions.”184
Generally, the vast majority of international environmental conventions explicitly
recognize the penal nature of an environmental crime by setting an affirmative duty to prohibit,
prevent and ultimately, prosecute. These conventions are usually a source of obligation within
the international community, not a source of law.185 Generally, conventions lack the ability to
combat the offenses themselves. This stems from the domestic interests of signatory states that
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lead to a failure of enforcement consensus.
B. The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES)

Under the under the terms of the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), trade in certain products derived from wildlife is
prohibited.186 Some 900 plant and animal species are included in this ban. These organisms are
generally in danger of extinction and an additional 29,000 additional species that are threatened
by commerce also receive protections.187
It is fair to say that CITES has disrupted the trade operations for many threatened species.
Unfortunately, the trafficking in these and other animals continues and the organization itself still
falls short in many instances in protecting wildlife. Generally, the majority of illegally traded
wildlife exists in developing countries such as Brazil, which supplies “10 percent of the global
black market” of trafficked species.188 What makes this form of conduct an international crime
that deserves an effective international response is the trans-boundary nature of these acts. The
demand to create these markets arises from collectors seeking wildlife or the products of wildlife
for ornamentation, clothing, medicine, food and other uses.
The multibillion-dollar Asian medicine industry poses the greatest risk to endangered
species in the continent of Asia. One of main challenges facing the community of nations, in
which all countries need to play a prominent role, is the protection of wildlife and natural
resources. This includes the need to protect endangered species, reduce water and air pollution,
and conserve natural resources including forests. The decision to protect or not to protect is a
question of policy; nations are constantly confronted with conflicts between technological
developments and the advantages it entails. These advances are generally nonconforming to the
desire of living in a clean environment.
The African Elephant is an observable example of the implementation and effectiveness
of CITES. The elephants began their rapid decline during the 1980s and 90s as they were hunted
for their ivory tusks.189 Since 1985, elephants have sparked heated debates at every CITES
Conference. In the 1980s, the elephant was added to Appendix II creating export requirement
permits, but this was still inadequate to protect the animals. In 1989, the Elephant was listed
under Appendix I granting it additional protections.190 This in turn prohibited any international
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commercial trade of the animal or its parts. However, in 1997, Botswana, Zimbabwe and
Namibia took the approach of shifting the elephants from Appendix I to a sub class of Appendix
A. This once again opened up the allowance of limited trade. 191
It has been argued that there has been two fundamental failings of CITES in the
protection of the African Elephants. The first was in 1997 when the international body
capitulated to Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe by allowing them to auction off 50 tons of
government ivory stockpiles. They were sold to Japanese traders in 1999.192 Again in 2002,
CITES voted to allow Botswana, Namibia and South Africa to auction another 60 tons of
ivory.193 This is a fundamental failure of the international body to protect against natural
resources and the illegal poaching of elephants. Indirectly, these accessions increase the demand
of ivory as more and more markets are temporarily flushed with the rare goods.194 Although
CITES has done a service to the world by banning trade of certain Appendix I species, the
political nature of the organization still has not been extinguished. In order to counteract such
failings, other international organizations or bodies of law would bring progress to certain
categories of illegal activities, such as the poaching of elephants in Africa. In order for this to
happen, public opinion must be aware of the international shortcomings.
It is thoroughly documented that the global community became aware of the dangers of
environmental crimes in the early 20th century. Even with such a head start, little has been done
internationally to face the challenges imposed by the continuity of such crimes, despite their
undeniable consequences. Research about this field of law has paid very little attention to
dealing with environmental crimes. Acid rain, pollution, and global warming are all only a few
of the symptoms associated with the problem. Other issues such as genetic changes, allergies,
and defective births are side effects that are rarely discussed. Another moral question stems from
the use of animals in genetic testing. Critics argue that such use falls under cruelty and inhumane
treatment of nature’s creatures.195 The awareness of these environmental issues within nationstates is a relevant topic of conversation when discussing the current state of the legal structure
and possible solutions to combat loopholes. Within the current public sphere, “what is failing to
occur, as evidenced by the worsening of many environmental problems, is a process whereby
members of society internalize specific knowledge and alter their behavior quickly enough to
mitigate environmental harm.”196
Environmental degradation is not a new concern. However, it was only in the latter years
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of the twentieth century – as pollution accelerated – that global awareness of the problems
mature. Understanding the natural environment and its problems must also be international in
scope. In the development of this awareness, the global consciousness has come to realize that
our world constitutes a single ecosystem composed of the interaction of all living organisms and
their natural environment. There is still a long way to go however when it comes to internalizing
the rapid information that is readily available to the world population. With the rise of the
internet and accessible media, the world and its leaders need to be educated on the issues so they
can act on them. Furthermore, the stewardship of this system of life is so vast an undertaking that
the care of the earth cannot be the task of one country alone; this problem is part of the process
of globalization.197 A cohesive effort of the international body would properly regulate man
made risks; risks that are associated with new technologies that pose unforeseen consequences
that could take thousands of years to reverse.198
C. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes

Similar to other international conventions, the Basel Convention requires states that are
signatories to create mechanisms of enforcement within the domestic legislative schemes. The
language of the covenant requires states to set appropriate bench marks and agencies to oversee
them, and the enforcement of penal provisions against violators of the convention. It states that
parties to the convention “shall consider illegal traffic in hazardous wastes and other wastes to be
criminal.”199 It also asserts, "Each party shall introduce appropriate national domestic legislation
to prevent and punish illegal traffic." This method is observed across many agreements.
The Basel Convention does not strictly forbid the movement of hazardous waste. It
merely regulates such movement. In light of this approach, the Basel Convention faces problems
that several other international agreements have encountered. Furthermore, the materials that the
convention covers is limited to prescribed wastes that contain “hazardous characteristics.” If a
material is not enumerated, the movement of that waste is not regulated, allowing frequent
polluters to exploit the loophole.
Implementation of provisions contained within the Convention raises several questions.
The agreement does not independently promulgate regulations of how the rules are to be
enforced. There is also a lack of guidance on how the waste disposal is to be monitored. The
Convention falls short by merely tracing restrictions that other programs have established.
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Unfortunately, many existing programs have fundamental errors embodied within it them. These
failures in turn are now included in the commitments of this Convention. This only increases the
number of problems and confusion surrounding the regulation.
D. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Regulation was needed during the twentieth century to counter the “freedom of the seas”
theory. This doctrine stated that domestic law only extended to a small area of the water outside
a nation’s coast, and the rest of the ocean was not within the jurisdiction of any individual nation.
This new regulation aimed to expand national jurisdiction over the seas. The theory found its
genesis in a growing awareness of depleting fish stocks and increasing levels of water pollution.
UNCLOS expressly requires that penalties be specified under the law. The course of
repercussions should be sufficient to discourage violations of the agreement. It states, "Penalties
provided for by the laws and regulations of States for vessels flying their flag shall be adequate
in severity to discourage violations wherever they occur." UNCLOS primary provisions address
territorial jurisdiction. The convention put in place regulations that designated a 12 mile long
zone outside a nation’s shores. This regulation allows a country to enforce their laws within that
limit. They are also granted 24 miles to enforce other certain laws to prevent enumerated
violations. UNCLOS has been utilized to hold criminals responsible for water pollution in
violation of national law or treaties.
The scourge of piracy and the international community’s attempts to reign in the
“enemies of all mankind” gives us a good understanding of the prosecutorial shortcomings of
UNCLOS. The international Maritime Organization (IMO) has reported that off the cost of East
Africa during 2007, 60 attacks took place. In 2008, 134-153 incidents took place and in 2009,
222.200 In additional to robbery on the high seas, murder and rape have been reported as an
attached consequence to these atrocious acts. Furthermore, estimates reach $15 billion of lost
profits (not including ransoms) between the Indian and Pacific Oceans in just 2006. 201
The U.S. Constitution explicitly grants the U.S. Congress jurisdiction to penalize pirates
on the high seas. This long-standing tradition exists in many other nations that also allow for
their governmental apparatus to extend jurisdiction over piracy. In a modern day context
however, a nation-state must observe the legal ramifications carefully before prosecuting pirates.
Traditionally, pirates have received the legal definition as “enemies of all mankind.”202 Under
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this legal definition, they do not fall under the protection of any state, and therefore any state
may exert jurisdiction over them. In the modern context however, UNCLOS abrogates
statelessness created by legal terminology.
The Geneva Convention of the High Seas (Geneva LOS) is another covenant that speaks
to the international law of the seas. The provisions of Geneva LOS and UNCLOS are very
similar. UNCLOS supersedes Geneva LOS, and although the U.S. is not a party to UNCLOS, it
is to Geneva LOS. Article 105 of UNCLOS gives nation-states the right to capture pirates and
determine their criminal penalty.203 However there is a limit to the exercise of this jurisdiction.
The Commission’s commentary to Article 19 of Geneva LOS, which closely mirror’s
UNCLOS’s article 105, states in part that “[t]his right cannot be exercised at a place under the
jurisdiction of another state.”204 States have used this to avoid the prosecution of pirates so other
nations may deal with the enforcement responsibilities.
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is a juridical body that issues
advisory opinions on the meanings of the provisions contained in UNCLOS.205 ITLOS falls short
however of being able to judicially try the suspects of piracy itself. In the case of environmental
criminal law, ITLOS is constricted similarly in that it cannot arbitrate matters but only issue
advisory statements on the UNCLOS. Under the current legal infrastructure of UNCLOS,
Geneva LOS and ITLOS, states follow the practice of sending captured pirates to other
jurisdictions in part due to the lack of a uniform body charged with enforcing international
criminal law against piracy.206
Although UNCLOS sets a firm foundation to enforce international criminal provisions
against pirates, it falls short from being able to enforce it through a judiciary system. This
example illustrates the difficulties in handling criminal matters in other sectors of public interest,
mainly environmental criminal law. Academics have argued that there are solutions that can be
implemented to give enforcement powers to provisions under these bodies of law. One such
suggestion is the strengthening of ITLOS to allow it to adjudicate matters and dispense
punishment appropriate to the crimes committed.

IV. Regional Agreements Establishing Criminal Liability
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Regional agreements have proven to be more dynamic in their efforts to mandate states to
resort to criminal sanctions. The most important agreements are concluded among and between
member states of the European Union.
A. The Council of EU Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law

The Council of Europe has adopted “a convention on the protection of the environment
through criminal law.”207 The European Union “has also adopted a similarly worded directive on
the basis of substantial domestic convergence.”208 Animal209 and ocean protection treaties
include penal provisions.210
B. The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movements and Management of Hazardous Waste

This regional agreement was entered into to protect environmental interests in Africa. It
asserts, "Each state shall introduce appropriate national legislation for imposing criminal
penalties on all persons who have planned, carried out, or assisted in such illegal imports. Such
penalties shall be sufficiently high to punish and deter such conduct."211
The Bamako Convention drew on regulations that the Basel Convention implemented. Its
provisions regulate hazardous waste materials, and they also ban the exporting of waste in
international waters. Furthermore, it regulates the process for international movement of this
waste with a notification mechanism. Finally, it applies an affirmative duty on the country to “reimport” any waste they have exported previously.
C. The Convention for the Preservation of Fur Seals in the North Pacific

Similar to other agreements, this convention contains some enforcement provisions that
permit parties to take action immediately to enforce the rules of the agreement. Article I provides
that violators against the Convention’s ban on pelagic sealing “may be seized” by domestic
authority where the infraction exists. It also states under Article VII that each party "will
maintain a guard or patrol in the waters frequented by the seal herd in the protection of which it
is especially interested, so far as may be necessary for the enforcement of the [Convention].”
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The Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals

The convention allows "duly authorized official of any of the Parties" to board and search
"any vessel... subject to the jurisdiction of any of the Parties”. They are allowed to conduct this
search so long as the official "has reasonable cause to believe... is offending against the
prohibition of pelagic sealing...." The Convention goes on to provide that if after searching the
vessel the official "continues to have reasonable cause to believe that the vessel or any person on
board thereof is offending against the prohibition, he may seize or arrest such vessel or person."
D. The Agreement Between Canada and the United States on Great Lakes Water Quality of 1978.

This agreement was founded to help maintain and replenish the biological integrity of the
Great Lakes. The purpose of drafting these regulations were to protect wildlife, air and water
quality, and the people who live in close proximity to the bodies of water. An addition to that
agreement affirms, "As soon as any person in charge [of a vessel] has knowledge of any
discharge of harmful quantities of oil or hazardous polluting substances, immediate notice of
such discharge shall be given to the appropriate agency in the jurisdiction where the discharge
occurs; failure to give this notice shall be made subject to appropriate penalties." This form of
regulations produces a more comprehensive form of rules then a more narrow case by case
analysis.
The focus of this agreement is to eliminate toxic chemicals from entering the waters of
the Great Lakes. The signatories have focused primarily on five factors, (1) presence and
ambient concentration in the Great Lakes environment, (2) degree of toxicity, (3) persistence in
the environment, (4) bioavailability, and (5) potential to bioconcentrate and bioaccumulate. The
purpose of these factors concerns the serious environmental damage that can occur from banned
substances.

V. Environmental Damage as a Violation of Customary International Law
Severe environmental damage breaches the responsibilities and trust placed on
individuals and corporate actors on the highest level. Such damage to the environment sets in
motion a chain of incidents that cause loss of life and great suffering. Not only can affirmative
51 |

acts make a party culpable, but so can the failure to act, for instance in the scenario of climate
change. The new thinking places a duty upon states to prevent degradation or in theory, find
themselves in breach of the public trust.212
International customary law provides a general principle that states should provide access
to Environmental Justice. Traditionally, customary law emerges through decisions and norms
established by the conduct of nations. They are not the result of formal written agreements. 213
These laws are time-honored customs that have been recognized by nation states through the
history of practice and recognition of norms. In today’s contemporary legal systems, it is the
norm for states to provide a judicial means to adjudicate environmental issues. This in turn is the
current practice because states themselves acknowledge their duty to facilitate such justice.214
As discussed supra, the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information is an example of
such customary international law that has been codified. After the signing of this convention,
international customary law was in line with the principle of free and open access to information,
touching upon access to justice in the environmental context. “States that deny access to justice
for environmental claims violate this customary duty, and are thus in violation of international
law.”215 An example of this would be the intentional destruction of files, evidence or hampering
of litigation between parties. Such conduct would effectively make equal justice unattainable for
citizens within a state.
States themselves can fail to provide the necessary resources and security to public
interest. In this situation, international mechanisms can be built to support the application of
international customary law. All though the State may have failed for myriad of reasons to
uphold its duties, the cooperation of a State when international parties engage to assist is crucial
in its commitments to international law. An example of this type of international assistance is
when “UNEP, together with the Environmental Law Programme of the IUCN, provided
consulting services to assist nations in establishing and refining their environmental
legislation.”216
Once international law has been established through domestic codification, enforcement
is the next approach in making sure environmental damage can be reduced in line with
international customary law. Generally, International enforcement of environmental laws can be
observed through two different prisms; that of domestic enforcement and enforcement with
international assistance.217 Relevant to our analysis lies the latter, which requires domestic
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schemes to abide by international law. Within this scheme, domestic legislative bodies would
create enforcement mechanisms through their own agencies, or permit international agencies to
hold quasi-jurisdictions within sovereign borders.

53 |

Chapter 3

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PENAL PROVISIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS

I. Implementing Environmental Laws
In order to be effective, environmental laws require enforcement. Implementing these
laws requires a judiciary and a prosecutorial body to carry out enforcement. A lack of either of
these independent and non-prejudicial parts can lead to a lack of enforcement or a miscarriage of
justice. A coherent regulatory system is the most efficient method for insuring compliance and
enforcement of environmental laws. For many years, the environment was not subject to
regulation by lawmakers on a domestic or international scale.218 The first real thrust of
environmental law saw the creation of specialized administrations and a body of law for them to
administer. This first set of legislation pertained to threatened species conservation, wilderness
conversation and pollution control. The laws were the progeny of the 1972 Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment.219
Certain countries began passing environmental legislation after the 1972 Stockholm
conference. They were slow to discover that without specifically authorizing prosecutors and
judges to enforce this legislation, polluters would not comply with these laws.220 In the late
1980’s, both judges and prosecutors received more attention from NGO’s and policy makers.
Unfortunately, in most countries, judges are still unfamiliar with environmental issues. These
failures of knowledge by the adjudicators of justice result in the lack of implementation of
environmental law on the national level.221
Challenges facing the judiciary in the enforcement of environmental laws vary among
nations. Some environmental issues are very technical and complex. This results in a knowledge
deficiency as lawmakers and adjudicators do not have the scientific knowledge, ability, or
expertise that is needed to make proper decisions relative to the case. One way to reduce the
cloudy issues of enforcing environmental law has been to exchange data concerning information
about successful implementation of environmental laws between sectors of the government
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responsible for enforcement. This model has been successfully used by NGO’s such as the WWF
TRAFFIC, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Global Witness. All three
organizations set up Secretariats to oversee this process. Additionally, societal unawareness of
environmental issues is generally reflected in the judiciary presiding over these cases, and may
lead to an indecisive approach to environmental problems. Other challenges are attributed to
constitutional limitations, prioritizing states’ interests in implementation, and conflicts with
codes.222
For most countries, proper enforcement and implementation of environmental laws
require reforming the whole regulatory system.223 Commentators have stated that developing
countries would benefit from subtle support structures by the developed world community. This
would assist them in facilitating a transitional justice project intent upon reforming their legal
body to align itself with international norms. Most importantly, it will establish the process of
cultivating the ‘glue’ that will ultimately hold together the uniform system of justice.224 This
would involve enacting green laws, empowering citizens and NGO’s by giving them standing to
bring cases in courts, and most importantly, a capable judiciary that is well aware of both the
relevance of the case, and the laws to address the problems at hand.
The Global Community must recognize the importance of creating international bodies
that carry out the implementation of environmental legislation under transnational jurisdiction.
This need springs from the failure of national laws to afford the necessary minimal
environmental protection through effective implementation of international treaties. 225
As signatory states, each party can have a specific role that is designated to them in
implementing environmental treaties. These specific obligations can be examined by reviewing
the penal code and the process of its enforcement. States may implement environmental treaties
by enacting civil law statutes, criminal statutes or both. Usually, they create or authorize existing
administrative agencies to carry out day to day implementation of environmental treaty
obligations.

II.

Stages of Treaties Implementation into National Law

Three stages encompass the implementation of penal provisions included in various
treaties. These steps are taken to enact provisions on a domestic level. They are:
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A. Signature and Ratification of the Treaty by the State

Under International Law, the signing of a treaty does not make it legally binding upon a
state; the ratification of the treaty creates a binding legal effect. An example of this is when the
United States became a signatory to the Rome Statute, and remained so from December 2000 to
May 2002. The Rome Statute established the ICC. During this time, the treaty was not ratified by
the U.S. Senate.226 In May 2002, the President of the United States ordered the “unsigning” of
the Rome Statute. However, during this period between May 2002 and the formal release of
obligation, the U.S. was bound to not “defeat the object and purpose” of the Rome Statute. While
under the purview of the Rome Statute, an obligation existed for the U.S. to cooperate with its
purpose, including surrendering persons to the ICC within U.S. territory. Because of these
obligations, the Bush Administration sought the removal of American commitment from the
international covenant.
Although the U.S. attempted to unsign the treaty, it may still however be considered
bound to its commitments under international customary law. For example, “[o]f the 189 U.N.
member states, 159 have ratified Additional Protocol I. While some of the Protocol’s articles
have not yet reached the level of customary international law, others may have, such as ‘Article
51, prohibiting attacks against civilians, including target area bombardment . . . .’”227 Law can
still become binding upon a party if it has reach the level of international customary law. Once
accepted by nation states, and affirmed as to its validity, countries moving in the opposite
direction of such directives can be ostracized for their actions.
The controlling application of treaties upon domestic law and state action are captured in
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This provision declares that the
mere signature of a treaty only prevents a state from taking actions contrary to the direction of
the treaty. Explained simply, a state should not frustrate the purpose of the covenant. It reads:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become
a party to the treaty; or
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(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the
treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.228
B.

Ratification Process

Ratification is a process by which a nation formally confirms its commitment
domestically to an international agreement. If a treaty requires a separate process through
domestic mechanisms to become binding depends on the terms of the treaty, as well as the
domestic legal requirements of the signatory state. Generally, the ratification process is
accomplished through a confirmation vote in a legislative body of the signing country.
Theoretically, this results in a representative decision by the citizens of the state.
The process of ratification has become more relevant as countries of the world are
democratizing. International commitments have a larger impact on the average citizens’ daily
lives, stemming from economic to quality of life concerns. Citizens exercise their right to
summon their legislatures to influence the policies and direction of government. Unfortunately,
this healthy civil influence is hindered by the influence of other parties participating in national
law making.229 Corporations, now considered legal persons, tend to lobby fiercely against the
ratification of treaties that may have adverse consequences on their economic interests.
When a signing nation completes the process of ratification, that country then becomes a
State party to the treaty. This obligates them to carry out the provisions and mandates of the
agreement.230 Throughout this process, states attempt to fulfill their obligations in good faith
according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the cornerstone of international law. The
notion of pacta sunt servanda, incorporated in article 26 of the Vienna Convention and typically
translated from the Latin as “agreements must be kept,” underlines the importance of voluntary
agreements. Consenting to a promise is powerful tool of evidence showing that the rule or
agreement is “binding” upon the agreeing parties.231 It therefore should come as no surprise that
one of the most basic principles of international law is the principle of pacta sunt servanda–that
is, that nations are bound to keep the promises they make.
C. Implementation of Treaties in Domestic Penal Legislation

Based upon the source of international law, the effect of implementation has varied
consequences on states. For example, a given country is not required to offer legislation
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accepting international customary law. This is because as members of the international
community, all nations are implicitly obliged to heed customary law. On the other hand, when
the international law in question is a specific treaty, it often requires that states who are parties to
the agreement act in unison to implement statutes. This in turn may impact existing law that has
been settled, or it may upset the cultural/legal norms within the country.232 This has important
implications for the development of the economic resources such as trade, agriculture and
manufacturing.
There are mainly two feasible methods in which persons or groups can be prosecuted
under for engaging in activities that are harmful to the environment. They are, (1) directly
through the application of international law, or (2) through domestic legal channels. International
agreements usually require domestic channels to criminalize certain conduct.233 As previously
discussed, such obligations are only carried out in a meaningful and practical way. If the State
party implements the treaty within its own legal system, the internal laws of the State must meet
the obligations under the covenant. By doing this, signatory nations achieve compliance with
their commitments. The mere passing of laws on the domestic level is not in itself assurance that
the treaty will be followed. There must be full scale implementation of benchmarks that measure
compliance and enforcement. The relationship between international conventions and domestic
regulatory schemes often hinge on a country’s commitment to a monist or dualist legal system.
In the monist system, no additional implementation procedures are required to bring the
nation within its commitments to the international agreement.234 When a conflict arises between
two contradictory laws, the treaty will trump domestic rule, as long as the legal norm of the
country places international agreements above domestic law. Non-self executing treaty
stipulations can only be carried out judicially (or have a supremacy clause effect which binds
judges) once there is legislation authorizing the treaty's implementation. After the implementing
legislation is passed, treaty stipulations should executed, as a matter of enforcing national foreign
relations policy decisions. This should be in accordance with the legislation and the implemented
treaty. It is important that authority of the treaty not be solely derived from an act of congress.
Foreign policy makes generally state that treaties have a supremacy effect against all domestic
law. For instance, if congress or a local government were to enact legislation to counter or
constrict treaty obligations, such law would be null and void. Unless the authority of the treaty is
purposefully undermined in the provisions of the agreement, the treaty obligations ought to be
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regarded as enforceable law (with full Supremacy Clause effect). This would provide the
government with legal authority to enforce national foreign policy decisions made by the federal
government against conflicting state actions. This ensures the supremacy of treaties over
domestic laws.235
Authority for treaties under the U.S. Constitution stems from Article VI. The reason for
this stems from the ability of the federal government to make commitments in a quasiconfederate system of government, where states have sovereign authority under a federal body.
In a situation where a state disobeys the intent of the federal government, the constitution
provides the ability of foreigners to use federal courts to make their grievances known.236
To ensure the separation of powers however, the U.S. Constitution requires that the
Senate provide “Advice and Consent” to the President making a treaty.237 Therefore,
international agreements by U.S. government will not take effect unless the Senate provides its
approval. This check and balance scheme limits the power of the executive to commit the U.S. to
international agreements.238
Pursuant to this approach, many treaties in the United States are known as “selfexecuting.” A treaty is considered self-executing when, by its terms, it creates rights without the
need for implementing legislation. Some legal cases, if not most, view the term self-executing to
be synonymous with private rights of action. To a certain degree, however, the logic becomes
circular; in order for a private right of action to arise the treaty must be self-executing. However,
the treaty is self-executing if it provides for a private right of action.239
There have been instances when the legislature is required to pass law for treaty
implementation. For example, the specific criminal component outlining bad acts and motives
must be enumerated by the legislature, not the principles of the treaty.240 In this instance, the
U.S. Congress would legislate laws that would penalize certain criminal conduct while outlining
the appropriate punishments.
In a dualist system, international law is separate from national legislation. Proponents of
dualism argue that between internal and international provisions, there cannot exist any forms of
conflicts since these provisions do not cover the same subject matter. This is premised on the fact
that internal provisions are applied exclusively between the state's borders and cannot intervene
in the international legal system. Though a state that adopts a dualist system is bound by
ratification when observing obligations under an international treaty, the treaty itself will only be
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integrated in the domestic legislative scheme upon an act of the legislature. This would require
specific parliamentary action. The United Kingdom is an example of a country with a dualist
system. In such parliamentary systems, treaties only become part of domestic law if an enabling
act of the parliament has been passed.241
The dualist approach roots its principles in the separation of powers.242 Within the
executive rests the ability to initiate and sign treaties. Thus parliamentary implementation serves
as an important check for the executive power. In other words, if the parliamentary check was
lacking, the executive would have the ability to change domestic laws without recourse by
signing international treaties.243 This in turn would subvert the legislative process.
Incorporation of treaties into national law can take place through a number of channels.
The first method is by amending the law in order to reflect a newly ratified treaty. Another
process is by adding the treaty to the existing domestic law as additional statutory provisions that
would require that the treaty be re-written. Third, the treaty could be added to domestic law in its
entirety, unmodified. In the previous case, when a conflict between a treaty and domestic law
arises, the judge will enforce the domestic law, not the treaty. This method would require the
judge to harmonize the two parallel laws to an acceptable extent.
Within the judiciary of each nation state, conflicts arise between domestic and
international laws. What happens when a conflict is identified is usually determined by “conflict
rules.” This regulates the jurisdiction and manner upon which conflicts should be adjudicated.
Many treaties have provisions that observe domestic law in its principles and goals. For
example, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, asserts “a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” This
recognizes the nature of the domestic element in the implantation of treaties, and empowers
national governments to subjugate domestic conflict. Article 46 makes an exception to Article
27 when a country agrees to be bound to a treaty, in violation of domestic law. The provision
recognizes the importance of such domestic laws as being of greater interest to the nation state.
In contrast, states have their own constitutional, statutory and common law rules that determine
the effect given to international law.244
One of the main issues that have a major influence on the effectiveness on the
enforcement of a treaty, is the emphasis placed on such agreements in the international hierarchy
of law. Transnational treaties do not exceed the authority of the constitution of any country. In
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the United States for example, the Constitution's specific incorporation of treaties into the law
does and should not grant the treaty a preemptive status. Treaties are but a part of domestic laws,
requiring state courts to examine their terms and purpose.245 In some countries, such treaties are
equal to legislation and in others they serve as common law. In other nations, the authority of
international law occupies a status below constitutional provisions and legislation.
The authority of an international treaty when pitted against domestic law is crucial to its
application. The degree to which a treaty is directly applied in a domestic forum, and to what
degree it is treated as state law without a further act of transformation, has been subject to debate
for more than a century. The direct application of a treaty requires it to have enforcement
mechanisms within domestic boundaries. However, even if international agreements are
considered valid in domestic law, they may not be immediately applicable.246 Factors that play
into the applicability of these agreements touch upon context and principles that are identified
upon its founding.
D. Implications of Military Alliances

An alliance between nations to protect their mutual interests with the forces of their
military goes beyond security interests in its implications. Organizations like the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the South
American Defense Council each assure mutual protection while shifting domestic policy to
accommodate their international obligations. These alliances, similar to non-military agreements,
also leave room for domestic interpretation and enforcement of international law. In the context
of environmental criminal law, it is important to understand the mechanisms of militarily
alliances and their usefulness in being able to implement international agendas. The counter is
also true, in that domestic policy can shift and change military covenants on the international
scale. The creation, selection of parties, and effectiveness of military alliances and treaties are
relevant to the exploratory mission of finding a firm foundation to promulgate environmental
criminal law.
The differences between nations on their domestic legal structures are overlooked in the
discussion of alliances and treaties. Entering into military alliances is a crucial component of any
countries foreign policy. Therefore, who a nation selects as their close military partners warrants
an inquiry in the context of international relationship creation. Generally, nations whose
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domestic legal structures closely resemble each other are more likely to select each other as
parties to a military alliance.247 There have been numerous scholars that have argued interstate
cooperation is bolstered by a common cultural background. When these alliances are formed,
parties integrate by adopting certain beliefs and skills from their counterparts.248
The content of the alliances themselves are also adjusted to match the domestic schemes
of signatory states. “When drafting an alliance agreement, states can incorporate into their
treaties numerous details concerning the functioning and execution of an alliance….”249 Civil
law contracts, common law contracts, and Islamic law contracts are some domestic principles
and legal doctrines that can make a treaty or alliance ambiguous and ineffective, or precise and
efficient. For instance, common law states and Islamic states place a greater amount of
contingencies on military alliances, while civil law countries place fewer.250
Research has found a major difference between military and non-military alliances.
“Opportunistic abrogation is less likely for alliances including democratic states and alliances
that are linked to nonmilitary cooperation.”251 There is also information showing alliances that
are between democratic states are less likely to end with a violation of terms.252 All of this data is
important to understand and digest when it comes to promulgating environmental protection
schemes on the international arena.
Understanding what factors help bond nations together, and the reasons why certain
international covenants succeed while others fail, will help strengthen an academic
recommendation for a new protective scheme. Environmental criminal law is a new field in
penal enforcement that still has not been adopted on the international scale. The values that
certain nations place on military alliances or non-military alliances may be a stepping stone in
asserting the environmental agenda in a venue that maybe non-traditional. For instance, a
military alliance could be lobbied to consider environmental protection as a national security
interest worthy of armed protection. As alliances vow to attack or defend any nation that is
attacked within an alliance, it is possible to categorize certain acts against the environment as
attacks on the national security interest. Furthermore, the likelihood of states to keep their
military alliances over nonmilitary alliances, and the frequency of regional alliances over vast
global military cooperation gives us the scholarly deduction that an environmental criminal
protection system may be implemented on a local and stable scale.
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III.

Harmonization in Domestic Penal Legislation

One purpose of international treaties is to create a universal understanding of a prohibited
act. This realization must be disseminated to the extent that it can be effectively used to
implement penal codes in the various signatory countries. Such an understanding could lead to
the criminalization of a prohibited act at domestic level in ways that create consistency and
predictability among the various countries.253 An obstacle facing such harmonization is the
reality that most treaties, in dealing with issues of prohibition, limit their mandates without going
further to demand a specific penalizing method to be adopted by member states, whether
criminal or administrative. States would also have wide discretion over the substance and form
of the penalties adopted to meet the requirements of the treaty. Standardization of prohibited acts
and punishable behavior would eventually lead to harmonization of national laws when it comes
to adequacy of implementation.
Developing prohibited acts that are universal, and coupling them with penalizing
procedures will most likely impact procedural and substantive issues of environmental law.
Examples are evidence of the commission of the crime, or proof of causality between the act and
the harm. The definition or nature of the specific environmental crime affects the burden of proof
that must be met to successfully prosecute the crime in question.254 A violation of an
administrative regulation would most likely require different standards compared to violation of
a criminal code. In addition, the very nature of environmental crimes necessitates a different
treatment of evidentiary issues because of the nature of the harm.255 Damage to the environment
can often be caused by long term accumulation of certain actions, rather than the immediate
result of single conduct. This is frequently the case in other non-environmental crimes. The
ability to meet the burden of proof also depends on the level of protection offered to the
environmental medium. For instance, prosecuting the endangerment of an environmental entity
generally requires a lesser burden than a case involving specific damage to the medium.
It is important to turn to recent history on environmental criminality, in concept and
practice. Societies are still unsure about what parameters define environmental crimes. This is
closely related to the historical reality that the environment has not been considered significant in
value. Therefore, building law on the subject cannot be found in traditional environmental legal
principles and precedent.256 Unlike other crimes that benefit only the criminal, crimes against the
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environment may have societal benefits, such as employment opportunities and economic
prosperity. For example, in the light of existing scientific evidence on global warming, continued
encouragement of such activities represents intentional harm that is immoral and destructive to
collective public interest. This is concurrent to the particular industries and companies that also
benefit from such crimes.257
Historically, the scope and severity of environmental crimes have been measured by the
amount of pollution they cause. This scale is coupled with enforcement being centered on
controlling the amount of pollution through administrative regulations. Here, the purpose of
criminal law is to ensure the proper enforcement of the regulatory scheme. Prosecutorial focus
must remain on important issues including the lack of permits. The lack of this element limits the
function of criminal law, as many acts of pollution are not prescribed in the permit scheme.
These types of conduct would go unpunished despite their seriousness. The threat that this
pollution poses to the environment is far more serious than mere administrative disobedience.
This dependency on administrative law to enforce environmental treaties has created serious
limitations on the effectiveness of domestic law and international treaties. This is strongly
correlated to the power vested in administrators who make controlling regulations, not
legislators. A few models have been presented that focus on the environmental interest rather
than adherence to the administrative scheme.
The first model is the Model of Abstract Endangerment. This essentially focuses on
criminalizing disobedience of administrative requirements,258 such as a failure to obtain
appropriate permits. It does not punish for damages committed against environment. Rather, it is
a penal code designed to punish entities that do not adhere to the dictate of government
regulations. This model reflects the notion that adherence to government regulations are more
effective in preventing environmental damage. The Abstract Endangerment Model couples
existing regulations that touch upon licensing, paperwork and monitoring of pollution producing
conduct with enforcement mechanisms designed to touch upon criminal law. The language
contained within the criminal provisions generally identify the illegal conduct and the specific
punishment to go along with infractions. There are also incentive provisions that reward parties
that adhere to the rules of compliance with mechanisms that protect them from further liability
and enforcement actions.259 The focus here is on vindicating administrative values.
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The second model, Concrete Endangerment, criminalizes actions that violate
administrative law and pose a danger to the environment. This model raises the bar closer to
protecting ecological values rather than regulatory schemes. It requires proof that the activity is
dangerous to the protected medium, such as water, air, or soil. An example of a violation of this
second model involves the Belgian Surface Water Protection Act of 1971. The courts have a
legal presumption that any discharge of waste water is considered pollution. This follows the
requirement that dischargers gain legal status through permits. Conversely, when no permit is
available for the specific form of discharge, the presumption does not apply. In this case, the
prosecutor would have to provide evidence that the discharge “could have changed the water
quality of the receiving surface water.” This would be a violation of this second model.260
The third model of sanctions for serious environmental pollution punishes harm to the
environment even if the act is not otherwise unlawful. This model severs the link between
administrative regulations and criminal law. It aims to punish serious environmental harm
regardless of whether there was an underlying administrative violation. Under this model, crimes
must be extraordinarily serious in order to justify a presumption that the harm was beyond the
contemplation of the regulations; that such risk was never permitted to be taken. Some legislative
structures provide margins that anticipate room for error.261 Not understanding minor infractions
or unintentional ones would be contradictory to its purpose.
Environmental treaties usually require that states enact penal laws to enforce its
provisions with respect to “prohibited activities.”262 However, most treaties do not provide a
definition of the prohibited acts. Signatory states may use administrative regulations to impose
penalties for actions such as violations of certain limits of discharge, or improper permits or
bookkeeping.263 Here criminality becomes complementary to the administrative scheme. The
concept of environmental harm is usually not presented; it is the protected interest of the
administrative measure itself and not the ecological value.
This poses a challenge to the very basic idea that criminal law should be implemented to
protect against harm. However, it could be argued that the enactment of the legislative law aimed
at protecting an environmental medium could be imposed regardless of the occurrence of the
harm.264 Here, all that is needed to prove a crime is the occurrence of the violation, regardless of
the mens rea or the degree of damage to the ecological medium.
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There is sharp criticism against the concept of abstract endangerment and its strict
liability premise. It originates from the delegation of power from the legislative to the executive
authority of government. This raises a constitutional issue in countries that do not criminalize a
violation of penal code that is ambiguous.265 (Nullumcrimen, nullapoena sine legepraevia et
scripta). Furthermore, the model has been called ineffective for its inability to prosecute against
those who have not violated an administrate rule, even though substantial harm has occurred. For
example, for the various mediums of soil, water and air, the agency in charge of monitoring
enforcement would set levels of “acceptable” contact between the environment and the pollutant
itself. This baseline would consider the various conflicting interests involved in the drafting of
the legislation as well as the underlying principles of its goals.266
The Council of Europe Convention adopted the Abstract Endangerment Approach by
requiring member states to implement directions through criminal or administrative measures.267
Article 4 of that Convention refers to inter alia; the unlawful operation of a plant. It allows its
signatories to rely on administrative law to accomplish the ends of the convention. 268
The concrete endangerment approach has a direct impact on the way a crime can be
proven. This is due to the relationship between harm and criminal liability. Policy-makers in the
1980’s became concerned about the dependency of criminal environmental law on administrative
law, and sought to separate the two by sanctioning violators directly. This affected the way
environmental crimes were proven. Rather than discussing an abstract analysis to the risk posed
to the environmental medium and human health, criminal consequences under this approach rely
on the nature of the damage to the environmental medium and the scientific diagnosis of such
damage. Two elements of the crime that must be proven include an allegation of the occurrence
of an illegal emission or discharge, or the violation of statutory or administrative duties
(including the condition of a license). Even under this approach, which is stricter than the
abstract endangerment model, administrative law provides a defense from criminal liability for
the polluter. Perpetrators can avoid sanctions by proving compliance with regulations. Thus, the
administrative scheme has a determinative influence on criminal liability since the emissions or
pollution can be charged as a criminal offense if they were committed illegally.
The Serious Pollution Model attempts to provide protection against extremely harmful
acts of pollution. Here, administrative authorities are not engaged in the process. The power is
shifted from polluters to prosecutors because criminal liability can still exist even if
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administrative conditions are met. The administrative link is broken because parties who follow
this theory understand that administrative code cannot always encompass harmful conduct of
perpetrators. The assumption administrative body did not permit the damage or risk at bar. The
end results require that the harms cause by the release of pollutants be “extreme in nature.”269
Casual links still remain however, as a very difficult field to predict with reliability. The
Korean and Japanese legislators have taken this into consideration and introduced presumptions
within their legal systems that address causation. This legal doctrine asserts that a presumption
exists when material that would normally cause damage if released would arise upon the release
of the material. The Koreans have gone a step further by placing penal provisions to couple the
presumptions.270
In harmonizing domestic legislation, two forces can be largely helpful in accomplishing
this goal. First, an international body that leads in changing law and practice. Second, a domestic
organization that lobbies and provides information to government bodies directly responsible for
implementing vital environmental law. UNEP was established in 1972 to be the leading
international organization in the realm of environmental protection. However its weakness has
been cited in its lack of centralized authority. Furthermore, rather than function as a long term
institution, it has been spending time and resources in short time fixes, lacking presence in
policy. All though this international organization has been a force in the realm of environmental
protection, it has fallen short of creating true impact with domestic policy and legislation.
IUCN on the other hand was established in 1965 and it operates within most nations in
the world. It has in recent times been focusing on providing judicial institutions resources and
material to assist in the adjudication process of environmental matters. It has also made strides in
creating cooperation amongst international bodies by planning summits and meetings. This and a
range of information that it has provided to judicial institutions has created a lasting impact in the
development of law on the domestic scale.271

IV.

Legal Persons – Criminal Liability for Pollution

The debate over the criminal accountability of corporations committing environmental
crimes has become increasingly more pertinent in light of serious atrocities committed on their
behalf. These tragedies have acutely affected the environment and areas of public and private
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interest. Companies such as Exxon, Pfizer, Bayer, BP, and Halliburton have recently breached
several environmental, health and safety laws.272 The direct financial and human consequences
of such actions are steep, and the damage that these crimes cause to the environment are
extensive.
State signatories to environmental treaties must commit to enforce penal sanctions
against parties who break the law on behalf of themselves or corporate entities. The ability to
penalize these entities, either civilly or criminally varies among nations. However, there is no
established protocol in international law for the penalization of a corporation’s activities
conducted by personnel or agents, even in the absence of a direct act by the company. In nearly
all countries, the illegal actions of a corporate employee must be within the scope of their
employment. The philosophy of the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine holds individuals
responsible for civil penalties and criminal sanction when avoidable violations occur.
Furthermore, under most circumstances, evidence must exist that their actions were authorized
by or with the consent of a senior official, and within the scope of his or her authority. In this
section, the criminality of corporate entities will be discussed firstly in the context of the liability
of individual employees and then the corporation itself.
1. Corporate activities are typically the result of myriad coordinated decisions, leading to
the potential for a wide range of delegated responsibilities. As a result, it can be difficult to find
and prosecute the person or persons liable for a crime in the case of “organizational
wrongdoing,” which can lead to an “organized irresponsibility” of individual employees. Thus
the indirect liability of a director or other actor can be easily avoided; such actors can only be
punished when they themselves have committed a crime. Therefore, the extension of individual
liability is being explored in both statutory and case law, especially in the area of entrepreneurial
activity.
There are general approaches to criminal liability regarding international environmental
law:
(a) Criminal liability for corporate officers may still exist even if they themselves
did not commit the act, as long as the act occurred within the scope of their control and
knowledge.
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(b) A more broad scope of liability occurs if the corporate officer is indirectly
responsible for the act in question; he may be liable for the failure to adequately
supervise subordinates.
(c) In broader cases, even if the officer is not a direct participant in an employee’s
unlawful behavior, he may still be liable. The officer would have to exercise special care
to avoid liability by preventing illegal activity.
International law generally seeks to create a presumption of intent or to change the burden of
proof per (b) and (c). In many counties, adherence to the traditional principle that criminal
liability requires personal fault ((a)) is being sacrificed in an effort to secure greater
environmental protection.
2. Once it has been determined that a corporate action constitutes a crime, it is possible to
punish both the individual and the enterprise itself. Numerous mechanisms are in place to
accomplish this goal. In the U.S., such sanctions include placing the corporation in the custody
of the U.S. Marshalls, requiring reforms of operations, financial penalties, and imposing
substantial sanctions. In cases involving financial penalties, the estimates of illegal gains is
generally not accepted, but there are nations that have regulations that calculate accordingly. For
example, in the matter of surcharges in the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, the law can reduce
illegal gains by imposing payment to the government with a clear numerical formula. There is
growing consensus towards bringing criminal liability against corporations.
However, in countries such as Korea or Japan, the difficulty rests more in determining
personal fault. For example, both countries provide that a corporate entity is held responsible for
a crime committed by one of its employees.273 In order to do this, one must prove that an
individual acted illegally and violated the regulation. Generally, this individual is difficult to
locate, particularly when the enterprise is a large company. Once the individual has been located
and charged, a prosecutor needs proof that the corporation did not uphold its requirement to
prevent the employee from committing a crime. In response to this problem, the Korean
Judiciary has adopted a theory of fault presumption, which allows for additional findings against
perpetrators. This example reflects the difficulty involved in punishing a large corporation. Such
approaches have been met with criticism because of the doctrine of guilt.
Observing corporate liability in the context of international law is rooted in legal
doctrine. In 1987, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law recognized corporate liability under
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international law.274 Since the formal acknowledgement of corporate responsibility, there has
been an increased push in holding non state actors criminally liable in the international arena. 275
In a recent analysis, scholars have argued that corporations fall under specific laws already
established within the community of nations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Genocide Convention. Furthermore, “Corporations are already widely regulated by
international law, whether through economic frameworks and trade agreements or through penal
provisions governing fraud and money laundering. Indeed, the next step to bring them
specifically under the rubric of international criminal legal norms is not a far stretch.”276
Opponents of liability have made their stand on international covenants such as the
Genocide Convention. The convention states, “Persons committing genocide or any other acts
enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rules,
public officials or private individuals.” 277 The defenders of corporate interests argue that the list
is fully inclusive of those that are subject to the jurisdiction of the convention, and the list does
not include legal persons but only real persons. However, there have been no judicial or textual
distinctions between a legal and non-legal person in reference to this specific international law
during its creation.278 Unfortunately, there is still debate as to the meaning and application of
“persons.” This continues to be an obstacle to the prosecution of corporations. The doctrine of
vicarious liability serves as another legal mechanism to bring corporations to justice. In recent
years, more and more nation states have been found liable for individual actors performing duties
on behalf of their country. This was solidified in 2007 when the International Court of Justice
rendered a decision making nation states liable for committing genocide.279 As states are held
liable for acts done by individuals, the argument scholars propose would effectuate the same
principle towards corporations. “Modern companies cannot feign innocence by claiming that
they were unaware that they enable genocide.”280 These measures would ensure that corporations
create internal systems of self-policing that would control their own directors and members from
engaging in acts that would be against the corporate interests. However, until we incentivize
corporations to not engage in these activities through penalties, fines, and penal sanctions, they
will continue to look at their profits as a driving factor of their agenda.

V.
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Transnationalization in Domestic Penal Legislation

Transnational subject matter jurisdiction is less than established, even with well settled
principles. Conflicts arise when more than one law is applicable to the same issue. Even with the
assumption that principles of nationalism and territory have attained customary law status, there
are neither general treaties nor customary legal rules for resolving such conflicts. Significant
obstacles to providing solutions gain genesis in the uncertainty revolving around conflicting
authoritative principles and extraterritorial principles under international law.281 To overcome
such obstacles, novel interpretations can be created to observe extraterritorial rules through more
a more workable prism.
A state signatory has jurisdiction within its territorial boundaries, including relevant
coastal waters and seabed areas (the so called “territorial theory” of jurisdiction).282 To apply
national law to transboundary cases, the range of territorial theory should be expanded by
determining the geographic location of a crime. Within the ubiquity principle, the place of
commission is where the act took place. That extends the principle of ubiquity in connection with
the principle of territoriality.
Broader jurisdiction theories are adopted by certain countries. The “passive personality
theory” extends jurisdictional prosecutorial powers to where the victim of the offense is a
domiciliary.283 The “protective theory” extends judicial dominion over all violations, including
those occurring outside domestic boundaries. Such acts could easily be argued as they have been
done, that they infringe on national security and sovereignty. The “universal jurisdiction theory”
allows states to exercise in personam jurisdiction over individual when they are within the
territorial boundaries of the nation state and their violations can be categorized as particularly
harmful or heinous to mankind.284 This concept is generally applicable when an international
covenant has outlawed or banned the specific conduct that was committed by the violator, and
the country is a member state to that agreement.285
There can also be limits that arise when the perpetrator is connected in some manner to
another country, but the offender does not adhere to foreign administrative requirements. For
example, the Federal Republic of Germany does penalize actors operating within a foreign
country who lack proper permits.286 Under the ubiquity principle, the location of the offense the
location of the harm occurred and the act causing such harm differ. However, this is only
applicable when concrete endangerment is an element of the offense. Abstract dangers that could
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or could not exist would be outside the bounds of this principle. In these circumstances,
according to prevailing opinion, the harm itself is not a legal element to the offense.
Illegal conduct must be top priority in the country where it exists. Both the United States
and the United Kingdom insisted on criminal jurisdiction favorable to territoriality. They did not
acknowledge the idea that a state may apprehend and prosecute actors outside their own
territorial boundaries. This is in sharp contrast to countries who have adopted the passive
personality principle, protective theory, and the universal jurisdiction doctrine to protect their
environment and prosecute criminals. In recent decades, the United States has moved away from
this possession.
Now the U.S. generally relies on what other countries recognize as extravagant
jurisdiction claims. The criminal provisions in U.S. environmental statutes have been interpreted
very broadly. These interpretations of legal principles allow the U.S. the reach beyond its borders
to have an international long arm. The extraterritorial interpretation of American environmental
laws would expose actors with no personal connections with the U.S., except through their
business, to criminal liability within the U.S. This is the case regardless of whether the
irresponsible officer’s corporation was a domiciliary of the U.S. or another country. Whether the
Americanization of international law enforcement is also applicable within the international
community should be examined more closely.
Numerous nations have adopted laws to protect interests outside their territorial
boundaries. The most common are laws focused on the protection of the oceans. These laws
generally ban vessels of the legislating state (or vessels operating within its territorial
boundaries) from polluting. Many of these regulations were passed in conjunction with the
implementation of the 1954 London Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
and the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.287
The passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was a legislative response by the United
States Congress to the environmental damage caused by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.288 This
act gave the President power to prosecute actors on a criminal level. The Act’s liability
provisions are ill-defined, as is the issue of applicability to foreign nationals. If it were, new
interpretations would be required of existing international maritime law. The enforcement of the
Oil Pollution Act’s criminal provisions within or beyond the territorial sea of the U.S. for spills
that fail to rise to egregious or willful, would mean that the US would be exercising greater
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power than that allocated to coastal states under the U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).289
Many provisions of UNCLOS have been accepted as customary international law. In
light of this, the agreement has been used to guide the marine jurisdiction debate in academic
circles. The importance of the UNCLOS and its provisions urge U.S. courts to give precedence
to the Oil Pollution Act over UNCLOS. The MARPOL Convention and its corresponding U.S.
legislation are based on the necessity of pollution reduction from routine ship movements and
operations.
The inability of the Law of the Sea to effectively handle developments in modern life is
well recognized. However, unilateral actions outside the law’s boundaries are viewed as
inevitable, which may lead to international conflict. In some academic circles, international law
is viewed as growing slowly because of its requirement of mutual consent prior to any communal
action. The use of criminal sanctions to protect the environment recognizes a growing consensus
that has emerged to govern the international community since the 1982 U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea. That Convention laid a framework that defers to the flag state for compliance
certification and enforcement action.
UNCLOS and MARPOL approach this problem by adopting the perspective that the
“freedom of the seas” should be absolute. The community of nations should seek to comply with
the provisions of UNCLOS. Its provisions reflect the needs of today’s worlds and will help shape
it for future generations. The international community should be accepting of rules that support
the mutual enforcement of rules against environmental crime.
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Chapter 4
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINALIZING
ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL ACTIVITIES

I.

History of Regionalism

The concept of regionalism has sparked a remarkable interest in the public consciousness
with its policy considerations. This surge of focus comes in the aftermath of the Cold War, the
consolidation of Europe, and the creation of several supranational agreements including
NAFTA.290 Because environmental issues arise from ecosystems and geographical features
rather than political boundaries, domestic and local actions are insufficient, requiring
international cooperation.291 The cohesive facilitation of environmental issues can create a
common pool of rules, goals, and procedures with the end product of international
cooperation.292
The consequences for failing to adequately address environmental crimes are potentially
disastrous. There exist well-funded criminal organizations that continually profit from exploiting
the environment. Within the same breadth, corporations continue to play out profit scenarios
upon which they accept financial gains over damages to the environment. The Environmental
Investigation Agency has urged “the international community to wake-up to the menace of
environmental crime and show the necessary political will to tackle the criminal gangs
plundering our planet for a quick profit.”293 Enforcement agencies traditionally have chosen to
place their efforts against classic international crimes such as the trafficking of drugs, weapons,
people and terrorism.294 The focus on these international matters have stymied efforts to regulate
environmental crimes such as the illegal trading of environmental commodities.295
The realities of environmental infractions require an appropriately measured response
that will regulate the field of law in a manner that would protect the lives of wild animals and
human health. Similar to traditional crimes, gauging the tolerable level of unregulated
environmental conduct is often difficult. Regardless of this analysis, sufficient regulatory
response is required from all parties that aim to police environmental crimes. Attempts to obtain
this goal have severely fell short in depth and breadth.296
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Cooperation on a regional geographic basis has been a builder of alliances since the dawn
of the history of nations. States, cities, and communities working together have achieved goals
that have progressed civilized society. With respect to environmental protection however,
progress has been slow and in many ways nonexistent. A few reasons for this are the delicate
nature of interests that conflict with neighbors. For example, it may be in the interest of one
nation to log its natural forests for economic gain, while the flood run off caused by this policy
may only affect the neighboring nation. Furthermore, even when states have common interests,
common obstacles remain in achieving their success. The lack of monetary resources, the risk of
economic harm, political instability, and lack of political will for long term commitment are all
problem issues that nations face.
Strong domestic legislation coupled with international law provides systematic
engagement on established principles that foster regional cooperation. This can then overcome
domestic legal differences as long as international commitment is priority within the region.
Given this premise, it is much easier to create cooperation in the field of environmental legal
issues in comparison to other fields of law. The main for reasons for this are: 1) the study of
ecology and the environment is a shared common body of knowledge with a medium that is
inhabited by all, 2) technological systems that are used by all mankind cause many of the
contemporary public health issues such as acid rain and urban smog, 3) the advanced nature of
governments cause commonalities in bureaucracies and their enforcement practices, and 4)
globalization that has caused the integration of economies, the speed of news, and the low travel
time between far distances has made it easier for different countries to find common ground in
the need for environmental protection.297

II.

Domestic Legislation

Often, legislation passed on the domestic level that aims to combat environmental crimes
has been inadequate in substance and enforcement. This is primarily caused by state’s selfcentered concerns about their economy and security. This focus ignores the environment while
focuses on short term growth.298 Pursuing the goal of regulating environmental crimes is out of
the possible scope of the individual state.299 Due to the glaring weakness of nation-state
regulations, interstate cooperation is the necessary mechanism to solve the steep crisis of
environmental crimes. Transnational cooperation has proven to be the correct mechanism to
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combat similar international challenges in the past.300 It has been effective in eliminating cholera
that had ravaged large populations.301 Community based cooperation also oversaw the
elimination slavery and the increase of the human standard of living.
A specialized agency that directs its efforts in exploring and developing a sound
knowledge base of organized environmental crimes is a rare reality.302 The few that are in
existence are grossly under financed which leads to poor training, and a wholly underdeveloped
understanding of proper strategies to produce intelligence led enforcement. Unfortunately, this
setback leads to a poor allocation of resources and a poorly planned approach to organized
environmental crime.
Corruption at the state and corporate level has proven to be the most prominent challenge
in circumventing environmental crimes.303 The root of the problem rests in corruption, anchored
in bribes and other monetary considerations; this must be addressed by all parties.304 Efforts are
need to push for administrative reform. Corruption prevention is the most effective and
historically successful way to combat the problem. However, many developed and developing
nations still face profound problems that adversely affect international and transnational
progress. Easily accessible technologies that can be adopted with nominal resources are still not
enacted to provide online auditing capabilities to average citizens.305
Commentators have noted that there seems to be an unreasonable institutional
complacency in respects to environmental crime.306 There is a certain lack of awareness
concerning the size of the environmental problem and the efforts needed to curb it which is
unacceptable. Proper attention must be paid to the clear fact that environmental crimes and their
resulting harm are time sensitive. This is exemplified by many organizations such as the
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality who aim to develop solutions quickly and
efficiently to solve the problems at hand in the Gulf of Mexico.307
In attempting to understand the specific domestic legislative schemes that are
encountered in the West, the United States and the European Union are a prime example for
comparison. The differences between the two bodies show the strengths and weaknesses of each
system that can be used to lobby for effective adoption of environmental criminal regimes. Even
if such adoption cannot be attained by the E.U. or the U.S. alone, their place in their regional
position in the world allows us to see alternative methods for understanding external pressures
for domestic adoption of laws.
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It is imperative to understand the effects of various legal systems. The differences allow
us to measure the success of certain legal structures and the deficiencies of others. This can
translate to not only the substantive nature of the laws themselves, but the enforcement
mechanism used to put them into practice. The United States has arguably the most advanced
system of environmental protection laws in the modern world. The only comparable system of
law is the steadily progressing European Union. This regional government has put into place
various pieces of legislation that ripples through its member states.
In the 1970s, the United States was in an era of drastic social change. One of the many
popular movements centered on environmental protection occurred during this period. The
adoption of such laws happened quickly and took place in effective fashion. “[J]ust within a few
years, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air amendments, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Noise Control Act, the Coastal Zone Management
Act, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973.”308 These laws were all passed on the federal
level, allowing national resources to be used to protect all of these environmental interests. This
is in contrast to individual states attempting to combat environmental challenges on their own,
with limited financial means.
Although the American system puts large emphasis on the federal government to enforce
and supervise industries, it does not place the entire burden on Washington. Rather, federal law
serves only as a minimum requirement, where states can create stricter rules and regulations. For
environmental rules, states are free to create their own emissions rules and standards that are
tougher than the federal bar. This of course is limited by the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the document to not allow States to place an unnecessarily high burden on
interstate commerce or the interest of other states. This is generally referred to as the “commerce
clause.” Another instance of states being countermanded by the Supreme Court is when federal
law occupies the field and preempts the area of law that the state is legislating in. The Supreme
Court refers to the “supremacy clause” that allows federal law to supersede that of states.
The model in the European Union has vast differences. Unlike the federal system in the
United States, the E.U. binds its nation states together through treaties and other international
agreements. Therefore, each country is only granted power that has been expressly outlined by
international covenants. “Despite this principle, the power of the European bureaucracy… has
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steadily increased and led to a steady shift of environmental regulatory competences to the
European level.”309 This is because a large amount of domestic policies that are passed by
individual legislatures are effectively becoming European Law.
In the E.U., enforcement is also a crucial component to understanding domestic
relationships. Member states themselves are charged with the enforcement of European
Commission environmental law.310 This has in turn pushed nation states to adopt in large part
rules and regulations that are used by the E.U. collective. “For example, sixty-six present of
environmental law in the Netherlands is based on European directives and regulations.”311 In
addition to this, the European Court of Justice has “held that under certain circumstances,
citizens who have suffered damage as a result of a lack of implementation by a Member State
can be entitled to compensation….”312
Another principle adopted in Europe allows an individual citizen to invoke supranational
law to challenge policies of their own state. This is another mechanism that allows individuals to
hold their own domestic systems accountable by using international law that binds signatory
countries. A prime example is an ECJ decision that imposed financial penalties on Greece for not
complying with an earlier judgment from 1992.313 This shows a clear support from the entire
European Community to hold those responsible for infractions against the environment and its
unified principles.
The main difference between both the U.S. system and the E.U. system rests in the E.U.’s
inability to hold citizens or enterprises liable. E.U. law is focused mainly on the nation states that
have signed on to its treaties. The member states themselves are responsible for prosecuting
citizens and enterprises that have offended principles of law. In understanding both of these
systems, one can observe positives of federal system that has great effectiveness in handling
matters on a domestic level. It can also not be overlooked that a supranational body like the E.U.
can hold many nations accountable at once through its own checks and balances; a power
unavailable to the U.S.
To maintain the balance, the world must come to the general consensus that
environmental crimes demand a sustained response from the community of nations. These efforts
must be undertaken before attempts to cure the problem is moot due to temporal inactivity. The
success of this initiative requires proper regional cooperation between all interested parties.
There have been a few global mechanisms, both governmental and non-governmental that have
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achieved solid results. These approaches have pushed forward this task in an attempt to connect
groups and help to create regional cooperation. 314
Regionally located organizations seem to be better equipped than global institutions, both
in efficiency and execution when dealing with the challenge of implementing effective
environmental policies.315 This is generally the case because regional treaties are able to
encompass a larger number of parties than a single global treaty, assuming that the cost of
cooperation is the same within both types of regimes. This results in regional cooperation being
more effective in policing and regulating environmental crimes.316 Generally, local organizations
have more accessible means to gather information, and it is simply easier to create cooperation
among regional parties with similar cultures and ecological systems.317

III.

Variability in the Application of Domestic Law

Individual countries with commitments to regional agreements have varying
circumstances that often this lead to exceptions and exemptions being applied to that party. Such
exceptions often remain the steadfast rule. For example, Eastern European countries, with their
lower environmental living conditions and nearly non-existent regulations, have ties with the
European Commission (EC). The environmental objectives are defined in Article 4 of the Water
Framework Directive.318 The purpose of this article is to provide continued access to sustainable
water while emphasizing a high level of environmental protection.
Article 4.1 defined the Water Framework Directive’s general objective to be prevalent in
all surface and groundwater bodies, namely, a positive status mark by 2015, and the introduction
of principles that help to prevent any further crippling of that status. Within the short term
however, there are a number of exemptions to the general objectives that allow for less stringent
requirements. For example, the article allows the extending of the deadline beyond 2015 for the
implementation of new projects, provided a set of conditions are fulfilled.319 The result is that the
interpretation of regional instruments will generally remain inconsistent, possibly for a long
period of time due to the nature of the exemptions and the likelihood that there will be a breach
by the subject state.
Poorer countries joining regional organizations are expected to develop their industry
fully respecting and adhering to environmental laws. Economic exemptions and incentives that
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allow these particular nations to take calculated precautions against pollution and gradually attain
pollution controls are on par with industrialized nations.320
Exemptions that are practiced domestically vary in scope. An example of this incentive
based exemption system was passed into law to form a successful U.S. based mechanism. The
system was designed to control acid. Title IV in 1990-The Clean Air Act was passed to allow
tradable emission allowances for sulfur dioxide. The system allowed for the electric power
industry in the eastern part of the county to be allowed a fixed number of allowances, and the
rules allowed the banking, buying and selling of these allowances.321 The theory revolves
around the idea that countries are allowed certain privileges to help better strike the balance
between economic prosperity and complying with environmental laws. These incentives are
designed avoid social and political instability that result in the shifting values countries place on
pollution control. Such changes in perspective can be due to their individual environments and
political climate.
Another example stems from the Baltic Sea region. Surround this geographic location are
14 countries at the drainage basin of the Baltic Sea; Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Germany, Denmark, Belarus, Norway, Slovakia, and Czech. Since these nations vary in
development, the amount each nation contributes to pollution in the region can be divided into
two categories. In developed nations such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Germany,
pollution stems from paper manufacturing and the fertilization of agriculture.322
Proponents of “regional cooperation” as a tool to protect the environment, which utilizes
criminal penalties, adopts and concedes that the differences between nations legislative structures
are roadblocks that hinder the success of environmental protection agreements.323 It is at this
junction that international law helps clear the murky waters. Standard conflict-of-law doctrines
are not sufficient to handle the existing challenges.324 However, participation must be voluntary
and by national will rather than international criticism and penalties. Nations who are pushed to
agreement by unsolicited pressure are less likely to keep their commitments.325

IV.

Environmental Standards in Individual Nations

The burden of determining environmental standards that should be controlling for each
developing country is often a difficult task. Applying general principles of international
environmental law to the various issues in these nations are not realistic.326 The principle of
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“Sustainable Development,” which formulates the idea that safeguarding the environment and
economic development are intertwined practices, has increased international environmental
cooperation.327 However, the principle of national sovereignty remains a significant obstacle to
full international cooperation. Many countries are stern in their demands and in their practice of
exploiting their native natural resources pursuant to their own political and economic policies.328
Nations often use the sovereignty argument as a shield to protect against rising social
costs and keep the contradicting benefits that go along with pollution control.329 These countries
feel that their privilege as sovereign nations allows them to use all available means to attain
economic success on plane with those enjoyed by the developed countries. This notion comes in
light of the plausible argument that these now-developed countries did not have to succumb to
any rigid environmental restraints, and they have achieved economic prosperity because of the
lack of restraints.
Before 1970 for example, environmental laws in the U.S were virtually non-existent. A
few states did attempt to establish limited controls. There were common law property and tort
principles that were invoked on behalf of environmental concerns in certain lawsuits. These
restraints were extremely limited, and there was no legislation in place that regulated pollution of
the air, water, or land. The U.S. had no national clean air legislation, no federal clean water act,
and no hazardous waste or toxic substance laws. Prior to 1970, the Environmental Protection
Agency was nonexistent. Mechanisms that did exist were only granted limited powers under
statutory definitions, most of which only allowed for some basic assistance to local and state
governments.330 Nevertheless, the sovereignty shield has been pierced now that nations realize
that international interests are most important in sustainable development.331
Other less discussed nations from Southeast Asia also illuminate the diversity of domestic
laws, and the deep history that accompanies legislation. In Indonesia for example, the “natural
resource management after the Suharto regime’s demise in 1998 is heavily influenced by the
ongoing process of decentralization of power to the regions.”332 This has led to a failure of
government in attempting to balance the interests of local provinces with those of the central
government in reference to national resources. Indonesia’s forest management effort has been
struck by a massive dysfunction as local leaders no longer comply with demands from the
centralized government.333 “Overall, the institutional governance of natural resources and the
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environment in Indonesia continues to be fractured, with problems of corruption and lack of coordination becoming even more pronounced than during the Suharto era.”334
Thailand offers a more optimistic perspective, where efforts have been bolstered by the
new Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE). The agency faces its toughest
competition not from outside special interests, but other government agencies, such as the
Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives.335 Although the new agency has seen setbacks after
its genesis, there is confidence that the governmental body will be able to regulate environmental
exploitation within Thailand’s borders. Malaysia has also taken the same approach by
establishing its own MNRE. Experts have noted however that “there are worrying signs that the
[Malaysian] MNRE is perpetuating the traditional emphasis on exploitation and wealth creation,
as evidence by the new Minister’s recent assertion that land and forests are national assets which
must not be left dormant.”336
Vietnam is another Southeast Asian country that has implemented an MNRE to regulate
natural resources. It too “faces challenges in reconciling the policies of its central and provincial
governments.”337
The common problem between these countries and other Southeast Asian nations
revolves around their inability to manage the interests between the central and provincial
governments. This is “exemplified by Indonesia and Vietnam [as] many of the laws enacted are
typically initiated by sectoral ministries interested only in the specific range of activities that fall
within their mandate.”338 This is in stark contrast to the United States that has a functioning
republican government with both a state and federal governments. The E.U. boasts strong
supranational policies with nation states enforcing international policy on the domestic scale
without great conflict. With every unique nation, there comes a delicate balance of government
that interplays with environmental policy and enforcement. Southeast Asia serves as a small test
site for the rest of the world. It provides a survey of how international law and domestic lobbying
for environmental legislation will be received by a diverse pool of countries.

V.

Regional Regimes

Regional regimes have developed to connect and reinforce the common interests of
different areas of the world. These systems are designed to help nations in their efforts to
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implement sound environmental laws.339 Local institutions include, among others, the Council of
Europe, the Asian Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (ARPEC), and
the environmental security regime established for the Baltic Sea region.
ARPEC consists of numerous nations that have made environmental protection a main
domestic priority.340 The illegal trade of commodities led to the creation of this forum. For
example, the increase in the trade of wild flora and fauna, hazardous waste, ozone depleting
chemicals, and other items initiated international concern and action. The continued patronage
and existence of these black markets contradicts the efforts of environmental conservationists as
well as the various agreements nation states have signed in an effort to protect wildlife.341
It is an implied reality that a more specialized regional legislation would be more
effective in providing specific solutions as problems arise. Other international bodies of law and
agencies do not possess regional character, therefore may not be able to effectively meet many
challenges.342 An example of a regional problem that required a more centralized effort can be
illustrated through a case in the People’s Republic of China and its neighboring countries. China
has a serious problem with environmental crime as it is the target for dumping a large amount of
hazardous waste. Over 85,000 tons of illegal waste shipments have been seized since 2000, and
the source of most of the ozone depletion substances (ODS) on the global market.343
Transnational exportation of waste in and out of China continues to plague the country.
This continues after years of difficulties with illegal international shipments of waste for disposal
within their borders and the attached human and environmental harms resulting from these
crimes. The NGO report, “Exporting Harm: The High-Tech Trashing of Asia,” is an early
example of a citizen group’s outcry resulting from such issues. The fingers point to the general
perception that China has a weak enforcement of their existing dumping laws.344 Citizen groups
continue to campaign against environmental harms resulting from electronic waste dumping and
disassembly.345 The Sky Hole Patching Project was launched in 2006 to help solve this problem.
The purpose behind Project Sky Hole Patching is to push forward the agenda of stamping out
illegal trade in ODS and other dangerous materials as set forth in the Montreal Protocol and the
Basal Convention in the Asia Pacific region.346
A. Asian Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (APREC)
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ARPEC was created in 2005 with the efforts of regional cooperation to help fight
environmental crimes in Asia. The principal goal was to create an operative mechanism that
allowed the free flow of information coupled with technical cooperation and coordination
activities among NGO’s and international associations.347
Through mutual cooperation, opportunities have arisen for these groups to enrich
themselves through educational workshops and through an established forum to share vital
information that they possess. Several regional organizations have formed as well. They include
Project Sky Hole Patching (aims to fight against illegal trade of ozone depleting substances) and
the Partnership against Transnational Crime through Regional Organized Law Enforcement.
Members of ARPEC include most notably, The Environmental Investigation Agency, The
International Union for Conservation of Nature, The World Bank, The Wildlife Conservation
Society, and The Ministry of Industry of Thailand.348 These forums are informal and
membership is open to other organizations.349
In July of 2011, several national government, NGO’s and international associations,
gathered to debate and share information regarding the illegal trade of flora and fauna. These
debates occurred at the 11th ARPEC meeting. This event was organized by the Regional Centre
organ of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime under the direction of UNEP.350
The participating groups at the ARPEC meeting discussed the importance of sharing
knowledge relevant to their goals. Conversation also revolved around how media management
can aid in the fight against organized environmental crime in target Asian countries. Emphasis
was placed on developing a forum of knowledge sharing among environmental law enforcers
from a global perspective. This theme is seen as an important key to defeating crimes against the
environment.351
Other tactics employed against environmental crimes were debated at length during this
meeting. They included the pressing need to push forward strict environmental legislation that
was not only simpler in its application but more effective. Combining this with the free flow of
intelligence sharing between enforcement agencies seems to be the main muscle that will be
flexed when trying to successfully prosecute environmental crimes. The hope is this will lead to
the development of better targeted penalties for environmental offenses.352
There have been a series of expositions on the importance of sharing knowledge and
intelligence by key actors.353 These have been pushed by several groups urging that the pertinent
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priority be the sharing of criminal intelligence. The Wildlife Conservation Society and other
similar actors accentuated their positive experiences by broadcasting their coverage of
environmental criminal acts in hopes of raising public awareness of the severity of such crimes
and their harm against humans, animals, and the environment. This meeting laid groundwork for
the introduction of a collaborative effort between the International Consortium on Combating
Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), INTERPOL, UNODC, the World Bank
and the World Customs Organization (WCO).354
Project Sky-Hole Patching was the original project that operated in the fight against
environmental crime in Asia.355 The initiative was a watershed effort by the Regional
Intelligence Liaison Office-Asia and Pacific (RILO/AP) that aimed to target and regulate the
smuggling of hazardous wastes and ozone depleting substances.356 Project Sky-Hole Patching
aimed to forge the intelligence gathering capacity and knowledge matrixes to intercept shipments
of illegal ODS and toxic waste, using the sources from customs authorities in 20 of the AsianPacific countries. The first phase of the project focused on ODS, and the second broadened its
reach to include hazardous waste. Since 2007, the project has been transformed into a standard
operation, employing numerous customs agents.357 Since then, over 100 tons of illegal ODS and
1,000 tons of illicit waste was seized.358 This project clearly raises the awareness of ODS, toxic
waste dumping, and smuggling among custom groups throughout the region. This has led to
positive cooperation even beyond the original target region, with RILO AP now allying
themselves with the European Union Network.359

B. The European Union and the Brief History of Criminal Environmental Cooperation in Europe

The European Union (EU) has been frequently cited as an example of strong regional
organization that has enjoyed success in combating environmental crimes.360 The E.U. was
originally established as a mechanism to facilitate economic prosperity and political stability
throughout Europe. This pathway to economic unification was laid out before the Summit in
Paris in 1972 which waded into the area of environmental protection as a component of
economic prosperity.361 The newly adopted Article 6 stands at the forefront of the Treaty. The
clause beckoned for the protection of environmental interests to be placed into the application
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and meaning of other policies. This article also stated that integration is one avenue of
promoting sustainable development.
This new article is seen to be complimentary with the Declaration on Environmental
Impact Assessment, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which drafted
the Treaty of Amsterdam.362 Environmental assessment compilations are prepared when the
Commission of this Declaration suggests initiatives that may have profound environmental
implications.363
On November 4, 1998 the Council of Europe passed the Convention on the Protection of
the Environment through Criminal Law.364 This Convention focused on advancing the substance
behind criminal law as a tool for transnational advancement in the area of international
environmental crimes.365 The preamble states the point of the Council of Europe is to create
unity between members. Its provisions include mandates for parties to “adopt legislation on the
national level.”366 The offenses that it lists include intentional offenses, negligent offenses, and
criminal or administrative offenses. The offenses listed are “…obligatory and the parties are
instructed to adopt the appropriate measures necessary in order to establish the criminal
[offenses] in their domestic law.”367 In addition to outline the offenses, the Convention requires
parties to establish jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its territorial borders.
The Council of Europe, formed in the aftermath of World War II, in the prevalent
criminal law arena. This Council is known for its 21 Conventions and 70 some
recommendations.368 Due to post Cold War geographic changes in the Eastern part of Europe, it
has 47 members.369The Council has shown its dedication to environmental matters, with most of
its focus on environmental crime.370 Several resolutions for this purpose have been passed based
on the conclusion of the 7th Conference of European Ministers of Justice in Basel, 1972. In 1977
the Council of Europe adopted its Resolution 28 on the Contribution of Criminal Law to the
Protection of the Environment. Further, the 17th Conference of European Ministers of Justice in
Istanbul passed the Resolution No.1 on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal law.
These resolutions articulate appropriate regulations that the nation’s governments should
undertake.
The Single European Act (1986), which is another example of regional enforcement,
provides clear authority for the European Community (EC) on environmental and natural
resource concerns.371 The goals of the European Community are to provide direction and suggest
86 |

regulations aimed at controlling pollution and safeguarding the environment. This is coupled
with future plans for higher protection. The European Court of Justice has appointed itself as the
principal chair that will seek to ensure that regulations adopted by the nations comply with the
outlined provisions. Pursuant to E.C. law, the burden of enforcement has been transferred from
inter-state and placed under the jurisdiction of the European Commission and the European
Court of Justice. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the genesis of providing financial penalties
upon signatory states that shirked from their responsibility in complying with community law. 372
Despite the importance allocated to the doctrines incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty, it is
unclear if the European Community will hold a tight grip on control in the environmental field. It
seems that the European Union’s views of environmental law and its method of enforcement are
one of its more popular activities in Europe.373
Chapter 7 of this thesis discusses in detail the European Union’s environmental
protection mechanisms and its suitability as a model for a global union with respect to
environmental protection, specifically through criminal law.

C. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)

Mexico agreed to strengthen its domestic environmental laws in order to encourage the
United States to politically support the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).374
During NAFTA negotiations, many groups warned of the pending consequences from increased
transnational pollution which had already begun to develop. The increase in pollution began to
occur when corporations began moving their plants to Mexico; the quasi-merger of bi-national
economies lead to symmetry within the countries’ environmental laws and a net decrease in the
United States’ strict environmental regulations. Furthermore, under-regulated Mexican imports
that posed health risks from the mishandling of harmful pesticides found a boon in this
agreement.
These important issues were silenced with the formation of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which is a supplemental environmental
agreement attached to NAFTA.375 Because the NAAEC does not provide any substantial
remedies to harmed individuals, it offers very little to parties of NAFTA in terms of incentivizing
their actions toward effective environmental regulation.
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Subsequent to Mexico’s adoption of NAFTA, the rate of environmental inspections
dropped drastically. This has led to reasonable speculation as to what the true motives were
behind this substantial thrust towards environmental protection.376 As late as 1999, Mexico’s
GDP was growing around 10-14% annually. Curiously, only 0.6% of the GDP was being
invested into the pressing needs of environmental protection.377 Mexico has not made any
substantial achievements in incentivizing industries to comply with environmental rules.378 It
seems that the majority of the maquila industry is missing the proper structures to battle the
grave environmental harm caused by the voluminous trade along the border.379 Between 1985
and 1999 commentators calculated that Mexico suffered substantial increases in environmental
harm. This includes the growth of rural soil erosion by nearly 90%, municipal solid waste by
108%, water pollution by 29%, air pollution by 97%, and other environmental harms.380
The aim of NAFTA’s Environmental Side centers on the domestic enforcement of
environmental law, including its establishment and maintenance. The agreements encourage a
forum of public participation in the legislative and policing processes. They also provide for
nation to nation conflict settlement for repetitive failures of effective enforcement of national
environmental regulations, and the establishment of a structure for cooperation between the
NAFTA parties. The Agreement provides persons or groups within any NAFTA territory can file
a submission with a tri-national secretariat. This filing will adjudicate allegations that a bound
party has failed to enforce its environmental regulations. The submission must comply with
certain established criteria (e.g., provide sufficient information regarding the allegation and it
aims for proper enforcement) that the Secretariat will determine.
Part Five of the Agreements lays out the mechanism for obtaining a chance to formally
dispute and settle when evidence of repetitive failure of a party to enforce their environmental
laws is present.381 If the incumbent dispute settlement panel does come to the conclusion that a
persistent pattern of failure as outlined by the Agreement exists, they will execute a thorough
plan to cure the problem.382 The sanctions against a party that fails to implement the proposed
action plan can include monetary assessment.383 If a party fails to pay the proposed monetary
assessments, as between the United States and Mexico, trade sanctions can subsequently be
imposed. The complaining party is required to first seek termination benefits in the same matrix
where the repetitive failure has been seen. As per the Agreement with Canada, the Commission
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for Environmental Cooperation, which was established under the Agreement, generally applies
to a court order to enforce the assessment.
Through regional coordination, countries continue to slowly but surely use their joint
resources and common available neutral facilitators to enhance cooperation. This is done to
support international decision-making and to ensure environmental threats are effectively
addressed.384 Such endeavors can be achieved through supporting political and programmatic
cooperation with a broad and diverse spectrum of major groups and stakeholders. Such
collaboration not only provides dates and information that is critical to crafting effective policy
solutions, but it produces and communicates this information, helping to connect scientific
networks to national governments.
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Chapter 5

INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
This chapter aims to examine the International Nature of Environmental Crimes, with a
focus on both the limitations and arguments for the criminalization of such breaches. Issues shall
be examined that center on the penal doctrines of certain environmental harms, while exploring
the mens rea requirement when defining corporate and individual liability. This chapter will
conclude with the idea of Internalization. It is a concept that seeks to incorporate international
law and international environmental protection into one mechanism with a functioning
enforcement scheme.

I.

Transboundary Character

International environmental criminal law takes root in certain conceptual categories that
define its inherit basis as an area of legal philosophy infused with transboundary characteristics.
The legal apparatus that covers this form of illegal conduct focuses in on the international and
penal aspects of punishment.385 Defining environmental crime requires acknowledging that
certain specific acts or omissions have occurred. This is relevant to discussing the environmental
aspect in a transnational forum. Putting into the focus the global nature of environmental crimes
is the subject of this dissertation, and the definition reads as followed:
Transnational environmental crimes, as defined in legal terms, refers to: (1) unauthorized
acts or omissions that are against the law and therefore subject to criminal sanctions; (2)
crimes related to pollution (air, water and land) and crimes against wildlife; and (3)
crimes that involve a form of cross border transference and an international or global
dimension. The third prong of the definition helps to lay the basic framework of the
transnational character that embodies the environmental crimes in this dissertation.
Shaping and defining the international element of environmental crimes has been the
work of many international protocols and conventions that deal with such matters. The discourse
has been brought to the forefront of international psyche as illegal trade in ozone depleting
substances, trade in chemicals, dumping in toxic wastes on land and sea, and the transportation
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of these materials increases.386 There are numerous international initiatives that have expressly
recognized the transnational character of certain environmental crimes by attempting to define
certain offenses.387
Examining the geographic locations of various environmental crimes reinforces the sound
notion that this form of conduct breaches multiple international boundaries. This analysis might
include a closer look into the production of toxic materials, illegal trade at sea and land,
trafficking in high threat regions, and terminal end points where these substances are illegally
abandoned. Mapping such harmful practices can serve us by providing useful insights into how
environmental harm is transferred around the globe, and by identifying who the responsible
parties of these violations are.
Viewed from a global perspective, transnational environmental crimes can be four
intertwined processes, each affecting the nature of world ecology.388 These categories are
resource depletion, disposal problems, corporate colonization of nature, and species decline. The
four layers of analysis illuminate some of the issues that threaten specific types of transnational
environmental crimes.
The existence of these environmental infractions are partly determined through the
complex processes of transference.389 Harm can move from one area to another. The difficulty
in ascertaining the origin and dumping grounds of toxic hazards stems from externalizers that
can make pollutants disappear from sight and record. The call for an international body to
criminalize international environmental harm will provide the incentive for transparency in
avoiding such loopholes. The illegal dumping of toxic wastes in developing countries constitute
some of the worst aspects of the “not in my backyard” syndrome. The result is a massive
movement of environmentally harmful wastes to the most vulnerable places and most exploited
peoples of the world.390 This is an example of rampant violations in a small area that could be
stymied by international law.
Environmental degradation at the transnational level is not only concerned with the harm
being done at the national level, but it focuses more importantly on the issue of pollution. This is
illustrated by the transfer of flora and fauna across various borders and into new ecological
habitats. Tracking the movement of these types of harms are important in the development of
remedies that can be applied through criminal sanctions. The Southern Ocean is prime example
to illustrate the harm that can be avoided by a system of tracking and categorizing. This location
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has become the slaughterhouse for whale meat to satisfy the Japanese black market. When the
Japanese can no longer whale in their own national waters, then transnational space is where the
whaling will now occur.
The global forum continues to provide cutting edge information on the emergence of new
environmental crimes. For instance, the decline of fisheries off the coast of Somalia due to
overfishing, has robbed the local inhabitants of their livelihood. A consequence of this reckless
disregard for sustainable fishing is illustrated by the common fisherman entering a new line of
work – most notably piracy. Environmental harm, legal or otherwise, can have spin off
consequences that is felt across the borders of several states.

II.

Limitations and Obstacles to the Emergence of International Environmental
Crimes

This section of the chapter will examine the limitations of a fully functioning mechanism
of international criminal law, applicable to the environment from an analytical perspective. Such
international legislation and agreements are lacking in large part due to the separate doctrines of
penal responsibility and environmental law.391 States are continuously argued to consider the
importance of punishing the most serious environmental crimes by international coalitions.392
Unfortunately, reactions to these calls have remained relatively dormant. Recommendations have
been made to provide for a supranational authority to be equipped with a wide array of remedies
and criminal sanctions. This would support efforts in ensuring compliance with environmental
protection laws by allowing academic recommendations for penal codes to be applied to
environmental actions.393
Though these proposals aim to address severe international environmental crimes, they
are quite limited in scope and purpose. For example, a Protocol I Prohibition centers more on
regulating war rather than protecting the environment.394 In reference to environmental
protection, UN efforts have not amounted to significant progress, and the Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime eventually omitted any reference to the environment. None of
these conventions attempt to deal with the growing global environmental threat.395
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State sovereignty continues to be a limit on the international criminalization of harm to
the environment. Sovereignty arguments have been used to undermine efforts for protecting the
environment on a transnational level. The interplay between states interest in the development of
their own lands, and the use of their natural resources, has cause many nations to fall back on this
legal stance to protect self-interest.396 Sovereign states and their domestic laws have traditionally
provided the legal mechanisms for regulating environmental issues. This has marginalized
efforts of non-state actors hoping to regulate international environmental criminal law.
Sovereignty and adherence to this principle severely interferes with the ability of nation
states to prosecute violators of environmental integrity. The continued resilience of the
international legal order serves as a paramount obstacle to those who would lobby for stronger
environmental protection.397
In the case of sovereign crimes, where the matter of “impunity” has taken center stage,
hesitation in enforcing current criminal offenses has to do with traditional assertions of
sovereignty. In many cases, the state that is attempting to enforce criminal law may be
influenced by actors committing the offense. Interstate crimes are caught in between the
intersection of competing state interests, which can stagnate efforts to penalize conduct. Nations
may overall be keener on repressing transnational offenses, but the various locations in which the
crimes are committed may make jurisdictional reach difficult.
There is an ongoing tendency for decision makers to ‘fit’ environmental crimes within
existing penal definitions enumerated by the ICC’s jurisdiction. This is done often in order to
bring strength to enforcement mechanisms so polluters may be criminally sanctioned. Such an
approach severely restricts the application of criminal laws to perpetrators. The problem with
observing harms against the environment under the existing framework is the fluid nature of the
infractions and criminals who commit them. Environmental law can be more effective if it is
buttressed to genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, and war crimes. Only a very small
proportion of environmental harms, even among those that sow devastation among human
beings, overlap substantially with “core” international crimes. Moreover, these crimes typically
require proof of complex elements that do relate with environmental degradation. Linking these
two separate fields of protective law may reduce prosecutions. Waiting for environmental
degradation to be genocidal, defeats the purpose of using criminal law as a first line of
deterrence.
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In addition to the difficulties linked with the limitations of international law based on
ideas of sovereignty, a would-be international environmental criminal law must also face the
challenges of a complex subject, the environment. Harm against the environment creates a
problem of its own that is not primarily interstate or political in the narrow sense. Prosecuting
environmental offenses that stir international harm may create novel problems of potential
interference within the domestic affairs of nations. It also becomes very difficult to determine
where responsibilities lie for prosecuting criminals. Failing to implement strong international
laws to protect the environment is best analyzed as a specific manifestation of a broader lacking
system to protect the global commons. This has been described and analyzed in this dissertation
as the tragedy of the commons.398
Contrary to their best long term interests, states are sometimes blind to the decisions they
have routinely made. These decisions include overlooking certain parties to prosecute. These
failures may be incentivized by not wanting to be the dissident who seeks to repress certain
parties.
The threat of criminal sanctions may deter countries and companies from participating in
certain economically worthwhile activities that now fall under the criminal prohibition. This is
due to the immediate prosecutorial costs, and more generally, because serious criminal
legislation is likely to have substantial political and economic expenses. This takes place in a
situation where nations will most likely not consider themselves bound by the international
criminal legislation, and in turn, they reap the benefits of not subjecting themselves to the rules
that apply to others. This is a classic free rider problem.
Theoretically, international criminal law could impede its own progress by creating a
market that shirks responsibilities. If there is to be a penal code and a significant enforcement
mechanism, it would most likely require a large global administration, possibly much broader
and more powerful than the ICC. Some international environmental lawyers have even
advocated that rooting sanctions in a criminal code will do more harm than good by alienating
and polarizing member states.399
There are several characteristics of criminal law that can be viewed as imposing limits on
the development of a strong international mechanism that serves to protect the environment. A
basic blueprint of criminal law is to sanction acts that are wholly undesirable to society, but the
environmental harms that are to be penalized cost society by generating alternative benefits.400
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There are acts that cause the environment to suffer which are illegal versions of otherwise
legal acts.401 Unlike traditional criminal acts such as theft or murder, which are rooted in
common law and defined within jurisprudence, environmental law has troubling drawing a
distinction between legal and illegal conduct. This difficulty may make environmental criminal
law seem like a balancing act that weighs the costs and benefits of each activity. When it comes
to environmental crime, profit-making is made possible through the overlapping relationship
between licit and illicit markets and the close connection between legal and illegal practices. The
link between vested private interests (corporations profit maximizing), state interests and
environmental harm is of great concern. This troubling aspect of defining and then punishing
environmental criminal law might be an impediment to forming a governing transnational
mechanism that addresses international crimes against the environment.
Another aspect of criminal law that is challenged in relating to international crimes
against the environment is the preciseness of the harm itself. Environmental harm in its entirety
is very damaging and is considered a crime in the totality of the circumstances. The troubling
aspect is each step towards defining a level of serious environmental damage is usually
unrecognizable and at worst negligible.402 Traditional criminal law relies on clearly defined and
immediate damage (murder, theft, property damage), and environmental crimes are unlike that in
nature.
The scope of environmental crimes may over include those who are not the true
perpetrators in any particular case. If an international body of law were to govern crimes against
the environment, casual and proximate relationships to the environmental crime would surely be
an issue. The further in time one stretches the horizon of harm, the more a particular result may
turn out to be the acts of a great many individuals. If this governing body extends the range of
liability and responsibility to everyone who has had some casual role in producing a certain
environmental harm, the end result may be a concept of criminal liability that is so over
inclusive, it would defeat the point of criminal law.
Many principles of environmental law are vague and unpredictable. They are
intentionally designed to allow countries to define the demands and boundaries of criminal
justice. Transnational environmental provisions typically rely on both soft law and customary
international law instruments.403 This may raise concerns about the respect for the legality
principle.404 Furthermore, both domestic and international versions of environmental law will
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rely on certain agencies to enforce sanctions in a way that can raise serious concerns about the
predictability of regulations.405

III.

Arguments for International Environmental Criminal Law

When it comes to deliberate and egregious environmental damage, most criminal law
theorists have agreed that additional steps need to be taken. Domestically, it has been noted that
civil penalties lack the enforcement capabilities to deter fundamentally egregious environmental
crimes.406 The strength of criminal law and its sanctions serve as an enforcer of certain
international norms that would not otherwise be abided. Criminal prosecutions for polluters have
been understood to work well, having a “very substantial effect” in regards to deterrence and
compliance.407
The tragedy of the commons may make it difficult to set up a system of international
criminal law (because such a system may only be effective if a very large number of states join
it). In turn however, criminal law may be the answer out of the tragedy.408 Many attacks on the
environment are decided in a cold calculated way, on the basis of perceived benefits. For
example, corporations make conscious decisions to pollute in an effort to save on production
costs. Criminalizing their conduct and prosecuting these companies may be the optimal way to
deal with environmental crimes in this particular context.409
International criminal law sanctions will not only be enforceable against traditional
polluters (state and corporate actors) but also targeted individuals. The modern reasoning behind
this policy is because environmental crimes are often committed by individuals and not abstract
entities. International criminal law is ideal for deterring illegal conduct done by non-state
actors,410 especially if states come to see themselves as the protectors of a certain transnational
interest against the power of corporations.
Efforts towards greater criminal sanctions could lean on an increasingly strong
connection between the international public order and the global environment. The protection of
the environment on the global scale has been tied strongly to a plethora of other values inherent
in the international system. This ultimately raises the legitimacy of its efforts. Governmental
bodies like the United Nations Security Council enumerate expressly that the environment is
connected to the protection of human life and some basic human values.411 It is also noted by
such organizations that aggressive acts against the environment effect peace and security. 412
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Further, there is a clear correlation between a damaged environment and poverty.413 Attention
seems to be gathering at the fact that there is a connection between the basic conditions of human
life and the health of the environment. This will hopefully put in place regime that makes it a
goal to connect the two in the future. This would produce a work public order that advocates for
those rights.
Hungary serves as a tragic illustration of the consequences of environmental crimes. In
early October 2010, “a thick red torrent of sludge [began to gush] from a reservoir at the metals
plant 100 kilometers south of Budapest….”414 During the tragedy, nine people lost their lives
from the surge, and hundreds more were physically harmed by the toxic sludge as it penetrated
the local communities. “The toxic sludge reached the Danube River several days later, from
where it could flow into six other European countries before reaching the Black Sea: Croatia,
Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova.”415 In one environmental tragedy, numerous
lives, indigenous species, and countries were affected.
Another indirect result of environmental crimes is green-house gas emissions. The
unrestrained emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere have been linked to global climate
change. Studies have shown that higher temperatures impact power generation, water reserves
for local and national populations, national security, and food production. “For example, in a
single year in 2003, melting reduced the mass of Alpine glaciers in Europe by one-tenth, and tens
of thousands of people died due to the severe health wave (European Environment Agency,
2010).”416 Furthermore, the change in climate will intensify and accelerate natural disasters that
we have seen in recent years. These hurricanes, cyclones, mudslides, floods, and severe droughts
will create a massive humanitarian issue that will require global parties to find solutions in the
immediate. Whether solutions can be found once the climate reaches a tipping point is still to be
seen.
Increasingly, the environment has been presented as an asset whose ruin constitutes a
violation of criminal provisions. The Articles on State Responsibility included a notion of
international environmental crimes that aimed to safeguard the human environment. It expressly
prohibited against mass pollution of the seas and atmosphere.417 Supporters of this type of
regime have argued that there are concrete obligations that flow from the international
community into the general public. This should be done with the inalienable intent to protect the
environment.418
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Currently, the existing legal infrastructure is not designed to bring environmental
violations under criminal law. However, in light of recent events including the changing climate,
more scholars have proposed and are vouching for such developments. As discussed supra, Polly
Higgins has defined Ecocide and has made the term an effective criminal definition to bring
violators to justice. “However, the likelihood that the United Nations, dominated by the carbon
dependent and carbon profiting nations of the global North, would establish ecocide as an
international crime is slim.”419
Moral consistency is also a factor that plays into the support of the criminalization.
International criminal law already sanctions acts that cause widespread and severe damage to the
environment during wartime. It seems difficult that the same policy should not apply during
peace.420 Environmental crimes are more akin to crimes against humanity, which would fit nicely
into the international criminal category enumerated by many international law theorists. This
category elaborates on illegal acts that are known widely across the community of nations as
crimes against humanity.421 The argument flows naturally that grave crimes against the
environment, because of their perverse nature, are in fact a crime against humanity. Therefore,
parties should be punished as such and by the regimes that are in place to punish the existing
articulated humanitarian crimes.
As the introduction of an international criminal law and its application to the environment
develops, there will be discussions to address the details of what actions should be illegal, and
the specific circumstances of enumerated degrees. There is a base for setting up a matrix because
there is already a scheme of legal and illegal uses of the environment (as seen in treaties such as
Protocol I and in domestic law statutes). A reasonable concern is the articulation and prosecution
of long term impacts of environmental damage, but these can be addressed by models that
already exist.
Finally, the character of international environmental law need only be a concern in
respect to the principles of legality and the definition of categories for prosecution. It is noted
that much of the existing international criminal law relies on broad standards contained in
treaties. These articulate what an international offense is, and the standards that have been
successfully illustrated and implemented. At worse, the vagueness of international environmental
crimes is a result of its infancy.
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IV.
A.

Criminalization

Nature of the harm

International environmental law touches upon various issues. They include clean air,
water, regulation, and the management of toxic substances and waste. Environmental treaties are
layered upon common law and international norms that have led to modern day approaches to
environmental protection. Over the last 30 years, this area of law has further developed.422 Most
treaties and international conventions have established broad regulatory goals. These agreements
then leave detailed regulation to the individual states and agencies.423 The agreed upon treaties,
convention provisions, and its accompanying regulations, coupled with land use regulations and
tort law, attempt to reduce environmental damage in the aggregate.
International environmental law focuses primarily on damage to nature and its human
rights implications. This particular method shows the various harms that might bring claims
against the criminal actor. The law should investigate the consequences of environmental harm
by analyzing duration, severity and geographic scope.
i.

Geographic Scope

The geographic reach of environmental damage varies greatly. The greater the area of the
geographic scope of damage, the more likely it has negative impact on humans who are in the
vicinity of the harm. For example, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, “Freeport-McMoran's
mining operations in the Irian Jaya region of Indonesia destroyed 15.4 square miles of rainforest,
poisoned a lake, and noticeably impacted people living within three hundred kilometers of the
mine.”424 There is a great probability that a swath of destruction, similar to that seen in Indonesia,
will have important human repercussions.
Geographic scope also engulfs the location of the damage and defines the total nature of
that harm. The significant concern surrounding the Three Mile Island incident was is geographic
proximity to New York City.425 Chernobyl's location near the Ukrainian capital of Kiev played a
significant role in that tragedy’s human costs.426 When international environmental harm occurs
close to highly populated areas, the probability that humans are harmed, either directly or

99 |

collaterally, increases significantly. This is especially true when the local population lives
directly of the land.427
ii.

Severity

The severity of harm is central to the question of whether the harm its self qualifies as an
international violation of environmental law. Contemporary waste treatment plants that operate
within normal pollution standards generally produce less waste than oil spills and open pits. A
nuclear incident of course overshadows all any of these forms of pollution. As the risk of
activities increase, so should the precautions. Unfortunately, when extra steps for safety are not
taken, the likelihood of harm increases to the environment and human populations. Simply
stated, low-level environmental pollution pales in comparison to larger scale violations.
The pattern of the damage should also instruct international organizations that are
assessing the severity of the damage. Currently, there are numerous ongoing violations that are
harming the environment. When oil spills, openly stored toxic waste, and dangerous gas flares
occur together, as they did in the Social Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v.
Nigeria,428 a stronger claim for abuse under general environmental obligations is appropriate.
iii.

Duration

The extent of time that environmental damage is ongoing, directly affects the severity of
the harm. Duration touches not only to the time span of the illegal conduct, but also to the
amount of time that the negative impact can be seen on the affected people who have been
harmed by the environmental damage. “Some problems, such as the destruction of forest and
farmlands through persistent acid rain, have minimal immediate impacts but massive long-term
ones. Other problems may constitute both a short-term nuisance and have long-term health
impacts.”429 “Flaring gas and improper toxic waste storage, similar to Shell's oil production
process in Nigeria, create air and water pollution that not only impacts people at the time of
exposure, but it also poses health risks over time.”430
Bhopal, India provides an example of how a gas leak over time seeped in to the water
supply and contaminated ground water.431 Ultimately, a great many more people were injured by
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the contaminated water than the original gas leak.432 The damage is generally greater when the
environmental harm continues to linger and magnify.
B.

Mens Rea

As a group, major environmental treaties criminalize virtually every known violation of
regulations, including operating without a permit when one is required, violating any substantive
regulatory requirement, and violating recording and reporting measures. This “knowing”
requirement creates a broad criminal net, which piggybacks on a full range of environmental
regulations. This places a heavy burden on the “knowing” requirement in assessing transnational
environmental crimes.
To “know” ones conduct has been interpreted and debated by the courts. It does little to
differentiate between the civil and criminal spheres of the environmental statutes. This
interpretation has been explicated and debated elsewhere at length.433 Though it is frequently
suggests that we eliminate mens rea from environmental criminal statutes, a more careful
examination of the “knowing violation” doctrine indicates that it is helpful in providing the basis
for what little separation there is between civil and criminal environmental violations.
A similar view mens rea requirement comes from the public welfare doctrine; criminal
liability's usual requirement of proof of evil intent is relaxed in the context of regulatory offenses
designed to protect public health and safety. The rationale behind the public welfare doctrine is
twofold. First, the public does not have the means to protect itself from the harm the regulations
it seeks to avoid. Second, the offender is dealing with a dangerous substance and should know
that his activities are heavily regulated. In other words, the defendant must be aware of the
criminalized actions and know all of the relevant facts that make his activity criminal. However,
the defendant need not know the law criminalizes his behavior. As a result, “innocent”
defendants, to the extent that they are ignorant of the illegality of their actions, may be reached
by the criminal statutes.
The application of the “knowing” distinction to the material facts that constitute the
violation of an international treaty or convention is both slippery and controversial. It is clear that
the defendant need not know that she is violating a regulation or permit, but the question remains
how much she should know concerning the facts that make her actions a violation. Instructive to
this inquiry may be holdings by the courts in the United States.
101 |

In Weitzenhoff, the Ninth Circuit required proof that the sewage treatment plant
managers were aware that they were discharging pollutants. They did not know that they were
discharging six percent more pollutants than the permit allowed.434 According to the applicable
regulations, the legal permit level is a law where knowledge of the element involved in the
offense is not required. In United States v. Hopkins, the Second Circuit reached the same result.
It held that the defendant need not be aware of the regulatory “proscription,” just the acts that
were “proscribed.”435 Rather than holding that knowledge of the proscription was not an element
of the offense, the Second Circuit held that it could be presumed, given the obviousness of
stringent government regulation in this area and the fact that the defendant was issued a
permit.436
In two situations however, the “knowing” requirement as it pertains to material facts still
has real enforcement powers. First, it creates a mistake of fact defense for those who innocently
and truly believe that they are engaged in conduct other than prohibited illegal activity. Second,
it creates a more technical defense based on either mistake of fact or lack of awareness of the
ancillary elements of the complex criminal provisions. Both situations provide minimal
separation between the criminal and civil regimes under the environmental criminal treaties. The
mistake of fact principle is firmly accepted within criminal law. It is the counterpart to the
excluded mistake of law excuse. Though the distinction between these two is fine and can
become confusing,437 it is the kind of determination the courts can be relied on to particularize
and make concrete through the exercise of the tools of international criminal law adjudication.
The Rome Statute defines its mental requirements under Article 30 to be intent or
knowledge. Under Article 28 (2)(a), the concept of command responsibility includes
recklessness. The requirement of reckless takes away the burden of prosecutors that must
normally show the violating party had actual knowledge or should have had knowledge of their
illegal acts. Rather, they must only show that their conduct was reckless, and this recklessness
was the proximate and actual cause of the violation. The most serious crimes in both war and
peace should have the requirement of recklessness as the state of mind standard to put a lower
burden on prosecutors, and increase the reasonability taken by individual corporate officers.

IV.
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Corporate Liability and Responsible Corporate Officer Liability

A.

Corporate Liability

Corporations are generally accepted as part of the definition of “persons” used in
international environmental law treaties. As persons, they should be prosecuted for violations of
international environmental laws. Corporate liability for environmental crimes is “based on the
imputation of agents' [or employees'] conduct to a corporation, usually through the application of
the doctrine of respondeat superior.”438 Liability can also exist for corporations, their
subsidiaries or predecessors even though criminal liability has not been found. Rather than
attempting to attach criminal liability to the corporation itself, the common trend has bucked this
notion and began to attach penalties to the corporate officers.
Using American judicial interpretation as instructive, under certain circumstances the acts
of a corporation's predecessors can create liability for the corporation. “A corporation is not
responsible for the liabilities of its predecessor unless one of four exceptions applies: (1) the
successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the liabilities of the predecessor; (2) the
transaction may be considered a de facto merger; (3) the successor may be considered a “mere
continuation” of the predecessor; or (4) the transaction is an effort to fraudulently evade
liability.”439 It seems to show that corporations can be wholly, severally, or jointly liable for its
and their employees criminal infractions that result in a violation of international environmental
treaties.
As discussed supra, current existing self-regulation schemes are unable to effectively
combat violators of international law. The urgency for remedying such conduct is widely
apparent. The Stockholm Declaration signified the need to international cooperation in order to
create and put in place novel solutions. In light of this analysis, and in line with contemporary
activist movements, scholars have argued that international criminal law should be used as
ultimo ratio to sanction violators, and end the international corporation’s ability to evade
prosecution.440
When observing existing criminal law, it is plain to state that the law itself is designed to
identify, associate, and punish blameworthy human behavior. Corporations however have been
able to evade this identification and punishment process because of their quasi-personhood
status. There are some international agreements however, such as the Basel Convention on
Hazardous Waters that create criminal liability for corporate entities. The international
community should not by itself be charged with holding corporations responsible. In a day and
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age of the internet and mass communication, the social importance of corporations is booming.
Private citizens and the corporations themselves should understand the social impact of violating
environmental integrity.
Criminal law has the potential to imprison and remove the freedom of certain violators.
This is a major benefit over strict civil penalties that are confined to monetary fines. A criminal
conviction of a multinational corporation would be a significant step shifting the status qou of
corporate business. This shifts the ability of corporations from doing a simple cost benefit
analysis when harming the environment, to an analysis of fear of imprisonment for failing to
follow the law. This will make it more likely that corporations follow the law rather than
circumvent it or blatantly violate the rules.
B.

Piercing the Corporate Veil

The legal doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil (PCV) allows for victims of corporate
wrong doing to attach directors and shareholders to civil proceedings for damages, effectively
merging the individuals who own and operate the corporation with the company itself.
Throughout the world, this doctrine has developed differently, and this dissertation gives a brief
overview of how PCV is observed in legal systems in Europe, the United States and China. In
the context of environmental crimes, PCV sets the stage of understanding how individuals can be
liable for actions of the corporation (or themselves). There are two instances when this is
applicable, 1. When the corporation commits an offense and a director/parent or subsidiary
company is held liable for the breach, or 2. When the director/parent or subsidiary company
commits an offense and the corporation serves as a shield for the actor’s wrongdoing. In both
instances, PCV in civil matters lends perspective on how to implement penal mechanisms for
corporate actors.
Under U.S. law, the PCV doctrine varies as one shifts through contract and tort actions.
“Generally, the corporate veil will not be pierced unless: 1) the corporate shareholder dominates
the corporate subsidiary, and 2) the corporate shareholder has engaged in fraudulent or illegal
conduct or other ‘improper conduct’ which has generated an injustice.”441 Under the American
system, courts generally do not allow for piercing unless there is an exceptional circumstance
where the “separate corporate entity is used to evade an obligation or statute, to perpetrate a
fraud, or to commit a crime.”442 The State of Delaware, a leading state in the creation of
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competent corporate law in the U.S., only allows PCV when it is in the “interest of justice, upon
the showing of fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or where equitable
considerations among members of the corporate require it.”443
The German system has a specific statutory regime to regulate corporations and parent
companies. These corporations, unlike their American but like their British counterparts, must
annually disclose financial information. They must also satisfy a minimum capital
requirement.444 Furthermore, the standard of care that each director must apply is stringent. “The
standard is absolute, and even slight negligence may result in liability. This strict standard
contrasts with the lower negligence standards and the business judgment rule found under both
U.S. and U.K. law.”445 The German system provides a better model to set up a legal system that
allows for individuals to be held liable under corporate law for their own wrongdoing.
PCV in the U.K. is very similar to the U.S. because both nations’ laws are “premised
upon the principle that the corporation is a separate entity, subject only to exceptions in unusual
cases.”446 The legal philosophy places a corporation as a stand-alone subject that must have some
extra level of control that is exerted upon it to create liability. English law has also been defined
by judges under its common law that outlines certain situations where the veil maybe pierced.
This includes occasions of fraud, criminal activity, the avoidance of debts, and a specific matter
when “a suit [is initiated] for damages arising from an individual shareholder’s use of corporate
funds to obtain control of a public corporation.”447
China officially introduced the doctrine of PCV in 2005 when it enacted a company law
overhaul. Unlike its western counterparts, China has explicitly codified its veil piercing laws.
The central provision states, “Where the shareholder of a company abuses the independent status
of the company as a legal person or the limited liability of shareholders, evades debts and thus
seriously damages the interests of the creditors of the company, he shall bear joint liability for
the debts of the company.” 448 Under the jurisdiction of Chinese courts, three main elements
must be satisfied before the PCV doctrine can prevail. They are, 1. Misconduct, 2. Intent, and 3.
Consequence.449 An instance where Chinese Law differs from other nations is that it only allows
creditors to pierce.450
Countries across the world each use their own method of common law and statutes to
allow government entities or individual parties to pierce the corporate veil. The method of doing
so is relevant for measuring the liability of those who have broken environmental criminal law.
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When a director or group of shareholder commit illegal acts that further corporate interest, while
degrading natural public resources, enforcement mechanisms should have a clear cut picture of
who they can prosecute. It is possible to merge western legal doctrine that allows for PCV when
the actor has committed fraud or an illegal act, with the codified structure of the Chinese. This
could bring greater clarification to an international body charged with bringing corporate
criminals to justice, especially for environmental crimes.
C.

Corporate Officer Liability

The Doctrine of Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) lends itself very well to the notion
of corporations who violate international environmental crimes, and the theory that the corporate
officer in charge shall be held criminally responsible for those environmental harms. Under the
environmental statutes, most criminal sanctions apply to any “person” who violates a regulation.
The RCO doctrine generally changes the scheme of liability from that of the corporation to the
individual officer. The doctrine does not require the government to pierce the corporate veil or
show that the officer personally perpetrated or otherwise participated in the wrongful act. If the
government proves that the defendant was a corporate officer who failed to use his or her
authority to assure that the corporation complied with laws and regulations, the government may
hold the defendant individually responsible under the RCO doctrine as an alternative theory of
liability.
Imposing personal liability on corporate officers is an important means of achieving
deterrence. This allows a greater the number of avenues for finding personal liability. It is
significant that courts and other administrative agencies are beginning to distinguish the RCO
doctrine from other theories of liability. By making this distinction courts and agencies added a
new tool to the enforcement arsenal by providing another vehicle for holding corporate officers
responsible for environmental violations. That is, the RCO doctrine can be applied where other
theories of personal corporate liability may fail.
The application of the RCO doctrine will encourage environmentally compliant behavior,
facilitate the intent of the primary international environmental treaties, and eliminate inconsistent
enforcement of those treaties. Furthermore, the majority of the international legal communities’
resources that are dedicated to environmental enforcement are spent in the civil arena (for
injunctive relief and penalties). Unfortunately, this financial backing does not support the
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prosecution of the most egregious, and far less common, “knowing” criminal offenses. The
philosophy of the RCO doctrine is to hold individuals responsible for civil penalties and
necessary criminal sanction when avoidable violations occur.

VI.

Internalization

The current status of the internalization of environmental criminal law can be found in
many treaties. They provide transnational guidelines for crimes to be drawn and the burden to be
placed on individual states to enforce these provisions. The thought is that by and large,
enforcement of these provisions are not suited for the international community to proctor.451
Academic observers of both international environmental protection and international law
warn against entrusting individual states with too much responsibility when it comes to enforcing
provisions and sanctions. Internalization of these provisions is presented as paramount to the
administrative necessity. This is due to the lack of incentives states have to launch their own
criminal statutes and protect the environment; this includes a lack of willingness to enforce
provisions.452 Left to their own sovereignty, states will either fail to criminalize or do so in a way
that cherry picks the harms that do not sufficiently provide justice to those who have sought
relief.
Further, even if states do criminalize independently, the fact that there are varying
environmental regimes still creates incentives for environmental “dumping.”
The international nature of many environmental crimes increases the risks of competing
jurisdictions. This arises when one state exercises jurisdiction frustrating the protection of the
public order of another. It can also lead to a waste in prosecutorial resources.
The creation of common international environmental offenses would at least have the
merit of reinforcing the cooperation of judicial bodies. The lack of supranational offenses
designed to protect the environment create conditions for the assertion of “creeping” domestic
jurisdiction, where states take advantage of the void that festers a lack of regulation. For
example, “the U.S.’s Oil Pollution Act criminalizes pollution in the High Seas in a way that is
not normally contemplated by UNCLOS” (which the US has not signed).453 The delicate balance
exists between the freedom of the seas the protection of the marine environment.
Legitimacy of international law has certainly flowed from a perception that it was dealing
with problems that were inherently “international.” Typically, the argument is that when “there is
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something involved that is too serious or important for the international community, the matter to
be entirely delegated to states and domestic law – even if domestic systems might conceivably be
up to the task.”454 It is important to acknowledge that there are symbolic factors at work.
First, there are notable historical antecedents to global crimes, and international
environmental crimes are slowly being considered part of this penal category. Inflicting grave
harm on the environment might be the modern-day equivalent of piracy; either because it
actually occurs on the High Seas or455 it occurs concretely on the territory of a particular state.
Second, some parts of international criminal law seem to already have evidence of a new
“global” approach. This pathway is still being matured and has not received much attention.
UNCAC for example, does not go as far as to describe the various crimes it creates as
“international crimes.” It does however mandate states to criminalize a vast field of infractions
that contradict the principles of global communal life (corruption, bribery, money laundering,
etc). These provisions would undoubtedly support the global interest by undermining forms of
exploitation, oppression and violence which would undermine the minimally functioning
domestic international order.
Lastly, the broad evolution of international environmental law has clearly been moved in
the direction of tackling threats to the global environment, rather than domestic harms. The
argument might be that a number of phenomena analyzed domestically do not by themselves
suffice to constitute a crime, and that it is only by seeing them in their aggregate dimension that
one can take in their full significance. It is argued since environmental problems are inherently of
a global nature, so should be their regulation. In turn, it would seem to make sense that
international environmental criminal law should ultimately follow the preferred route of its
subject matter, rather than international criminal law’s own logic.
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CHAPTER 6

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COURTE
I.

Necessity of an International Environmental Court

The Rome Statute sets out grave crimes for the International Criminal Court as “crimes
that threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” and “atrocities that deeply shock
the conscience of humanity.”456 Over the past six decades, the international community has
established fundamental treaties that have shaped international customary law in the areas of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, water rights, and enforcement. However, it must be
noted that with few exceptions, international crime “violations of civil and political rights and do
not cover the serious violations of international economic, social, and cultural rights and
international environmental law that are of direct relevance to sustainable development.”457 The
current context of environmental crime is limited to war based crimes that prohibit certain acts
and degrees of violence. For example, genocide, the usage of chemical and biological weapons,
and the treatment of civilians and prisoners during conflict have all been addressed through
international agreement.
In light of recent political and historical incidents, the international focus on crimes of
war and mechanism of peace are understandable. However, the exclusion of other violations of
international law has had severe consequences for the victims of such acts. This problem is
captured for illustration when we observe that current law punishes long-term damage to the
environment through acts of warfare; however when the environmental damage itself is caused
with no relation to acts of war, no criminal statute is invoked to challenge the perpetrator. As
discussed below, international violations of ICESCR such as the right to not be medically
experimented on during war time, or be starved, are acts that can also be achieved outside the
context of war. In this situation, violations against health and food supplies would not violate
international law. This proves to show that violations of existing criminal law schemes remain
deficient and parties may still violate with impunity on an entire range of conduct that attacks the
pillars of sustainable development.
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These gaps in the international enforcement of cultural, social, and economic rights are
difficult to close with the powerful interests such as corporations who are invested in combating
such implementation. “As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Business and Human Rights,
a patchwork of weak, non-existent, or inadequately enforced laws in both developed and
developing states has resulted in gaps in the governance of transnational corporations operating
in developing countries.”458 These loopholes have allowed corporations to proliferate their
profits as they target and expand the lack of regulation.
The lack of ability to penalize violators of these gaps has pushed governments to install
legislation that holds parties civilly liable for infractions. However, even this mechanism falls
short. As illustrated by the Chevron-Texaco case, civil enforcement can be greatly perverted to
meet the needs of the corporation. The costs placed on the judicial authorities charged with
hearing the cases, the costs placed on private parties bringing suit against violators, and the
easily corruptible authorities in certain nations all make this form of enforcement weak in form
and execution. Most importantly, civil liability does not capture the gravity or the moral
blameworthiness associated with crimes against the environment.
This Chapter argues that a court of universal jurisdiction over environmental crimes is
necessary. After numerous disasters created by corporate and individual actors, it has become
apparent that national law enforcement has been ineffective in deterring the degradation of the
environment.459 An International Environmental Court (IEC) must be established in order to
combat the widespread harm caused to the environment that is not only unpunished but
supported.460 The call for an IEC presiding over environmental crimes finds its base in the
fundamental connection between the preservation of life and environmental damage, between
human rights and the human environment.
The argument logically follows that environmental rights and protection are a part of
fundamental privileges enumerated by several international bodies that aim to prevent and
sanction abuses of core human rights.461 There has been an increased awareness generated by
major environmental disasters, along with a growing international economy and global
communication. This has caused an increase in the belief that states and private parties should
have an obligation not to harm the environment in a way that is so severe that is causes grave
risks to the life and well-being of humans.
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Even in light of these facts, it is only within the last quarter century that the International
Community has begun to realize that an IEC is the correct forum to address the need for
universal environmental protection.462 With this realization, an analysis is warranted to evaluate
and argue the appropriateness of the establishment of an IEC to serve as a forum for sanctioning
grave environmental damage.

II.

Environmental Destruction Is a Fundamental Human Right

Awareness generated by major environmental disasters has caused an increase in the
belief that states and private parties should have an obligation not to harm the environment in a
way that is so severe that is causes grave risks to the life and well-being of humans. It is still true
that the exact moment at which environmental harm crosses the threshold of a human rights
violation remains uncertain.463 Furthermore, it remains very difficult to identify boundaries
between illegal conduct which qualifies as a violation of a fundamental human rights and its
relation to an environmental breach of duty.
Customary international law has been defined as a legal body of accepted norms that
branch from general practices of states that owe each other a uniform legal obligation. This
obligation cultivates the formation of customary law over an extended period of time. The state
practice of following these norms has, now developed into jus cogens. The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has held, “Multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording
and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them.”464 Unanimous
conformity with a universal norm is not required for it to be defined as an obligatory custom. The
ICJ has stated it is “sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with
such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally
have been treated as breaches of that rule.”465 The natural environment is essential to life,466 and
this right to life is the most fundamental principle within jus cogens, without which no other
right can be exercised.467 It is well established that customary international law requires the basic
minimum standard that grave environmental harm, threatening the life and nature, is not
acceptable.
Recently, there have been numerous conventions, and agreements established
international tribunals that have reinforced the conclusion that grave environmental harms
constitutes a basic violation of customary international law. The repetitive practice of states,
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through the mechanisms of international and state law, illustrates a clear modis operandi in being
bound to customary legal obligations. States have adopted over 1000 bilateral agreements
designed to protect the environment.468 Over 50 nations have memorialized, in their national
constitutions, an affirmative obligation to protect the environment.469 Furthermore, over 100
states that attended the World Conference on Human Rights, declared that the illegal dumping of
toxic waste threatens the right to life, a fundamental human right.470 The practice of the
International community has been to apply local law to civil and/or criminal liability on
perpetrators for the most severe environmental crimes.471
The duty not to cause grave environmental harm has been witnessed in adjudications by
many international tribunals. These bodies have recognized that environmental dangers that pose
a severe risk to the health humans is forbidden, and they have penalized the act of causing such
danger under customary international law.
The first of all cases to observe this concept of international environmental law is The
Trail Smelter case, which expressly recognized that international liability may stem from
supranational actions that cause grave environmental harm.472 In another case, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee handed down a ruling that dumping of nuclear waste on a large scale is
grounds for a prima facie showing that a violation of the right to life has occurred in Article 6(1)
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.473 That Committee further noted that
the scope of any state’s autonomy to achieve economic prosperity was limited by the direct
obligation to maintain human rights protections under international law.474
Beginning in the late 1970s, the International Law Commission decided that a state’s
“serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and
preservation of the human environment” violates principles that “have become particularly
essential rules of general international law.”475 The breadth of scholarly opinion, together with
judicial authority in this field, supports the proposition that the duty to prevent the most serious
forms of environmental harm, in particular harm that is transboundary in nature, has attained the
status of custom. It has become a part of the group of fundamental human rights that are to be
protected by customary international law.476

III.
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The History, Failure, and Need for an International Environmental Court

A.

The History of Proposed International Environmental Courts

The first expression of an International Environmental Court was first suggested in the
late 1980s. This came to the forefront of discussion in Rome by the International Court of the
Environment Foundation. 477There was a suggestion that urged for a new administrative
authority within the appropriate UN organ. This suggestion was proposed during the Hague
Declaration on the Environment. It called for an administration with the sole purpose of
confronting global warming concerns. Furthermore, the enforcement mechanism argued for
would be armed with the right to make decisions concerning the cases it held jurisdiction over.478
In the late 1980s, the Congress on a More Efficient International Law on the
Environment and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment Within the United
Nations urged for a tribunal to establish an inherent right to a clean and flourishing environment.
It further requested that a stable world administration be enacted to inspect and sanction crimes
against this inherent right.479 Further conventions on an IEC were held in the early 1990s. There
was a particular meeting in Florence where procedural rules of an IEC were debated.480 In the
late 1990s, there were advocates of an IEC but their calls were squarely rejected by the heads of
UNEP.481 The articulated reason for rejecting the IEC revolved around a concern over the
authority that the court would have in regulating penalties against states that did not comply with
environmental statutes, as well as private corporations that disregarded these environmental
laws.482
Possibly the most detailed proposal for an International Environmental Court came at the
National Academy in Lincei in the late 1980s.483 The IEC proposed during this meeting would be
controlled by an administration that centered its principles on human and environmental rights,
in which an inherent right for each individual was attached to a safe and healthy environment.484
This meeting led to a draft completed in 1992. It explained that states are to be legally liable to
the entire international community for harm to the environment that is caused within their own
borders. They must further take every possible measure to circumvent this damage.485 Rights
under this provision include in relevant part:
(a) the fundamental right to the environment; (b) the right of access to environmental
information, along with the duty to provide such information; (c) the right to participate
in procedures involving the environment; and (d) the right of the private sector . . . to take
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legal action in order to prevent activities that are harmful to the environment and to seek
compensation for any environmental damage. 486
B.

Failures of Previously Proposed IEC’s and the Glaring Need For A Functional IEC

There does not exist any functioning judicial tribunal with explicit mandatory
jurisdiction, right to monitor and observe, or legally-bind parties to enforce or sanction globally
corporations and nation-states. There exist only a few treaties that allow for the monitoring of
parties who do not comply with international law.487 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
technically has power to exercise jurisdiction over international environmental cases, but has not
exercised this power in nearly 40 years. Furthermore, this unused jurisdictional power is
expressly limited to conflicts between state parties. This implicitly secludes private citizens,
corporations and NGO’s from procuring legal standing in these types of cases.488
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,489 which concerned environmental harm, the ICJ
shirked from its jurisdictional power and did not rule on the environmental dispute. Instead, it
deferred to a previous agreement to control the outcome of the case. The European Court of
Justice (ECJ), the European Court of Human Rights, and the Council of Europe have been
forward thinking in regards to enacting international environmental laws that are capable of
facilitating proper resolution of disputes in regional forums. The ECJ will generally grant
standing to NGO’s and private citizens in matters that concern the application of the European
Union’s regulations pertaining to the environment.490 The European Court of Human Rights has
utilized international human rights to increase the view of environmental protection, but it has
failed to extend the thrust of its jurisprudence in subsequent cases.491
At the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
the Environment,492 The Council of Europe submitted for signature a Convention on the
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law. This agreement asked member states to
enact domestic statutes to establish crimes specified as environmentally harmful, without regard
to the accompanying mens rea requirement for illegal conduct.493 Nevertheless, the depth of
these efforts remain regional. The regulations have limited reach; their purpose remains
incomplete and insufficient from the perspective of proponents who are promoting
comprehensive international protection of the environment.
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In the international forum of criminal law, the Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), which has expressly defined its jurisdiction over the gravest international concerns, does
not expressly confront the issue of its jurisdictional power to prosecute environmental crimes. In
Article 22 of the Statute of the ICC, the provision ensures that jurisdiction over environmental
crimes by the ICC would need amendment of the Statute.494 This absence of power from the
ICC’s jurisdiction is a cause for concern in light of the language in Article 19(d) of the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It states that “a serious
breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and
preservation of the human environment” shall constitute an international crime.495
Evident from the lack of compliance with these international conventions that national
courts have instituted in adjudicating crimes against the environment, there is strong advocacy
for an international court to exercise universal jurisdiction over such cases. The need is ripe for a
world-wide coordination of these existing international courts and tribunals. This could be
accomplished by International Environmental Court.496
International treaties addressing the enforcement of penal provisions against international
environmental crimes and their progeny are insufficient to handle the depth of environmental
crises.497 The inherent problem that seems to be incurable is that the treaty process that is
insufficient and unable to be an effective channel for curing the rapidly increasing environmental
harms. This is a consequence of the current system as treaties take an unduly amount of time to
be effective and reach their enumerated goals. The 1992 United Nations Convention on the Rio
Declaration of Environment and Development is instructive for the inherent problems of treaty
implementation. In the aggregate, this treaty moves the international environmental criminal law
systems in the right direction, but a learned analysis of the treaty uncovers that there are
extremely vague doctrines. Additionally, the regulations imposed in the treaty are not accepted
by all states. The United States has taken direct reservation to many of the principles that
provided the true enforcement powers of a treaty in combating grave environmental harms.498
This is an example of the typical ineffectiveness of international environmental criminal treaties,
and it only supports further the need for an IEC.
C.
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Expansion of Existing Courts

Another method of achieving the same goals as International Environmental Criminal
Courts is expanding currently existing regional courts to administer the same jurisprudence. A
prime example of this would be the African Court of Justice and Human Rights which is
currently seeking to expand its jurisdiction and judicial power. Similar to the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human rights, the African counterpart’s purpose
is to “hold accountable states whose action or inaction violates their residents’ human rights in
contravention of states’ treaty obligations.”499 There are additional courts that are forming to
achieve the same purpose “such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.”500
The earliest regional courts used a method which can be implemented in early levels of
expansion. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction allows “at any stage of the procedure, the
International Tribunal [to] formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the
International Tribunal in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Tribunal.”501 This in turn grants jurisdictional power to the
international body over matters of criminal concern. In relation to existing international courts,
this serves a method for them to establish their integrity as a judicial body. This is in contrast to
the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction scheme where the court exerts its purview when a
domestic court is unwilling or unable to commit to investigation, prosecution and sentencing.502
Placing appropriate importance on regional courts is crucial in understanding the larger
picture of international jurisprudence. As this dissertation approaches the ICC as a model, a large
international tribunal is not the only method to achieve successes in prosecuting environmental
crime. There are regional bodies that are capable and willing to investigate and prosecute
environmental criminals. As they grow, they can seek to implement the concurrent method of
jurisdiction. This will allow greater cooperation from the regional tribunal, without them
impeding on sovereignty of nation states.

IV.

The International Criminal Court as a Model for an International
Environmental Court

The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court adopted the final statute for what became the world's first
International Criminal Court.503 The Rome Statute created a court with “jurisdiction over the
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most serious crimes of concern to the international community . . . .”504 This Statute gave the
International Criminal Court jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of
genocide, and the crime of aggression.505
The primary principle of this Court is to address human rights abuses without expressly
extending its jurisdiction over grave environmental crimes that deeply deprive humans of safe
and healthy environments. The only express mention of environmental sanctions in the Rome
Statute states, that it is a war crime to “intentionally launch an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause... long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”506
Advocates of an IEC assert that there are many challenges that have stymied existing
transnational courts. These obstacles can be solved by creating or granting power to an
international judicial body. The ICC has taken many steps to define and prosecute the core
crimes enumerated in its governing statute and under its jurisdiction. Similarly, the advocates of
an IEC recognize the same care needs to be taken for a network of independent nations in the
international environmental community. This will allow individual states greater ability to
submit jurisdiction and police power to an IEC.
Section A below will argue that the ICC already has the power to exercise jurisdiction
over grave environmental crimes. This stems from the understanding that serious crimes against
the environment automatically endanger the right to life.
Section B will examine the enhanced progress the ICC has made while being the primer
Court that prosecutes international environmental crimes by extending its jurisdiction over grave
environmental crimes.
A. The ICC’s Jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity Inherently Includes Grave Crimes Against
the Environment

Though not expressly articulated as within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, the inclusion of environmental crimes is not only legally proper, but it is necessary to the
spirit of the definition of the core crimes as defined in the Rome Statute. For the International
Criminal Court to have the power to properly address the violation of the “most serious crimes of
international concern,”507 it must have the power to prosecute crimes that gravely harm the
environment. This can be allowed under firm legal arguments illustrating that the perverse nature
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of environmental harms are inherent to the core crimes enumerated by the Statute. To put this
simply, grave environmental harm is inherently inseparable from the Rome Statute’s core crimes.

Each core crime enumerated in the Rome Statute and their connection with
environmental harm will be discussed in turn below.
i.

Crimes Against Humanity

Serious environmental crimes match many of the criteria for crimes against humanity.
The Rome Statute is the first action by a supranational administration to articulate precisely what
is known as crimes against humanity. The topic of crimes against humanity was debated during
this conference. The question arose to whether the Statute would define acts committed as part of
a “widespread or systematic” attack against a civilian population, or more simply just acts that
are “widespread and systematic” attacks.508 Many states were concerned that if the threshold
were too low, “common crimes such as mass murder would fall within the jurisdiction of the
Court.”509 The final language defined crimes against humanity as:

[A]ny of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b)
Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e)
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of *237
comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity . . .; (i)
Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts
of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.
There are two further definitions enumerated within the language of the Rome Statute
that are instructive and strengthen the argument of this Chapter. The Statute states that
“[d]eportation or forcible transfer of population” means in its actual application , “forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.”510 The term
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“extermination” is defined to encompass “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia
the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part
of a population.”511
The ongoing environmental issues that include international corporations conducting oil
drilling in the greater Amazon River Basin, as well as the subsequent oil spills, serves to
illuminate how grave environmental crimes are encompassed within the Statute’s definition of
crimes against humanity. These crimes touch upon the spilling of chemical, nuclear, biological,
and other dangerous waste materials. In the early 1990s, the government of Ecuador had
recorded nearly 30 serious oil spills. They discharged roughly 17 million gallons,512 and millions
of those gallons were harmful toxic waste which entered the surrounding lands and waters.513
The legal suits that were brought to seek compensation were dismissed on substantive grounds in
the aftermath of these spills.514
The U.S. District Court concluded that it must dismiss the case because it did not have
general jurisdiction to preside over matters.515 Contrary to that reasoning, the International
Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the “most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.”516 The ICC would be acting negligently if it were to completely
disregard these grave environmental crimes. The facts of this involve supranational corporations
knowingly and continuously discharging several millions of gallons of oil and toxins. These
materials flowed into the lands of innocent people, resulting in displacement, injury, and death; it
is clear that this action resulted in a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”517
ii.

Genocide

The horrible crime of genocide was clearly defined in the Rome Statute. In fact, the crime
is defined exactly as it was in the Genocide Convention.518 The Rome Statute defines genocide
as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b)
Causing serious mental or bodily harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
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in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.519
It is easy to envision a supranational company knowingly acting to allow toxins into a
water supply which may injure, displace, or possibly kill the native inhabitants of a particular
land. It has been recorded and visibly observed, that economic development, particularly in third
world countries, causes fatal environmental degradation.520 An example of such an occurrence
took place in the 1970s, when the Ache and other native people in Paraguay were the victims of
acts of genocide by their own government. The government, in its efforts to grow the economy,
allowed unrestricted oil exploration by supranational companies on native lands.521 Today, those
indigenous inhabitants are considered to be a wholly extinct group of people.522
As seen in Paraguay, where there is a clear “intent to destroy,” the means by which the
genocide is formulated should not be dispositive. It has been argued that any perpetrator who
knowingly destroys a native people by destroying their land and their right to life is guilty of
genocide. Attached with this crime is the grave environmental harms contemplated by this
Chapter. This clearly shows that the Rome Statute guarantees some level of environmental
protection from acts.
iii.

War Crimes

Article 8 of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect to
war crimes.” This has a caveat as an additional clause that stated the court shall have jurisdiction
“in particular when [an act is] committed as part of a plan or policy as a part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.”523 This additional clause was intended to increase the low threshold
for jurisdiction, but that intention has been dead letter.
The eight war crimes of section 2(a) were derived from the grave breaches of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949. The twenty-six war crimes of section 2(b) were derived from the
Hague law. The three crimes in section 2(c), applicable in armed conflict not of an international
character, were derived from Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. Finally, the
twelve war crimes of section 2(e) were derived from the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions.524
This statute has a fully articulated penal provision that addresses grave environmental
damage. It is the only explicit addressing of the environment and its need for protection in the
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Rome Statute. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) defines as a war crime “[i]ntentionally launching an attack in
the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated.”525 The completed text requires full knowledge that damage will
be excessive in relation to the advantages gained by the commission of the act. This is a classic
balancing test that urges us to consider the environment and its need to be protected.
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) may be vague in its terms, but there are specific acts that do meet the
burden articulated under the Statute. These crimes produce grave environmental harm and are
clearly. An example is the Iraqi bombing of the oil fields in Kuwait and the subsequent discharge
of millions of barrels of harmful oil into the Persian Gulf, during the Gulf War.526 It is clear that
the exact perimeter of what is “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated” may be tough to gauge. What is clear is that horrible acts of illegal
environmental conduct, such as those in the Gulf War, would be a war crime and punishable
under the Rome Statute.

V.

Domestic Law Enforcement is Ineffective to Adjudicate Environmental
Crimes
It must be noted that domestic laws, where they exist, are not effective in policing

environmental crimes. The reasons for this are numerous and out of scope for this section. What
will be analyzed are the consequences of harmful conduct when countries exploit their native
lands in hope of economic prosperity.
Many countries, especially developing states, are the unfortunate dumping grounds for
first world nations, as well as powerful corporations. This happens often and systematically
because these countries do not have sufficient means to enforce their environmental laws. In
many cases, environmental laws themselves do not exist for a prosecutorial body to act on.527
These groups clearly take advantage of the naivety of the indigenous residents and their money
hungry political officials. Criminal groups have also taken advantage of infant political systems
by paying bribes in order to have access to dumping of toxic wastes.528
Developing nations rely on strong companies to invest in their land and economy.529
These corporations, armed with limitless financial assets play a controlling role in the political
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and economic development of the countries they invest into.530 This puts tremendous pressure on
these developing nations. In a global economy, it seems that no country can have powerful
environmental laws that would hurt the bottom line of international corporations. If a legislative
body does this, they risk putting themselves at an economic disadvantage. Deregulation of law
enforcement has also resulted in many problems for these exploited countries. Numerous states
have implanted what is known as “free trade zones” in which companies have placed themselves
in superior positions, evading civil and criminal liability.531 Wherever these “free-trade zones”
are established, there is enormous and long lasting environmental harm.532 However,
international law has yet to clearly state whether a corporation operating abroad can or should be
forced to follow the environmental laws of its home country. Until this question is clearly
answered, transnational corporations will be allowed to continue their exploitation of these
countries.
This recurring problem of economic growth and the resulting environmental damage
clearly illuminates the need for an International Environmental Court. The need is even more
glaring in light of the inter-connectedness of countries and economies in the 21st Century.
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CHAPTER 7

THE EUROPEAN UNION

I. History of the European Union
In 1951, Belgium, Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were faced
with the after effects of World War Two. They banded together to promote economic progress
and created the European Coal and Steel Community. This turned out to be the foundation of the
European Union.533 By delegating their collective steel and coal production to a single entity,
they chose to start a forum for greater European integration. The idea of European integration
was further pushed by the terms of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and
the European Economic Community (EEC). This was done with the initial goals of establishing a
common market, common competition and economic policies.534
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome articulated the goals of the free movement of goods, people,
services and capital, but it would take years for those goals to become reality. To facilitate the
accomplishment of these benchmarks, the customs union was achieved in 1968. Still, more was
needed to be done to move from a customs union into an integrated market without internal
borders.
The Single European Act was the legal foundation for the start of the single market.535
The states that were privy to this act fully dismantled all their national borders, and they began a
single market in which goods, capital, and services can move freely. Today, citizens of member
states are free to move and live anywhere in the E.U. The last bastion of traditional borders was
removed by the signing of the Schengen-Agreement, which established the free movement of
people entirely. The Treaty on European Union536 enhanced the mechanism of the integration of
the European community, and it brought member states closer to a modern economic and
political structure. This treaty and its kin have laid the roots for the introduction of the single
currency system. The combined efforts of multiple nations have setup a new, largely
intergovernmental political structure, in the form of a single institutional.

123 |

II. The Union's Contemporary Legal Environment
The European Union is a group of independent countries that envision a collective that
respects human rights. These principles have formed the bedrock of their treaties policies and
political goals. The European Union is empowered with sovereign authority, its own sovereign
rights and an independent legal power. This legal framework results in the citizens residing
within the borders of the E.U. to be subject to the jurisdiction and laws of the international body.
The longer the European integration occurs, the greater the amount of domestic rights that will
be surrendered to the central order.
The legal foundation of the Union is not established in a constitution, but it is
compromised by the totality of rules and basic values found in its treaties. These doctrines form
the political and legal system that establishes organization’s procedural mechanisms for
rulemaking and the basic rights of the member states.
The main functioning body of the European Union is the European Council.537 This entity
within the E.U. is composed of the leaders of the member states. Although the Council does not
have any legislative power, the Treaty of Lisbon defines their charge to set forth “the general
political directions and priorities” of the Union.538 Their main purpose is to provide guidelines
for the envisioned European integration. With the Council at the helm of E.U. planning,
substantive legislative items receive significant influence from its decisions and
recommendations.
Since the Council consists of numerous national leaders, domestic political parties fall
into the analysis E.U. decision making.539 Within each governing entity of the E.U., there are a
wide variety of politicians, many from the leading political parties of their home countries. This
creates a complicated political stage for moving forward a legislative agenda.540 For example, if
a political a minister who belongs to the German Christlich Demokrastische Union (CDU) votes
in support of a conservative regulatory scheme, would their fellow CDU party members vote
similarly? In certain cases, voting takes place along national party lines, and in other instances,
members of the governing apparatus vote in accordance with their opinion on continental
government.541
The European Council however has bucked the notion of domestic party influence
through recent studies. The natural assumption would be that agreements would be hard sought
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with such varying degrees of political backgrounds of the European leaders. The Council
however has created a “culture of consensus.”542 Decisions made by the body are only contested
one-third of the time. This is due in part to the negotiation tactics used by the Institution. When
topics are discussed and deliberated, the Council goes to extra lengths to include all of the
member states and their political representatives. This in turn has created a Council capable of
making decisions with a vast array of political players. 543
The E.U. is also composed of a legislative body called the Parliament. This institution is
composed of the General Secretariats, Staff of the European Parliament’s Political Groups, and
the Members of European Parliament (MEP).544 MEPs are selected by the citizens of the E.U.
through a democratic election process.545 Member states are allowed a formulized number of
representatives in accordance with their current population. The parliament has been charged
with the responsibility of formulating legislation to govern under the Council’s long-term
direction. This governing body has the mechanism for producing rules that will govern its
member states.546
The commission performs the executive functions of the European Union.547 This
institution safeguards the ratified treaty, and it also promulgates legislation across Europe. The
commission is akin to the administrative organs seen domestically in the U.S. Enforcement
powers rest within the authority of the commission, and individual parties who break rules can be
brought to justice within the European system. Employees who serve within the executive body
must receive the consent and approval of the European Parliament.
The law is interpreted by the Union’s judicial branch, also known as the Court of
Justice.548 This branch is the sole authority that is empowered to interpret and answer questions
of law for the European Union. This court, as the sole judicial body, delivers legally binding
orders. Its case load is first prioritized by the Court of First Instance and it is regulated for
optimal efficiency.
Throughout the 1970’s the European Court of Justice engaged in judicial activism that
helped establish the Treaty of Rome as a supranational constitution granting rights to citizens
within the E.U.549 This in turn has allowed the Treaty of Rome to stand as one of the premier
international bodies of law that support and propel environmental protection. The E.C.J.’s ability
to co-opt domestic judges and lawyers, serves as another driving force in European integration.
Domestic legal systems that have developed in a construction that is against their own interests
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are now routed through an international judicial entity that supports the interests of the entire
European body.550 The E.C.J. has continued to rule against the interests of the most powerful and
influential bodies within the E.U. This institution serves as a beacon of supranational authority
and functioning integration.551
A recent example of the E.C.J. paving the way for European integration beyond its
economy is the matter of the European Commission v. Italy (C-297/08). The Court found that
found Italy in breach of Article 4 and 5 of Directive 2006/12/EC when it incorrectly disposed of
wastes.552 This not only shows the power of the E.C.J. to hold member states accountable, but it
also shows the power of a judicial institution in creating integration on an international scale
beyond the economy (e.g. the environment and human health).
The Union’s acts are structured to provide boundaries for individual autonomy of the
states. These formulas are careful to safeguard states’ rights as independent and functioning
actors, with pathways to retain their own sole laws and regulations. Individual state autonomy
allows members to execute their own administrative tasks. Generally, the European Union will
only be allowed to exercise its jurisdiction when the autonomy of the individual state is not
threatened. This is an area where environmental criminal law legislation fits perfectly. In the
enactment of such laws, member states would be relinquishing independence for the betterment
of the entire environment, by allowing a supranational organization to police illegal conduct.
This would be the appropriate course of action since individual states find great challenges in
handling these particular crimes autonomously.
Decisions made within the E.U. create controlling regulations for member states. These
laws establish the principles that guide European nations when administering rules. Upon the
ratification of legislation within the E.U., member states are given the authority to enforce the
related provisions. This form of implementation is appropriate for the problem of international
environmental crimes. The E.U. can articulate the criteria for a crime and the minimum penalties.
Furthermore, the act of sanctioning can be left to the member states. This type of mechanism can
allow member states to abandon jurisdiction to the E.U. and the Court of Justice to adjudicate
any particular claim that may be difficult for a state to prosecute.
Upon its formation, the European Commission was the sole enactor of Union law. The
Parliament was merely granted an advisory function. Through the passage of time, new
procedures were adopted because of the need for more efficient promulgation of laws. These
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new procedures allow the Parliament to amend laws by providing review and policy assessments.
The Parliament has the discretion to reject these policies by motions, and they can assert
comments for amendment. These procedures are similar to the Notice and Comment approach
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that is utilized by Federal administrations
who engage in the promulgation of rulemaking. Similar to the APA, the E.U.’s procedures
address rules in a far reaching spectrum of issues, including economic and environmental
concerns.
Law is created in the European Union pursuant to the procedures outlined above. The
correct application of these laws are controlled and adjudicated by the European Court of Justice.
This court is the proper adjudicatory organ for complaints of international environmental crimes.
It has the authority given by community, in a supranational forum. This type of forum will bind
the states to a certain order of regulation, and this is necessary in response to the factual realities
of environmental crimes.
What is attractive about this model for implementing environmental criminal provisions
is the breadth that these laws provide. The legislation, with authority from its organic treaties,
imposes affirmative duties on the individual member states and their citizens. The aim is for the
community to act as a union, for the betterment of the group as a whole.553
The European Court of Justice enforces principles laid down by the community, and they
are applied to the member states uniformly.554 This direct application is the type of enforcement
that is needed to deter and sanction environmental criminals. The proper mechanism for this type
of enforcement is a strong and united supranational forum that articulates clear regulations and
while simultaneously enforcing any breaches of its law.
It is especially promising that in the case of a conflict of law, the court requires that the
Union’s law to be controlling over the domestic laws of the member states.555 Union members
have willingly relinquished some of their rights in order to allow Union law, as principal, to be
properly applied throughout the EU. This has been advanced by institutions such as the E.C.J.
which has used legal doctrine to push forward integration of the various European States.556 It is
important for the application of legal duties of the member states be uniform in defining,
prosecuting, and adjudicating international environmental crimes. Allowing the E.U. to have
supremacy when there is a conflict of law, allows for the circumvention of any country that may
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have been bribed or forced to accept pollution against their interests. The Union has the capacity
to override this coercion and properly execute the laws it is legally bound to impose.

III: Criminal Law Provisions for Environmental Crimes: History and Structure
The European Community promulgated decisions that are written to protect the
environment through the use of criminal sanctions. These decisions are structured to safeguard
the environment through the use of several avenues, including the use of criminal sanctions.
Member states also provide feedback which is appropriate to reach the goals established by the
collective.557
The increasing number of international mechanisms prescribing penalties for
environmental infractions comes during an era where law makers are internationally embracing
their role as the protectors of the environment. This is a stark change from past politicians
following the traditional cost-benefit analysis. Growing social and public pressure has pushed
this view as obvious environmental damage continues to mount. To adhere to the public pulse,
the European Union has put the enforcement power back into environmental protection by
formulating environmental laws that prescribe criminal sanctions.
Currently, there exists minimal international environmental enforcement provisions.
There is however existing sanctions enumerated by the environmental laws of the European
Union (compared to the damaging effects of the criminal acts).558 An introduction of penal
provisions and standards from the European Union will be helpful in taking a more holistic
approach to environmental protection.
Legal principles suggest that the E.U. adopts baseline laws. This puts into place a
foundation that shall provide stability and uniformity for which member states must conform
with and abide. These provisions are important for instructing member states on what acts of
environmental pollution will rise to the level of criminal conduct. Such laws must be enacted to
promulgate the appropriate level of criminal sanctions that encompass the vision policy makers
had when they drafted such provisions.559
The implementation of these regulations find their justification from the numerous
environmental crimes that are international in nature; crimes that continue to impact nature
across national borders. The uniformity of criminal sanctions is needed so that perpetrators
cannot take advantage of weak national laws, and the differences between domestic legal
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provisions. It seems the E.U. must face its problems head on regarding international
environmental damage. Its directive asserts that provisions are important where the crimes have
damaging results or are acted out in a forum of criminal mechanisms that play an important role
in environmental crime. In response to organized environmental crime, the Directive requires
strict criminal provisions by clearly articulating the disapproval of the malice mens rea
requirement.

IV. Legal Structure of Criminal Provisions of International Environmental Crimes
A sound and firm legal structure is needed to combat international environmental crimes.
An instructive piece of international legislation which forms a basis for the proper mechanism
for criminal provisions is found in the 2007 Directive Proposal.560
This Proposal aims to formulate a set of grave environmental crimes to be labeled as
criminal conduct throughout the E.U. The provisions are applicable to water, soil, and living
beings (animals, plants), and it also encompasses the conservation of certain species.561 The
Directive enumerates the list of acts that constitute criminal offenses. This list is instructive for
an international organization who aims to criminally sanction environmental crimes. It includes
offenses that incorporate the discharge of emissions or materials into a natural medium; the
unlawful discharge of emissions or materials into a natural medium that will likely cause death
or injury; the unlawful handling of waste that will likely cause death or injury; the unlawful
operation of an electrical plant; the unlawful handling of nuclear materials; the unlawful
handling of animals; and the unlawful act of degrading a protected habitat.562
A.

Analysis of the Crimes

This Directive states that a particular act is criminal in nature if it causes an enumerated
result. Furthermore, a “significant” risk that may cause damage to the environment is to be
punished, as is an omission to act if if there is an affirmative duty to act.
An unlawful commission of an act is required to violate this directive. This is an act that
impinges on controlling legislation, administrative provisions, or opinions proscribed by proper
authorities that seek to protect the environment.563 The lone exception is the particular offenses
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enumerated in Article 3(a). This provision touches on an end result that is nothing less than
devastation (death, disease, etc.), rather than the illegality of the act.
The mens rea requirement for these offenses are satisfied when the act is performed with
intent or with gross negligence. Aiding and abetting the offense is equally criminal and will be
sanctioned.564
B.

Corporate Criminal Liability

Nations that are members of this Directive must make certain that corporations can and
will be held criminally liable for offenses committed on their behalf by employees and agents.565
The Directive provides the choice to enforce criminal sanctions against corporations. This was a
policy compromise that attempted to downplay the concerns of certain states that do not provide
for criminal liability for corporations. Some nations have articulated that the criminal sanctioning
of corporations goes against their legal statutes.566 What is needed to truly combat the harmful
emissions of corporations is the establishment of a Directive that binds all states to criminally
sanction corporations. Corporations continue to use the dishonorable trade of bribery and
monetary pressure. These international sanctions can help strike a balance between international
governance and domestic failures. Binding sanctions that are uniformly applied seems to be the
best way to fight back against strong corporations and deter them from future pollution.
C.

Criminal Sanctions and Fines

The enumerated criminal offenses are to be deterred by basic criminal doctrines. The
punishment should be effective and proportionate for both citizens and corporations.567 For
certain crimes performed under certain parameters, such as causing severe and long lasting
damage, the level of criminal punishment for the actors, regardless of if the actor is a citizen or a
corporation, should be within a specified range of punishment. This range of punishment is
necessary in order to deter criminals from exploiting the differences in national criminal laws.
This scheme is an effective method in deterring environmental crimes from occurring.
Uniformity across all nations, bound together, will ensure the successful application of sanctions.
This particular Directive contrasts primary criminal sanctions and collateral criminal
sanctions. Primary punishments include imprisonment and certain fines against citizens or
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corporations. Prison time and its proposition approximate a certain balance that correlates to the
conclusion of the Justice and Home Affairs Council.568
This scale encompasses the criminal structure that defines incarceration times, based on
the illegal conduct. The exact terms depend on the mens rea of the actor, combined with the
totality of the circumstances.569 This structure also provides for crimes that are conducted by
organized bodies by making punishment much steeper.570 It must be noted that these criminal
sanctions and their application must not be left to the individual nation to implement. This
problem arises frequently when attempting to establish an adjudicatory process. The international
community must be willing and able to enforce these provisions, which require unison among
countries. Providing a forum for the several nations to effectuate a uniform application of
environmental criminal laws would be optimal. It must not however be left to the individual
nation.
D.

Secondary Sanctions and Measures

The directive provides articles enumerating lists for restitution that will hopefully stymie
future environmental acts of degradation from occurring. Also, ancillary punishment is listed for
environmental criminals. This gives powers to states to disbar businesses from activities that
require official approval. This sanction is enforced when the criminal’s activity presents a
probable chance of repeat breaches of law, and this may be accompanied by a requirement to
repair the damage done to the environment. Also, sanctions exist that may bar a criminal from
public benefits and effectively disqualifying them from certain business practices. This forces
them to adopt safety provisions to manage and repair damage already done to the environment.

V. Implementing the Directive
Past civil sanctions have not been effective in curing the issue of environmental crimes,
which is why criminal sanctions are necessary. Promulgating such criminal sanctions is seen to
be the appropriate method for deterring future environmental crimes. Civil sanctions have
continued to fall short in being effective. One of the main reasons for this revolves around the
monetary penalty principle itself. When a company is asked to pay a civil fine, the corporation
will automatically engage in a cost benefit analysis. This balancing of the scales allows the
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company to see if it is financially profitable to pollute the environment (if the costs of civil
penalties are still cheaper than changing their modus operandi).
Adopting criminal sanctions will alter this analysis. Polluters will now be forced to factor
in criminal sanctions when choosing their actions. Furthermore, unified criminal laws will be
symmetrical across all member states. It will deter polluters from planning illegal actions in
countries that do not criminalize such conduct. This is crucial in the implementation of criminal
sanctions.

VI. Current Analysis of the European Union’s Impact on Environmental Protection
At the center of various E.U. treaties, including the 1992 Treaty on European Union, is a
strong push for the protection of the natural environment. This prioritization is focused on the
long term sustainability of the human habitat. The 1992 Treaty was especially important because
it provided for an express enumeration of environmental goals. It asserted that the E.U. should
“aim at a high level of protection” for the environment.571 The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon continued
this push by forming the structure of legal goals encompassing environmental protection.
The European Union has shown a deep enthusiasm for a continental scheme for
environmental protection. This however is challenged by the goals of individual states and
economic integration. The first major balancing test that the E.U. faces in creating such laws
revolves around the need to protect the environment versus the protection of free trade
principles. The E.C.J. has created a proportionality test to protect regulations that come into
conflict with free movement priorities.572 There is also the larger balancing test that includes the
interests of domestic governments with their own environmental protection schemes versus the
creation of a universal European law designed to protect the same interests on a larger scale.
Although the E.U. has faced these conflicting interests, they have continued to push forward
regulations that have created an international impact.573
Through regulation, subsequent European Law has formulated environmental protective
measures. These laws have given signed treaties a more defined role as they used to create
controlling law in prosecuting future crimes. A calling card for Union legislation surrounds its
regulatory provisions that are legal doctrines, created at an international level. These pieces of
international agreements have been integrated and implemented on the domestic governmental
level.
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In particular, these laws have been designed to merge domestic and European Union
regulations to create a proper structure for environmental protection. It also allows for the
individualized enforcement of relevant legislation by national governments.574 Currently, there
are more than 175 different forms of regulations that expressly speak to the protection of the
environment. These provisions control different forms of pollution including water, air, waste,
and nuclear discharge. Furthermore, being held responsible for environmental damage has led
the Union to promulgate laws that will control other important arenas of environmental
protection.575
The E.U.’s environmental laws have been influential in shaping legislation passed on the
domestic level for its member states. A glowing example is that of the United Kingdom. This
nation has seen an 80% increase in their environmental regulations since they joined the E.U.576
Additionally, other countries within Europe have been required to adopt all existing
environmental legislation into their national legal system in order to obtain E.U. membership.
This requirement is coupled with the mandate of effective enforcement to the prevailing
standards.577
A helpful mechanism in the proliferation of E.U. environmental policy has been the
E.C.J.’s willingness as a judiciary to create case law that assists in the strengthening of
international protection. In the ADBHU case, the court incorporated environmental priorities into
a supranational context. Paragraph 12 of the judgment stated “that the principle of freedom of
trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the
objectives of general interested pursued by the Community provided that the rights in question
are not substantively impaired.”578 Rulings like this continue to define the thin line between free
trade interests in environmental protection. As seen in this ruling however, concerns such as
environmental protection, are given superior status in certain circumstances.
The E.C.J. has also strengthened the plaintiff’s position in litigation against polluters. In
Handelskwekerij GJ Bier v. Mines de Potasses d’Alsace, the Court dealt a polluter that
discharged tens of thousands of tons of chloride into the Rhine River. The Court ruled that
victims of transboundary pollution may bring suit in the jurisdiction of their choice that is either
where the harm occurred, or within the country where the event that gave rise to the harm
occurred.579 Although legal scholars argue that this promoted forum shopping, it is undeniable
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that parties wishing to bring suit against polluters have been empowered to bring accountability
to environmental polluters in the E.U.580
Legislation aimed at the protection of the natural environment is another expansion of
positive environmental regulations within the European Union over the past two decades. A
provision that is in line with this growth, Directive 2008/99/EC, articulates the enforcement of
criminal law in relation to environmental protection. This is an important nexus between criminal
and environmental law. The application of criminal law upon members has largely been
shielded from the European Union’s jurisdiction. Criminal justice, including environmental
criminal justice, is an arena in which European Union effectiveness has fallen short. Through the
various treaties and covenants established by the E.U., under this sphere of law, member states
have not granted full power over such matters to the Union. Nevertheless, cooperation among
and between the Member States and the E.U. is at an all-time high, resulting in effective
implementation of environmental criminal law provisions.
European Criminal Law is a new body of legal provisions, and its use has become
increasingly noteworthy. It is a well-known fact that cooperation on forums previously foreign to
the competence of the Union is currently one of the most exciting zones of E.U. legislation and
policy formations. The criminal justice system is within this area, and the European Court of
Justice has been interpreting and adjudicating cases that have been brought under this field of
law. This is a positive development for the E.U., as it exerts its jurisdiction over national actors
to effectively protect the environment.

VII. Current Concerns with European Union’s Policing of Environmental Crimes
and Solutions
The E.U. is a leader in international policy formation, and it is during global conventions
that it thrusts its political power with large international entities. World leaders are aware of the
Union’s power, and they must be keen to the possibility that Union policies will be pressed upon
individual states.
The European Union is a mix of many components, including the right of members to
partake in treaty drafting.581 Its authority has been developed by separate treaties that define and
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allocate power to the Union.582 It is important it note that member states remain independent with
powers outside those enumerated within the E.U.
While sovereignty of the members is a prevailing concern, the E.U. has gained
considerable power from the member states. This can be seen in the ECJ, where the court
submits orders that are to be followed by all member states and even if it overrides decisions by
the independent countries. The rationale behind this power of the ECJ, revolves around the need
for a substantive norm of law to govern Europe in certain areas of concern.583 When a single
judiciary governs multiple states, individuals residing in the many nations effectively become
citizens of the larger body.
The Parliament is the legislative branch of the E.U., but it is striking to see that this body
has very limited decision making powers.584 This organ cannot promulgate law, lacks the power
of the purse, and it cannot elect representatives who can perform legislative duties.585 The limited
power vested in this E.U. organ primarily rests in its veto powers. The reason for this limited
authority is clear; member states are not willing to establish a central power that will be
authoritative over their domestic governments.586 The E.U.’s controlling votes remain entrenched
in the several administrations that are comprised of officials from the member states. The format
of voting allows for a minority of states to retain veto powers over matters that could affect the
entire group.587
The fragmentation of control could pose a problem in addressing environmental crimes.
The need to act quickly when an environmental crime occurs is almost always necessary. Having
a system that is not self-aware of what mechanisms it can use to act and with what authority, can
hinder the whole operation. It is also crucial to outline the level of enforcement authority
available to allow for effective implementation of regulations.
A fundamental problem the E.U. faces comes from the divided interests its member states
face when they vote in favor of the entire body and their domestic interests.588 The system
creates pressure that is placed upon the sovereign states to gain additional votes for their favored
legislation. This is evidenced by the U.S. Senate demanding that the U.S. be allocated additional
votes, equal to Great Britain in 1919.589 The Soviet Union demanded the same compensation to
equalize their share with those totaled by the United States in the mid 1940’s.590 Maintaining
voting power that is equal to opponents creates a major issue. This causes conflict when
attempting to advance the interests of environmental protection.
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The protection of the environment is an important issue that is discussed greatly among
international leaders.591 The E.U. has taken the opportunity to promulgate environmental policy.
Concurrently, the United States has disfavored the Union’s attempts to protect these vital
interests. Regardless, European leaders have paved the way for law and policy in the field of
environmental law.592
Another important aspect of this international body is its member states ability to assert
their individualized policy concerns. This is illustrated by the divided perspectives and priorities
for enhancing environmental protection. Support is strong in Germany and Scandinavia but less
in Portugal and Ireland.593 Regardless of individual state preferences, the Union has promulgated
strict environmental policies by impressing high standards of environmental health upon all
countries.”594
The E.U. has shifted towards regulating environmental policy that affects its entire
member pool. Environmental policy however, exists for issues that are not international in
nature. An example of this is the European model for solid waste disposal. Though the E.U. is
furthering the application of its regulation equally, it becomes frustrated when attempting to
impose costs upon business and producers in fair divisions.595
NGOs have become an accepted and promoted aspect within Europe. They have been a
part of the decision making process within the Union since its inception. Recommendations and
reports appear alongside E.U. policy implementation and legislation as NGOs employ multilevel lobbying strategies when they address the European Commission and European Parliament.
Their role within the E.U. has been one of great import given the lack of information that the
European Commission operates with.596 The disappearance of NGOs from the policy creation
process would be similar to “driving with eyes shut.”597 Throughout the history of the European
project, these international organizations have led to the growth of democracy and intelligent
planning for the continent.
NGOs have taken a foothold in the field of environmental protection. There exists an
NGO which is comprised of several environmental support administrations called the European
Environmental Bureau. This NGO is financially supported by the E.U., and it helps to
promulgate policy that the E.U. supports.
In addition to NGOs, Europe has developed other organizations to help spread its
environmental policies throughout the continent. These organizations in conjunction with the
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E.U., have been a positive force in overseeing the environment through regulations developed at
the transnational level.598 These policies are often pressed forward by the individual member
states that are in support of additional environmental protections.599
An example of the E.U.’s influence on environmental regulation can be seen by their far
reaching efforts in reducing greenhouse gas emissions during the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
negotiations.600 During these talks, Europe communicated a growing concern in reference to the
emissions of greenhouse gases. They called for all developed states to reduce their greenhouse
gas emission by 15% from levels emitted in 1990. Several countries did not accept that reduction
number and agreed to a lower percentage. The E.U. was the most ambitious in its proposed
reductions, which is encouraging in light of the great harm that these emissions inflict upon the
environment.601
Analogous to the enforcement agreements seen in the wake of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is
the European effort to create an international enforcement agency. The E.U. is a leader in this
field as it has defined international enforcement agencies which require member states to adhere
to regulation.602 These agencies are well respected and followed by the European population.
This is the key component in maintaining high environmental standards through enforcement
mechanisms.603
The E.U. is now seen as the transnational organization that is given the authority to
promulgate environmental policy and law that will be binding upon all member states. That is the
correct approach and the best method to remedy and sanction environmental disasters.

VIII. The European Union as a Model for a Global Union
The European Union is a model for more comprehensive global cooperation in an effort
to protect the environment. The European method has laid down a foundation to prosecute and
remedy crimes of transnational environmental import. The E.U. model has implemented
environmental criminal provisions for environmental crimes by imposing duties on its
institutions, member states, and private citizens. A very similar model is needed in order to deal
with the realities of environmental crimes and their transnational character on a global scale.
The European Union model for addressing environmental crimes has been outlined
previously in this Chapter. This process can guide world leaders in adopting a global union to
combat environmental crimes. There are several aspects of the E.U. that make a global union an
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attractive option for combating global environmental degradation. However, there are drawbacks
that must be factored in.
A. Positive aspects of the European Union as a model for a Global Union

Prior to the eastern expansion beginning in 2004, the E.U. was a smaller international
government with less member states and conflicting interests. After 2007, the European
institution almost doubled in size. Scholars immediately began to forecast a divided and sluggish
government that would be unable to strike concord between the many nations.604 However, the
E.U. stayed relatively the same, passing laws and effectively enforcing them as it did prior to
2004.605 This has been credited to the informalization of European negotiation, where proposed
policies are debated and hashed out prior to large votes and decisions.606 A Global Union can
also use the same model of negotiation and policy development that has been in effect since the
eastern expansion. Such a scheme of negotiation and legislation can be effectively used for a
large body of member states that can encompass an international government that exceeds the
size of the E.U.
There are also several positive aspects that can be pinpointed when observing the
European model of international integration. For our purposes, the most attractive aspect of this
model is its ability to review and penalize environmental criminals. The E.U. is known as a
Community of Laws607 which bases its regulations on the provisions articulated in Article 6(1) of
the Treaty of the European Union.
The right to a clean and healthy environment is regarded as a fundamental right by many
leaders. The boundaries of this right and actions that infringe upon it are adjudicated by the
European judiciary. This is an important component of the European Model that is extremely
desirable if a global union is established to combat environmental crimes. This global governing
body must have a court of proper jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes if it is to be capable of
properly sanctioning environmental crimes. The European Court of Justice serves as an effective
judicial protection of the environment that is ingrained in the European legal order. This right
and the protective shield obtained from it, is clearly one of the laws common to the constitutional
traditions of the member states. The implementation of a holistic procedure will push individual
nations to include within their constitutions, protective measures to safeguard environmental
interests.
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The Global Union should be structured with modified with guidance from the European
Union as it presents the most advanced system for a practical international diplomacy and
institutionalized enforcement mechanisms. A recommendation for this expansion can be
summarized briefly in several points.
First, the EU model should be considered for its effective ability to achieve diplomatic
consensus. The E.U. acts in large part by its ability to come to agreement on a wide array of
issues. Unlike domestic legislatures that bicker and cease government operations, as seen in the
United States with their recent 2013 government shutdown, the E.U. climbs above their
differences to institute effective laws that benefit the commons. In context of the environment,
the Global Union could follow this by instituting the same mechanisms used to achieve such
cooperation when making decisions for the environment.
Next, the E.U. provides individuals standing to bring suit against parties across the
European Union. Jurisdictional boundaries have been limited and rules of jurisdictional exercise
have allowed courts to reach farther than before when adjudicating cases. Within the Global
Union, a similar approach will allow for individual parties to bring violators of international
regulation to justice. It will avoid the limitations of courts and allow for more cases to be
adjudicated in venues favorable to common citizen litigants.
The European Union is also ahead of its American in Chinese counterparts in standards
stretching from manufacturing to energy consumption. In essence, the highest standards in the
world are their minimum. The Global Union can attempt to achieve such standards while
balancing the interest of economic growth. However, the analysis will be shifted away from
business and towards sustainability, which in the long run will boost human prosperity.
The Libson Treaty is a recent attempt by the E.U. to emulate a form constitution that
establishes and sets out authority for its institutions on a cohesive and single agreement. The
Global Union must create a constitution to serve as its core document to govern its institutions,
and set forth its principles. The right to a clean environment would be one of the fundamental
rights set forth in this constitution. Courts and laws that are created under the Global Union
could not violate this fundamental right, and a court inside the Union would adjudicate such
issues by interpreting the constitution.
This court or courts will be charged with rendering fair and balanced decisions, in line
with the mission set forth at the founding of the Union. The job of the Courts will be to
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determine the meaning of the constitution and set out orders that require states and citizens to
comply with them. A proposed method of establishment would involve multiple courts in
different fields of law. For instance, an International Environmental Supreme Court would be the
international court of last resort in the area of environmental law. Courts under the hierarchy can
be assigned to already existing courts, such as domestic high courts.
B. Drawbacks of the European Union as a model for a Global Union

Over recent years, the weakness of the E.U. has taken center stage during the economic
recession that was started in 2008 by a melt-down of the global financial system. Shortly after
the world entered into the “great recession,” certain European states have found it difficult to
maintain current payments on their public debt. None has been as prevalent as Greece which
totaled over €363 billion in public debt during the year 2011.608
Traditionally, a single state that defaults on their public debt payments could be contained
depending on the size of the country, and the nature of their debts. Within the E.U. however,
each state is inextricably tied the other member states through their common currency, the Euro.
A default in Greece could have resulted in a total collapse of the European project or pushed the
political mechanisms that bind the E.U. to the brink of dysfunction. A Global Union would have
to take a clear lesson from recent world events so it may create the infrastructure to protect itself
against near calamity.
It is worth noting however, that even though the E.U. has faced severe issues with
member states being overburdened by their public debt. The economic bloc’s GDP per capita in
purchasing power is three times that of Brazil’s, four times that of China, and nine times that of
India.609 Scholars have argued that the E.U. is not in absolute decline, but in a relative drawback
as the entire global economy has slowed. It is imperative for a global union to be decentralized
economically and committed jointly to the goal of sustainable development, in order to protect
the progress in environment protection from the utter effects of economic drawbacks.
Additional drawbacks to following Europe as a model for a Global Union revolve around
the notion that globalization has been an economic force that has imposed unwilling nations to
unwanted policies and influences. Resistance to globalization, whether through terrorist violence
like that directed at the World Trade Center in 2001, or through increasingly oppressive
immigration and detention policies directed against noncitizens,610 may prevent the continuing
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development of a global order. The United States has a strong interest in facilitating this
development and ensuring a global order incorporates a strong commitment to human rights,
including environmental protection. It is difficult to distinguish between policies and practices
that “impose” values on unwilling cultures, and policies and practices that foster communication,
consensus, and adherence to particular values. However, characterizing efforts to develop
communication and consensus on national and global adherence to human rights norms such as
environmental protection and criminalizing against those protection as “imposition” of values,
serves only to frustrate communication and change.
It seems that Western Cultures have a leading interest in encouraging and nudging the
development of a world order that outlines that a strong commitment to human rights. These
rights would include the protection of environmental. A key aspect to the Global Union would be
an enforcement mechanism to penalize criminals who violate environmental regulations. It is
very difficult to separate the difference between policies that impose ideas on unwilling societies
and ideas that are in place to further communication and adherence to certain basic fundamental
rights. Another concern centers on the capability of an effective judicial body adjudicating cases
of environmental crimes. It has been argued that fundamental rights without access to judicial
review would have little enforcement power and be dismissed as irrelevant. To have this model
work properly, sovereign states would have to give up some power over domestic matters to a
court that would have international jurisdiction. This is necessary for this Global Union to
properly enforce its goal of protecting the environment and criminally penalizing those who act
in an interest against the global good. If a court can be established, and a proper enforcement
mechanism adopted, the world’s nations can put to rest concerns of an international body being
incapable of handling such a vast undertaking. An impartial court, with prosecutors, judges, and
enforcement officials would be able to effectively control the contamination of our water, land
and air.
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CONCLUSION

I.

Status of International Criminal Law Currently

The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico may yet allow for a renewed
interest in the possible use of criminal charges for the damage done to the Gulf waters and coast.
Currently, there has been debate on whether to prosecute the corporate executives of BP further
within the United States, but as seen with the Chernobyl radioactive cloud, pollution in many
cases does not respect territorial boundaries. Currently, there exists no legal platform to remedy
the situation on an international level.
The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction covers crimes that cause the deliberate
destruction of the environment, forcing mass exoduses of civilians.611 For many years the
international community has been challenged when attempting to find a legal formula that is
suitable for redress of international crimes against the environment. This need is urgent in light
of the obvious incompetence of national forums to effectively provide a solution to this complex
problem. Environmental activists have continuously called the mass destruction of ecosystems
an international crime against peace. They urge for a codified classification of such crimes under
this category, which will place these acts on the same level of genocide and crimes against
humanity.
There is a growing possibility that international crimes against the environment may one
day fit into the jurisdiction of the ICC. This Court has shown that it is very efficient in penalizing
polluters through criminal sanctions. Pressure will continue to mount as domestic systems of law
are incapable and unwilling to handle transnational polluters. Within a nation, environmental
offenses may fall under a range of watery offenses that do not punish in accordance with the
seriousness of the crime.
Opponents of this categorization argue that the illegal act of environmental degradation
may not necessarily be targeted toward a specific state or population. They also assert that
environmental crimes are not crimes against the humanity, under the original guise of the
classification. Rather than understanding the consequences of the crime, they seek to artfully
play with legal classifications to strip enforcement power. Observing the conduct and the result,
what makes an illegal environmental act a crime against humanity is the considerable impact it
142 |

creates by destroying the living conditions of man. Such global acts should fall under a special
category of crimes operating under the conditions of globalization.612
A. Current International Treaties

A number of international treaties contain mandates for criminal sanctions that address
violations of certain environmental norms embodied within their texts. However, all of these
agreements unanimously fall short of expressly asserting international jurisdiction over illegal
environmental conduct, exacting punishment, or designating an international body for
enforcement. They have also failed to create an international system independent of state
mechanisms to deal with these crimes.613
These international conventions have handled the issue of environmental crimes against
the environment with general directives. They require member states to follow a certain
protocols of handling criminal conduct, while leaving specific details to domestic decision
making. States have varied in their individual implementation of these treaties for multiple
reasons; chief among them is the resilience of the perpetrators committing prohibited acts,
corruption and the cost of implementation. It is important to note that many attempts to create
the desired level of protection on the international level through criminal sanctions were
frustrated and stymied during their genesis. An example of such an event took place at the Rome
Conference when the body adopted the ICC statute to include a regime for criminal liability for
moral personas. This was rejected like many other initiatives that could have brought
advancement to the protection of the environment.
Currently, the laws that have been adopted to penalize criminal conduct is limited in
scope and application. There is an incompetent range of laws that have been adopted by several
nations. International bodies have been created to prosecute and penalize war crimes and human
rights criminals, but there is no binding jurisdiction for international law when it comes to the
matter of environmental crimes. The boundaries and circumstances of environmental crimes do
not have an international legal definition. There is a distinguishable difference between crimes
against human rights and war crimes. It is often said that “most polluting activities not only
cause costs for society, but also generate some benefits.”614 Such an argument continues to stem
efforts attempting to categorize environmental crimes as a severe breach of international
conduct.
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The directives and aspirations of many international treaties have failed to bring results
because of their lack of enforcement mechanisms.615 For example, at the 1992 UN Conference
on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit), the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) was born. Here, one hundred and ninety two nations, including the governing body of the
European Union, are now parties of that convention.
In April 2002, the parties to the CBD committed themselves to significantly reducing the
loss of biodiversity by 2010.616 Predictably, that goal was never achieved. Rather than oversee
the reduction of bio diversity, international leaders have become stewards of a world that is
losing its vibrant spread of organisms.
The Kyoto Protocol is another global agreement that aims to deter international
environmental criminal law. The Protocol introduced flexibility mechanisms which were defined
as methods to achieve the reduction of emissions in an effort to stem climate change.
Further treaties have been adopted and proposed for the purposes of protecting the global
environment. The Economic and Social Counsel of the United Nations reached resolution
1994/15 in 1995, wherein it called upon the community of nations to “consider acknowledging
the most serious forms of environmental crimes in an international convention.” The 1994/15
resolution also urged member states to give consideration to the need for law enforcement
resources. This monetary support would be used to address environmental crimes and facilitate
the prosecution of international crimes, in particular environmental crimes. The takeaway from
the meeting of these nations was an urging to strongly consider the viability of establishing an
international criminal court.617
According to sources within the U.N., there are now more than 500 international treaties
and other agreements related to the environment. The majority of these accords have been
concluded in recent years.618 Making agreements however, is only a step towards a tremendous
goal. The difficulty lies not in the creation of treaties, but applying the agreed upon principles to
practice and enforcement them. Countries that embrace a treaty by becoming a signatory state
are not bound by its accords until its internal legislative bodies ratify the treaty.
B. Failure of Individual States

The role of a given state in implementing international treaties can be examined by
analyzing the process by which a treaty can be implemented and enforced through their penal
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code. Civil and criminal statutes can be used to implement environmental treaties by states.
Nations usually create or authorize existing administrative agencies to carry day to day
implementation of environmental treaty obligations.
Environmental treaties usually require states to enact penal laws to enforce its provisions
with respect to “prohibited activities.”619 Ambiguity arises under this mandate as most treaties
do not provide a definition for the “prohibited acts.” Signatory nations may use administrative
regulations to impose penalties for violating set levels of toxic discharge, maintaining improper
permits or keeping a false account. Here, the control of criminal conduct merges with the
administrative scheme. The concept of environmental harm is usually not presented; it is the
protected interest of the administrative measure itself, and not the ecological value. This
highlights some of the failures of individual states in implementing international criminal
environmental law.
C. Failure of Domestic Legislation

There have been strides made on the domestic level with creating laws and enforcement
mechanisms to prosecute environmental infractions, but a gap remains. Nation states have
generally recognized that legal persons as well as natural persons can be held criminally liable.
However, when attempting to prosecute and charge corporate actors, it becomes difficult to
follow through with current principles. This is because it is hard to distinguish between
individual actors within the corporation. With various layers, and hidden aspects of corporate
business, prosecution is almost unmanageable. A shift in the paradigm to hold certain individuals
within corporations consistently responsible for certain acts would cure this.
Sovereign states are naturally concerned about their security and Economy. This in turn
pushes environmental protection down on the priority list as other short term benefits are found
to be far more attractive. This has made the growth and effectiveness of domestic legislation
non-existent in terms of environmental protection.620 The goal of regulating environmental crime
is challenging for individual states.621 Domestic governments have natural weaknesses that are
difficult to overcome, and interstate cooperation is a necessary mechanism to solve this crisis
involving a lack of regulation. International cooperation has proven to be the correct mechanism
for combatting similar international challenges in the past.622 For instance, cohesive efforts led to
the elimination of cholera that ravaged human populations.
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Corruption at the state and corporate level has proven to the most challenging obstacle to
neutralize for preventing environmental crimes. Public officials under domestic governmental
regimes continue to take bribes or other consideration without consequences. To combat this
issue, efforts should push for administrative reform. Corruption prevention is the most effective
and historically successful way to combat this type of problem. Another beneficial focus should
be drawn to developing easy to access technology that reduces human interaction in areas of
trade in natural resources. The proper use of technological advances can be a game changer in
promoting transparency. Online access for the average citizenry and media organizations can
create a self-check system for heavily regulated industries.623
Individual nations in regional agreements also differ in their domestic circumstances, and
this often this leads to exceptions and exemptions being applied to that specific country. Such
exceptions often remain as the steadfast rule. Also, sovereignty issues have held back the full
integration of international law into domestic law. Nations often use the sovereignty argument as
a shield to defend their views on the social cost of progress and the contradicting benefits that
coincide pollution control.624 These nations argue that their privilege as a sovereign country
allows them to use all the means within their disposal to obtain economic success on par with the
affluence enjoyed by the developed countries. The argument draws valid points as many
developed countries exploited the natural resources within their own territories and beyond to
obtain their current financial status. A counter argument must be made to insure developing
nations that the time has come and gone for the quick exploitation of the environment for
immediate benefit. If we continue to use our natural resources and pollute the planet, any short
term gain will be offset by the diminishing returns of the future.

II.

Regional Cooperation

Regional efforts have proven to be more dynamic in their agreements. Many mandate
states to resort to criminal sanctions to reinforce their environmental protection. The
international community must accept that environmental crimes demand a committed and
sustained global response. The success of this initiative requires proper regional cooperation
between all interested parties. There have been some global mechanisms, both governmental and
non-governmental, that have taken this burden in an attempt to connect groups and help create
regional cooperation.625
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The consequences for failing to adequately address environmental crimes are potentially
disastrous. There exist well-funded criminal organizations that continually profit from exploiting
the environment. The Environmental Investigation Agency has urged “the international
community to wake-up to the menace of environmental crime and show the necessary political
will to tackle the criminal gangs plundering our planet for a quick profit.”626 The reality of
environmental crimes requires an appropriately measured response that will regulate it down to a
level that no longer threatens the life of wild animals and the health of humans. Similar to other
criminal conduct, the intolerable level of environmental crime is still unknown. Regardless of
this measurement, a sufficient regulatory response is still required from all parties that aim to
police environmental crimes. Observing historical data, initiatives that have attempted to reach
this mark have fallen short.
Regionally located organizations seem to be better equipped than global institutions, both
in efficiency and implementation terms, to deal with the burden of implementing effective
environmental policies.627 Regional cooperation is most effective in policing and regulating
environmental crimes.628 Local organizations have access to additional information because of
their personal relationships to regional entities. This makes it easier to create cooperation among
states with similar cultures and environments.
In an effort to implement sound environmental law, regional regimes have developed to
connect and reinforce the common interests of various nations.629 Local institutions include the
Council of Europe, The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, The Asian
Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (ARPEC), and the environmental
security regime established for the Baltic Sea region. ARPEC, which embodies many regional
organizations, has made the fight against environmental crimes a paramount goal, and is an
example of such cooperation.630 This organization was created because of the unfortunate reality
of a flourishing illegal trade in commodities such as endangered wild flora and fauna, ozone
depleting chemicals, and hazardous waste. The black market that seeks and distributes these
products seriously undercuts the burgeoning progress of several environmental protection
agreements. More importantly, the continuation of this trade furthers the endangerment of
humans and their health and safety.
A. European Union
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The European Union is a group of sovereign democratic countries that envision a
continent which respects human rights and peace. They have formed an agreement in various
treaties for their commitment to each other and the greater good. This international governing
organization is empowered with sovereign authority and an independent legal power that has
jurisdiction over its citizens. Coupled with proper enforcement mechanisms, the E.U. is a fully
functioning governing organization that is able to legislate laws, and punish violators.
The interpretation and application of these laws are determined by the European Court of
Justice. Its functions embrace actions such as treaty infringement proceedings (Article 169 EC),
actions for annulment (Article 173 EC) and complaints of failure to act (Article 175 EC). The
ECJ seems to be the proper adjudicatory organ for complaints of international environmental
crimes. This Court has the authority of the community to preside over such cases. The power of
the ECJ stems from its ability to bind subjugated states to orders that are issued. This is
necessary to establish a proper response to environmental crimes. The model of the E.U. can
serve as the foundation for a broader and more comprehensive Global Union. This proposed
international governing body will take away the strongest mechanisms of the E.U., which include
imposing duties on domestic institutions and private citizens. This direct application of
international law is the appropriate enforcement device that is needed to deter and sanction
environmental criminals.
A strong and united supranational forum that allows for unambiguous regulations and
decisive acts of punishment, with binding enforcement mechanisms, is the clear choice for an
environmental protection scheme. Especially promising about the E.U. is the way it handles
situations when a conflict of law arises. Here, the ECJ grants the Union’s law supremacy over
national laws of the member states.631 Regulatory administrative law concerning the environment
remains at the heart of environmental protection for the European Union member states. The
current international environmental enforcement and criminal sanction provisions are minimal at
best. The E.U. has enumerated632 the readily necessary introduction of penal provisions and
standards from the European Union will be productive from a policy perspective.
B. Criminal Sanctions and the European Union

A sound and comprehensive legal structure is needed to combat international
environmental crimes. The 2007 Directive proposal serves as an instructive piece of international
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legislation that forms a basis for the development of proper criminal enforcement mechanisms.633
This proposal aims to formulate a set of grave environmental crimes to be labeled as criminal
conduct throughout the E.U. The provisions are applicable to water, soil, and living beings
(animals, plants, etc.). It also encompasses certain species conservation.634 The agreement
enumerates the list of acts that constitute criminal offenses. This list is instructive for an
international organization that aims to criminally sanction environmental crimes.
Corporations continue to be the main perpetrators of international environmental crimes.
They use the illegal methods of bribery and monetary pressure. The best method to tackle this
increase in corporate money and its distasteful use is by installing sanctions to strike a balance.
Binding sanctions that are uniformly applied seems to be the best way of fighting back against
international companies. Such measures would deter their unlawful conduct. The European
Union provides the choice to enforce criminal sanctions on corporations, and this was a policy
compromise that aimed to downplay the concerns of certain States that do not provide for
criminal liability for corporate entities. A number of these states have articulated that criminally
punishing corporations goes against their legal provisions. Punishing corporations criminally is
the best way to deter acts of environmental crimes.
C. International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice has been established to adjudicate crimes against
fundamental rights. The ICJ may be the proper forum to sanction environmental crimes that are
counter fundamental human rights. Customary international law has been defined as a legal body
of accepted norms that branch from general practices of states that owe each other a standard
legal obligation. This obligation has been cultivated over an extensive period of time, and it is
now developed into jus cogens. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that
“multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules
deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them.”635
Recently, there have been numerous conventions and agreements by international
tribunals that have reinforced the conclusion that grave environmental harm constitutes a basic
violation of customary international law. This practice between states illustrates a clear pattern of
willingness by nations to be bound by customary legal obligations through international and
domestic law.
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The ICJ has developed into a proper forum to adjudicate crimes against the environment.
The duty not to cause grave environmental harm has been witnessed in numerous cases by many
international tribunals. These tribunals have recognized that environmental harm that poses
severe risk to health and life of humans is illegal under customary international law.
The very first case to recognize this concept of international environmental law is The
Trail Smelter case, which expressly recognized that international liability may stem from
supranational actions that cause grave environmental harm.636 The breadth of scholarly opinion,
together with judicial authority in this field, supports the proposition that the duty to prevent the
most serious forms of environmental harm. There is an agreement in particular that harm that is
suffered on an international scale should be guarded against under basic rights established by
customary international law.637
D. Failure of Proposed International Environmental Courts

Currently, there is no intact judicial tribunal with explicit mandatory jurisdiction, right to
monitor, right to serve, or legally bind parties to orders for sanctions on international
environmental crimes. There exist only a few treaties that allow for the monitoring of
noncompliant parties to established international norms.638 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ), technically has the power to exercise jurisdiction over international environmental cases,
but it has not exercised this power in nearly 40 years. Furthermore, this unused jurisdictional
power is expressly limited to conflicts between state parties. This implicitly excludes private
citizens, corporations and NGOs from procuring standing in these cases.
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has expressly defined its
jurisdiction over the most grave international concerns, does not expressly confront the issue of
its jurisdictional power to prosecute environmental crimes. In Article 22 of the Statute of the
ICC, the provisions ensure jurisdiction over environmental crimes by the ICC would need an
amendment of the Statute.639 This cause for concern was highlighted in the language of Article
19(d) of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It stated, “a
serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and
preservation of the human environment” shall constitute an international crime.640
It is evident that there is lack of compliance with these international conventions that
national courts have instituted in adjudicating crimes against the environment. There is strong
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advocacy for an international court to exercise universal jurisdiction over such cases. The need
for world-wide coordination of existing international courts and tribunals exists.641

III.

Exemplary Models to Criminally Sanction Environmental

There are two primary organizations that are models for a comprehensive attack on
environmental crimes. These two models are the European Union and the International Criminal
Court. Both are fully able to adjudicate crimes against the environment.

A. International Criminal Court

The Rome Statute created a court with “jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community . . . .”642 This Statute gives this International Court
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of genocide, and the crime of
aggression.643 This Court’s primary purpose is to address human rights abuses without expressly
extending its jurisdiction over grave environmental crimes; acts that deeply deprive humans of a
safe and healthy environment. The only express mention of environmental sanctions in the
Statute states that it is a war crime to "intentionally launch an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause... long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”644
Although environmental crimes are not expressly articulated as under the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court, their inclusion is not only legally proper but necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the Rome Statute. For the International Criminal Court to have the power to
properly address the violation of the “most serious crimes of international concern,” 645 it must
have the power to prosecute crimes that gravely harm the environment. The perverse nature of
that environmental harm is inherent in the core crimes enumerated by the Statute. It is an
important conclusion to draw that environmental harm is inherently inseparable from the Rome
Statute’s core crimes.
The ICC would only be responsible for hearing offenses that rise to the same level of
egregiousness as those covered in the Rome Statute. With the limited resources and the singular
nature of the ICC, effectiveness would be reduced if all environmental matters were brought to
the court without a gate keeping mechanism. The issue would arise as to whether the signatory
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states of the Rome Statute would allow the ICC to increase its jurisdiction. If so, the ICC would
be a useful tool in beginning the process of prosecuting these crimes.
For the inclusion of environmental law under the jurisdiction of the ICC, there are three
roles that the court must fulfill to give the environment the same treatment as other crimes
against humanity. The ICC must serve as a criminal court, a watchdog court, and a world
security court in the realm of environmental protection.646 The first role as a criminal court is
similar to the system seen in many domestic judicial institutions. Through this core function, the
ICC should engage in the investigation, prosecution and sentencing of parties that engage in
illegal pollution or violation of the environment. It is important to note that domestic cooperation
is key in allowing the investigation of matters involving corruption and corporate dereliction of
duty. As a watchdog court, the ICC serves the function of supervising signatory states to comply
with their obligations egra omnes.647 This effectively gives the ICC a form of enforcement power
to keep nation states in line. In the context of environmental criminal law, the court should
investigate and prosecute parties that do not comply with international law directed at protecting
the environment. To fully be able to perform this function however, the international community
must specifically create, through the United Nations, a comprehensive environmental protection
regime which the ICC can adopt and enforce. Once this is achieved, the Court can continue its
duty by enforcing compliance among member states.
Within the context of this dissertation, the final role as a World Security Court is arguable
the most important aspect of the ICC. The environment is a fragile resource that can cause severe
damage to the human race if infringed upon. For example, mass pollution and climate change has
led to thousands of environmental refugees. The existence of these refugees and the degradation
of their homes present a significant issue for world security. As natural resources are further
depleted and local habitats less untouched by global corporations, a drastic change to the human
environment can cause a catastrophic impact to the security of nation states. The ICC can bring
criminal enforcement against actors who contribute most to the instability of global security. The
end would undoubtedly be a safer world.
B. European Union

The objectives of environmental protection demand a comprehensive approach
employing a range of mechanisms that will influence the actor’s conduct. These range from
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public participation to the use of criminal sanctions. Regulatory environmental administrative
law remains at the very heart of individual European nations’ mechanisms for environmental
protection. Very recently, the EU issued a new Directive on the Protection of the Environment
through Criminal Law (2007 Directive Proposal, Directive Proposal) which follows the example
of both the Council of the European Union and the Council of Europe.648
The ECJ’s ability to choose the legal grounds and mechanisms for the protection of the
environment has mustered opponents. From this Directive, the Union must force member states
to provide for effective criminal sanctions for violators of international environmental laws. The
Directive provides the framework for environmental protection and penalties against polluters.
The same proposed arguments that led to this Directive Proposal in the field of environmental
protection can easily extend to other common policies while encompassing the four freedoms of
movement, persons, goods, services and capital.
Several E.U. treaties, including the 1992 Treaty on the European Union, continue to
emphasize the protection and sustainability of the natural environment. That Treaty was
especially important as it provided for an express enumeration of environmental goals. It stated,
that the Union should “aim at a high level of protection” of the environment within its scope.649
Continuing with the purpose of that agreement is the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which forms the
fundamental legal goals of the EU. The covenant touched domestic and international spheres of
environmental protection. 650
These agreements have been effectuated to meld regulations by creating the proper
infrastructure for environmental protection in the E.U. Individualized enforcement is also
centralized on the domestic level. Currently there are more than 175 different forms of
regulations that expressly speak to the protection of the environment and the European Union’s
control over such matters. These matters include the pollution of the water and air, waste
disposal, nature conservation and nuclear energy. The E.U.’s regulations speak to the free flow
of information that is pertinent to the protection of the environment, liability for criminal acts,
and the formation of the European Environmental Agency.
In 1992, the dispensing of justice became an integral part of the European Project.
Measures have been made to guarantee certain rights and minimum standards across the E.U.
However, these initiatives have not enjoyed the same legal status as regulations and directives
that are commonplace in other areas. Rather, through the use of so-called “framework decisions,”
153 |

a much higher degree of discretion is reserved to member states. E.U. institutions also have a
lower level of competence to propose amendments.
European criminal law is a new body of law that has become increasingly glairing.
Cooperation on the forums previously untouched by the E.U. is currently one of the more
exciting areas of Union legislation and policy formation. The criminal justice system is within
this area and the Court of Justice has been interpreting and adjudicating cases that have been
brought under European Criminal Law. That is a positive outlook for the European Union and its
jurisdiction over these environmental crimes.

III.

Suggested Methods to Increase International Cooperation

Interests of nations vary differently and can be based on numerous circumstances. For
instance, global climate change talks are generally divided between the developing world and the
developed. Developing nations are hesitant to reduce their consumption of greenhouse gases that
play an important role in the industrialization and economic growth of their countries. All while
the developed nations attempt to persuade the developing countries into sacrificing carbon
consumption to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Location, colonial history, current economic
conditions, natural resources, and military security all factor in to the varied interests of nations.
Establishing environmental criminal law and the appropriate mechanisms will receive its
fair share of discord and discontent from certain parties around the world. This dissertation
proposes alternative methods of increasing the viability of an eventual comprehensive scheme.
This system should eventually prosecute and sentence violators of international law within the
environmental spectrum.
A. Promoting Regional Cooperation Towards a Unified World Order

Since the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 after World War I, the
international community has viewed international government organs as a mechanism to solve
difficult problems that are unmanageable on the domestic level. The United Nations, the
successor entity to the League of Nations, was established after World War II in an effort to
decrease the probability of War and increase the dialogue between countries. The U.N. has
served as a global government, but it lacks true enforcement power among member states. There
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are numerous procedural road blocks that disallow democratic policies by bind signatory states,
mainly the veto powers of the U.N. Security Council.
This inability to act during difficult situations is best exemplified during the genocides of
Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur in 2004. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered an emotional
and persuasive speech to the United Nations regarding Darfur on September 9, 2004.651
Unfortunately, the U.N. Security Council and the Secretariat failed to apply the term genocide to
the massacres occurring in Sudan. 652 This eerily resembles the stance of the United Nations
during the horrific acts in Rwanda that led to the massacre of at least 500,000 people. In both
situations, the U.N. failed to protect innocent people by remaining silent in the midst of an
international crisis.
The factors behind this delayed response stems from the inability of the U.N. Security
Council to handle matters of pressing concerns in the immediate. This exemplifies a fundamental
failure of global governance in contemporary international politics. Other instances of conflict
and disagreement can be seen within the U.N. in more recent years. International outcry for
sanctions and intervention against Kim Jong Un of North Korea and Bashar Al-Assad of Syria
meet resistance from China and Russia on the security council. It is generally known that
members of the U.N. Security Council will vote in favor of their private interests above those of
the international community.
In light of these conflicting interests in our premier international body, the United
Nations, implementation of environmental criminal law must be pushed from separate angles.
Rather than attempting a full international adoption of an aggressive system designed to
investigate, prosecute, and reduce this types of crime, smaller attempts at local regional
governments should be explored. We can take note from the historical legislation designed to
combat human trafficking. The issue of women and children being trafficked became a part of a
growing social reform movement in the U.S. and Europe during the late 19th century. After
numerous international agreements in light of these movements, an international conference on
White Slave Traffic ratified earlier treaties from 1901 and 1904.653 The agreements created a
foundation for international bodies and domestic governments to protect against human
trafficking.
This leads us to the presumption that grass roots movements touching on different
regions of the world can eventually lead to international recognition and adoption of
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comprehensive legislation. In addition to the supranational union, the E.U., there are numerous
regional unions, governments and alliances that can be lobbied to enact reforms implementing
environmental penal law. These entities are the African Union (AU), Arab League, Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Caribbean Community (Caricom), Central American
Integration System (SICA), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Commonwealth of
Nations, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG), Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEc), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Turkic Council (Turkon), Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR) and the Union State.
A good place to begin would be in the African Union. On January 30, 2007, the A.U. was
established to promote democratic principles and institutions within the continent of Africa.654
With its own charter, the A.U. has worked tirelessly to deincentivize parties within Africa from
participating in military coups.655 Similar to the ICC, the A.U. has proposed the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to be a regional tribunal in Africa.656 This court would
“create the world’s first combined state-level and individual-level criminal accountability
mechanism for human rights violations on an international scale.”657
The A.U. along with its proposed court brings a new dimension to the promotion of
environmental criminal law. The ability for more local international governments to prosecute
crimes allows environmental activists and academics the ability to achieve smaller victories for
the greater good. Like other international movements, every large body of law protecting human
rights had their start at an incident or local level. Eventually, the world catches on and large
international frameworks are created to protect human rights and liberties. With a push on
regional governments to include a criminal law regime to prosecute and bring environmental
polluters to justice, the world may one day accept the need to institutionalize a global mechanism
to do the same.
B. Model of Harmonization

There have been occasions throughout the history of international cooperation that
international laws and regulations have been implemented by numerous agencies with unified
success. As we seek to find ways for an international regime to assist in the application of
international criminal law, it is important to branch out to other areas of developing law. One of
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these examples stems from the banking industry that received a jolt of international attention
after multiple bank failures in the 1970s and 80s. During this period, the world became well
aware of the effects of bank failures and the danger of the domino effect regardless of national
boundaries.658
In light of these bank failures, the international community has sought to create the
minimum level of capital requirements that banks were mandated to hold in order to protect
against further failures.659 The Basel Committee, an international body that provides a forum for
cooperation on bank supervisory matters, agreed to look into the matter of under capitalization in
1982. A year later, the Congress of the U.S. expressed its own concern with the passage of the
International Lending and Supervision Act that mandated U.S. bank regulators to cooperate with
foreign counterparts, insuring proper bank capitalization.660
The main elements that propel the adoption and concord between the involved
international actors stem from two origins. First, there must exist an issue that the international
community as a whole has given attention too, in a public and formal way. Second, domestic
governments must implement and support the recommendations and attitudes of the community
of nations. Coupled with both of these elements, domestic enforcement can be achieved even for
the most complicated international issues.
With international environmental criminal law, efforts must be focused on tackling these
issues with both prongs. To begin however, an international agreement must be reached that
shows public concern and focus that the environment deserves. As proposed in the earlier
models, the adoption or resolution of any of these examples can provide for the fundamental
ground work to progress international environmental criminal law. With the establishment of the
foundation needed to move forward, the second phase must revolve around the domestic
legislators of the nations involved.

V.

INDIVIDUAL STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT IS INEFFECTIVE

Domestic laws have time and again shown that they are ineffective in policing crimes
against the environment. Nations continue to exploit their native lands in hope of prosperity.
Many countries, especially developing states, are the unfortunate dumping grounds for First
World Nations as well as powerful corporations. Various interests groups take advantage of the
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naivety of the indigenous residents and their money hungry political officials. These criminal
syndicates continue to use the tactics of bribery to ensure corrupt officials allow them to use third
world countries as toxic waste dumping grounds. These are examples of wide spread problems
that individual nations cannot effectively protect against.661
Developing nations rely on strong companies to invest in their land and economy. These
corporations, armed with limitless financial assets, play a controlling role in the political and
economic development of nation states. This puts tremendous pressure on these developing
countries. In a global economy, a country who does not fall in line with corporate demands, risks
losing a substantial amount of economic benefit. This could in turn harm the security interests of
a specific country. Deregulation of law enforcement has also meant many problems for these
exploited countries. Many of these nations have implanted what is known as “free trade zones”
in which companies strategically placed themselves. This relocation allows corporate entities to
navigate any criminal or environmental regulations in place to their favor. Wherever these “freetrade zones” are established there is an enormous and long lasting environmental harm.
International law has yet to clearly state whether a corporation operating abroad can or should be
forced to follow the environmental laws of its home country. Until this question is decisively
answered transnational corporations will be allowed to continue their exploitation of these
countries.
Corruption also severely interferes with a nation’s ability to combat environmental
crimes. Corruption itself has been recognized as a global issue and over the years, international
covenants have been signed to combat it. This includes the OECD Convention of Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (ratified 1999), the
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ratified 2001), the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe (ratified 2002), and the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (ratified 2006).662 The largest of these was the Convention
Against Corruption signed under the banner of the United Nations by 150 nations. This
criminalized numerous conducts under the umbrella of corruption.
The laws to combat corruption have already been laid down. Strict enforcement is the
only element that is missing in creating a global community that lacks corrupt political systems.
The United States, United Kingdom, and Germany are the leading nations fighting corruption on
the global stage. 663 Germany has been second to the U.S. in the number of tried bribery cases,
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and third to both the U.K. and the U.S. in the cases charged.664 These three nations are optimal
examples of how the global community should tackle political corruption.
In light of current U.S. policies against corruption, coupled with its enforcement powers
backed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Security and Exchange Commission, and the
Department of Justice, corporations have adjusted their conduct to avoid illegal conduct.
Companies now implement comprehensive compliance control regimes to insure their
noninvolvement in corruption activities. This self-policing in the private sector is a boost to
enforcement interest of states attempting to reign in political bribery.
These three countries teach us that fighting corruption must be a priority of the nation
state. If done correctly, corporations will find that participating in corruption is against their
financial interest. Through a comprehensive penal system of fines, lost contracts, and public
relations efforts, company directors will seek to adjust practices to fall in line with domestic
regulations that take root from international law.
With economic growth comes numerous problems that are attached to environmental
damage. This clearly illuminates the need for an International Environmental Court and an
enforcement mechanism against corruption. The need is even more glaring in light of the interconnectedness of the global economy in the 21st century.

VI.

International Environmental Supreme Court

This dissertation proposes a key method in creating uniformity and an adjudication
process that is effective for the international community. An International Environmental
Supreme Court (IESC), would be a supreme body that would be a court of last resort. The
following diagram charts how a such a court could established within a legal hierarchy:
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To implement this system, traditional notions of jurisdiction and sovereignty would have
to be addressed. All nations place their own courts of last resort as the supreme body of
jurisprudence that is responsible for dispensing ultimate justice within territorial boundaries.
However, these courts are limited in scope and adjudicate matters not based on international
interests, but those set out by citizens from their own country. Therefore, single courts charged
with dispensing justice on the environment, a category that affects all nations, only issues orders
and opinions in line with national interests and doctrine.
This proposal does not call for an ultimate international court that would be a court of last
resort for all matters. It only seeks to establish a system of international adjudication in matters
involving the environment. Its strict limits of subject matter would allow nations to be friendlier
to the idea of a higher bodied court superseding domestic institutions.
The referral system can be based in two proposed ways. First is through a referral from
the United Nations Security Council. In this instance, for criminal matters, a prosecutor would be
assigned from a neutral nation to bring a complaint against the violators. Through an
international grand jury of sorts, a diverse panel would determine if such a complaint is well
founded through the presentation of evidence. If so, an indictment would be issued and either a
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summons or a warrant for arrest. The arrest warrant could be executed by signatory states that
are willing to participate in the court’s application.
Matters adjudicated within domestic court systems face a different form of referral. Here,
the Supreme Court of the United States for example can adjudicate a matter and issue an order
granting or denying a petitioner’s application. In instances where the court feels unable to
comfortably exercise its jurisdiction, for example when multinational corporations begin putting
political pressure on domestic judges, it may formally refer the matter to the IESC. This would
have allowed Ecuador to refer the Texaco-Chevron matter to the IESC in light of corporate
corruption tactics. Once the IESC has heard the matter, it can issue order upon which domestic
states would be bound by international law.
For the IESC to remain effective, it should also have the ability to exercise jurisdiction
over matters that are being heard in domestic courts; when those cases are being improperly
handled by the courts. At any time during proceedings, a petition can be lodged to the IESC by
parties who are engaged in litigation. The grant of certiorari would be determined after a fact
finding hearing in which the moving party would have the burden of showing impropriety of the
domestic tribunal. Once established, the IESC would exercise jurisdiction and move the case into
its court.
Within many nations, lawyers and judges themselves are disciplined and managed by
their court of last resort, or another judicial body. The IESC should be granted some form of
review for attorney and judge statuses when it is shown that impropriety has been alleged. This
would require an additional surrender of sovereignty on the part of the nations as the IESC would
govern lawyers in a limited manner. This type of authority could proceed in the form of
sanctions, forbidding travel or seizing assets for those attorneys and judges who are culpable in
corruption or environmental destructions schemes.
The IESC would also be armed with special knowledge cultivated through its
specialization. Marshalling international experts in the field of environmental study, the Court
can implement studies and rely on crucial findings to assist in its decision making process. It
could also provide these experts on request to nations who require scientific or technical
consultation. This will also assist in the competency of the court to hear these matters. Given the
delicate nature of sovereignty issues, integrity and competency in a judicial body is paramount
for participants to agree and follow court order.
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The ICC serves a solid example for the proposed international structure of the IESC. The
IESC should consist of three chambers, pretrial, trial, and appeal. Each division receives eight
judges from signatory states. The office of the Prosecutor would also be attached to the
institution to bring action against parties who violate international law protecting the
environment. In addition, the common law of both the United States and the European Union
serve as sufficient legal back drop to begin issuing opinions. Although the judges themselves
will decide the area of law that they find influential, these common law areas are established on
fundamental rights such as privacy, liberty, and property. Using the ICC as an example, and the
environment as its guiding principle, the IESC can do much to change the way criminals are
prosecuted on the international scale.

VII.

The Need for a Global Union

The growth of an increasingly global marketplace coupled with a growing concern for
environmental protection has resulted in a complex scheme of regulations and treaties.
Corporations are now capable wielding tremendous power around the world, and their actions
continue to produce criminal consequences for the environment. Furthermore, environmental
harm is transboundary in nature and must be regulated by a global court. It is this reality that
urges the need for a Global Union.
Within the past decade, new efforts to put enforcement powers into international
agreements have been initiated by creating new supranational enforcement authorities. What is
unique about the E.U. is that it already has very well developed institutional authorities to make
its members comply with adopted standards. European governments have learned how to work
through such structures, and their citizens have become accustomed to obeying international law.
Thus, the European Union can be a persistent force for tugging other states towards following the
European example; an example that teaches countries how to hand over bits of their sovereignty
to a supranational institution in order to combat transborder issues. This is the best mechanism
available for a comprehensive protection scheme for the environment.
There are several attractive aspects of the European Union that serve as a model for a
Global Union. Effective judicial protection of the environment is necessary to combat
environmental crimes. Within Europe, a central judiciary is able to prosecute and adjudicate
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cases that would otherwise not be pursued on a domestic level. This should be one component of
an international body that governs environmental protection across the world.
It is important to note the differences between the charter of the United Nations and a
possible constitution of the Global Union. The charter of the U.N. was not designed to be a
constitution, but rather an affirmation and commitment to certain beliefs. As stated in the
preamble of the charter, its purpose is to solidify the principles of peace, human rights, social
progress, and freedom. Furthermore, the charter is not the supreme law for which all signatory
states are bound to. In domestic constitutional governments, the constitution serves as the source
of all law, and a guiding force in common law.665 In comparison to this type of legal system, the
U.N. Charter was created after the acceptance of many other sources of international law,
“including fundamental elements of international law such as the Genocide Convention which
requires its signatories to prevent, stop, and punish genocide….”666 For a new Global Union, a
charter would be inappropriate as it would not create the legal system needed to combat issues
like environmental criminal conduct.
To establish this Global Government, member states would draft and approve a
Constitution with a judiciary, an enforcement mechanism, and representative form of legislative
development. Its principles should be based on the inherent values of human rights and
environmental protection, similar to the principles laid out in the U.N. Charter. The fundamental
rights listed in the Constitution should, without modification in substance, become legally
binding on all signatory states as an integral part of the Constitution. The purpose of this is to
create a new legal system that uses this constitution as the supreme law of the global community.
Rather than using separate domestic systems and laws to settle international issues, one common
legal scheme, with grand humanist principles, can be utilized to push an enlightened agenda of
progress.
A unified effort from all nations is required to take the appropriate steps to secure our
environment. The models vary and the methods to implement change are challenging. Individual
nations on their own cannot achieve what requires a global community to accomplish. With
academic recommendations, and in depth analysis of current systems, we can build a better
world by building a better supranational government.
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